THE DEFENSE DEBATE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Spring 1988 *$5.95 a copy*

Zbigniew Brzezinski
America's New Geostrategy

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Lessons of the INF Treaty *Lynn E. Davis*
Defending Post-INF Europe
Jeffrey Record and *David B. Rivkin, Jr.*
The Kremlin and SDI
Benjamin Lambeth and *Kevin Lewis*

Toward Peace in the Holy Land *Walid Khalidi*
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The Dollar and the Defense of the West
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
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INTRODUCTION

This is the season of political debate. While a few foreign policy differences have opened between the two parties—for example, on deployment of a strategic defensive system—the debates so far have revolved around personalities more than policies. They have been surprisingly devoid of serious substance. Even the Senate hearings on the INF treaty, which could have provoked a major controversy, have to be called tame. Sharper divisions will presumably appear once the final candidates are chosen.

Meanwhile, a concern over foreign policy that has captured the public mind is being articulated outside the arena of presidential politics, among scholars, commentators and officials looking back on their former responsibilities. There is one general conclusion: with President Reagan's departure, his particular approach to foreign affairs has clearly run its course, no matter who succeeds him. "The day of the messianic foreign policy . . . is coming to an end, for a while at least" is the way Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., put it in our Winter issue.

What can be said now of the post-Reagan period? For a start, the next several years will be dominated by the legacy of the huge budget deficits and trade imbalances accumulated during the Reagan presidency. We have become badly overextended.

"Our aims may exceed our resources," Senator Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, concluded in this journal. Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard elaborated on the theme: America's foreign policy is no longer in balance, he argued in our America and the World 1987/88 issue; a "gap" has developed between our commitments and our capabilities. Consequently, we have to repair our economic position if we are to restore our strategic balance. The question, in short, is whether, and how, the United States can maintain its security commitments and defend its interests in a time of severely constrained economic resources.

Some observers go further and wonder if the problem is solely one of economics. In his widely noted new book analyzing the historical rise and fall of great powers, Professor Paul Kennedy of Yale suggests that the United States suffers not merely from an imbalance but from the same "imperial overstretch" that afflicted the empires of the past: the United States is vulnerable, unless it adjusts, to the fate of its great power

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predecessors over the past 500 years. The unusual popularity of his hefty volume is testimony that the issue of American decline is striking a sensitive nerve. It will inevitably be in the background of the political debate in the presidential contest. And the related issues of constancy and competence in our global role, as well as of economic capacity, will clearly be on the agenda of the next chief executive when he takes office.

Restoring a balance is possible for a statesman; if the issue runs deeper and the United States does indeed confront a period of historical decline, the problem becomes one of an entirely new magnitude.

Two of our authors in this issue contest the implications of Spenglerian pessimism about America's future. Zbigniew Brzezinski asserts that "rumors of America's imminent imperial decline are somewhat premature." Walt W. Rostow, in reviewing Kennedy's book, raises doubts about the applicability of the historical model to the United States.

In any case, we cannot escape the immediate issues: how will we maintain our national defense in an era of severely constrained budgets? Will our allies be prepared to assume a larger burden in what we believe to be the common effort? How do we conduct East-West diplomacy in the strategic circumstances so altered by the INF treaty and the incipient Reagan-Gorbachev détente? The articles that follow offer some tentative answers.

There seems to be a consensus that the status quo cannot be maintained. The debate is over the nature of the changes required: to stay within the mainstream of policy or seek more radical alternatives to confront the demands of a new era, such as major troop withdrawals from Europe. Brzezinski makes the case for a new geostrategic vision, including an increased assumption by Western Europe of the costs of its defense and a stronger, more cooperative partnership with Japan. Increased burden-sharing is also the theme of the article by David Calleo, Harold van B. Cleveland and Leonard Silk, who describe the geopolitical causes and impact of the budget deficit and the weak dollar.

But the effort to shift the burden of European defense costs is an issue still open to analysis and debate, and is complicated by the potential consequences of the INF treaty and the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from Europe. The lowering of the nuclear threshold would seem to argue for an increased effort to strengthen NATO's conventional defenses,

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rather than an American withdrawal. On the other hand, the economic pressures on the United States point toward a reduction in the American contribution to the alliance. In his farewell appearance at NATO, in early March, President Reagan sought to reassure the allies about the American commitments; he received strong support for another arms treaty with the Soviet Union on longer-range strategic weapons. But the overall atmosphere was one of apprehension about the direction of a matured alliance in the 1990s.

European security and arms control issues are addressed by Lynn E. Davis, the former deputy director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. She believes that, despite the current "unease" in Europe, the INF treaty accomplished the West's objectives and that, accordingly, further steps in arms control can be taken if lessons drawn from the INF negotiations are taken into account. Two other defense experts, Jeffrey Record and David Rivkin, see major problems for the alliance in adjusting to the post-INF circumstances. They doubt a Soviet interest in accommodating Western terms for a mutual reduction in conventional defense forces, despite General Secretary Gorbachev's new rhetoric.

Skepticism about Gorbachev's basic aims is the starting point for former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's comprehensive review of the arms control record and the consequences for the future. He strongly urges that the focus of arms control remain on genuine reductions in weapons. But while pursuing this course, he argues, the West must maintain its strong commitment to defense, and the next administration must resist the major cuts being proposed in Congress.

Thus the post-Reagan agenda for American foreign policy is beginning to emerge. Some of the questions covered in this issue of *Foreign Affairs* have a familiar ring—NATO, China, Israel and the Arabs, the United Nations, Indochina. But in confronting them in the years ahead, the United States will have to operate under drastically altered economic and geopolitical conditions.

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Zbigniew Brzezinski

AMERICA'S NEW GEOSTRATEGY

The rumors of America's imminent imperial decline are somewhat premature. They are, however, quite fashionable. Particularly within some intellectual circles a decided preference has taken hold for Spenglerian handwringing, which barely conceals a measure of schadenfreude over the anticipated end of the imperial phase in the history of this somewhat crass, materialistic, chaotic, libertarian and vaguely religious mass democracy. America's assumption of the imperial role after World War II—with U.S. power and influence projected around the world—was never popular either within America's intellectual class or more recently within its mass media. Hence the anticipatory gloating over the allegedly inevitable demise of the world's current number-one power.

To debate the accuracy of such a prognosis may be futile. The future is inherently full of discontinuities, and lessons of the past must be applied with enormous caution. Some recent scholarly studies have attempted to do so in a searching and comprehensive fashion, and without the dogmatic assumption of any kind of inevitability. This has greatly helped to raise the level of thoughtful discussion. From the political point of view, moreover, there is even some genuine benefit to be derived from the fact that doubts have been raised regarding America's future. Posing the issue so starkly focuses attention on the definition of the actions needed to maintain a constructive American world role, the essentials of American security, the core American interests, and the effects on the foregoing of the inexorable geopolitical and technological changes.

In other words, the intellectual debate over a possibly inevitable decline can become a political deliberation on how to avoid it, how to reinvigorate America's global power and how to redefine it in the context of a changing world. That can be the objectively positive result of posing the issue. Accordingly,

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the task of responsible statesmanship is to define more precisely the policy implications of the geopolitical and technological changes for the U.S. relationship with the world over the remaining years of this millennium, bearing in mind that such changes are significantly altering the setting within which U.S. interests and national security must be protected. Out of such an examination one can derive better guidance regarding the very character of America's world role in the years ahead.

In any such analysis three clusters of issues are central, namely: (1) strategic doctrine, which bears on how the United States can best promote its national security; (2) geopolitical imperatives, which determine the central foci of American regional involvements; and (3) the U.S. global role, which pertains to the manner in which America should wield its worldwide influence.

Over the last forty years the United States has relied heavily, indeed, predominantly, on nuclear deterrence to check much-feared Soviet expansion, particularly in central Europe. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, when it in effect possessed a monopoly on the capability to deliver nuclear weapons at intercontinental range, the United States went so far as to postulate the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation as a response to even conventional Soviet aggression. But as Soviet strategic capabilities grew, adjustments in doctrine became necessary. By the 1960s U.S. strategic doctrine was embracing the concept of flexible response to a Soviet military challenge, though it still lacked to a considerable extent the targeting capabilities and the weapons needed for sustaining such a strategy.

The increased vulnerability of American society to a Soviet strategic attack, however, gave rise to the publicly compelling view that the condition of mutual assured destruction (known as MAD) had now become the basis for reciprocal deterrence. The resulting strategic dilemma was that this transformed deterrence into an essentially apocalyptic threat to commit suicide, a threat that could be credible only to deter a similarly suicidal attack by the enemy. Short of that extreme eventuality, U.S. strategic policy started to lose its credibility in deterring less than a total attack—while concurrent technological refinements have at the same time given rise to altogether novel opportunities for far more selective and strictly military uses of nuclear weaponry. A doctrinal readjustment, with significant

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force posture implications, was thus becoming due in order to close the consequent deterrence gap.

Over the last four decades, U.S. geopolitical imperatives have been largely preoccupied with the defense of both the far western and the far eastern extremities of the Eurasian continent against Soviet political and military domination. With the recovery of both Western Europe and Japan, which enhanced their capacity for more effective self-defense, and with the felicitous consolidation of a new, stabilizing relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China, Americans have come to see the Soviet threat as less ominous. At the same time, American geopolitical concerns are being refocused on other critical regions, heretofore not major sources of U.S. security or political concerns.

The American global role has also been undergoing a profound transmutation. Throughout much of the last forty years, American political leadership has rested on a solid base of economic and military preeminence, and much of the motivation for the exercise of that primacy stemmed from a concern that the Soviet Union was seeking to dethrone and to replace the United States in the exercise of that special role. Today, the economic basis of American primacy is clearly much weaker and is likely to become weaker still in relation to the growth of other economic centers. At the same time, however, the Soviet Union has clearly failed as an economic rival. It has been revealed to be at best a one-dimensional power, a challenger in the military realm alone but not a serious rival socially, economically or ideologically. In other words, the Soviet Union poses a threat to American security and geopolitical interests, but does not represent a challenge to American global primacy as such.

Thus on the strategic, geopolitical and global levels the need exists for significant adjustments in the way the United States participates in the global political process and promotes its fundamental national interests. Let us examine the policy implications that follow in each of the above three broad clusters.

II

In strategic doctrine, the United States needs to shift away from its long-standing preoccupation with the threat of a nuclear war between the superpowers or a massive Soviet conventional attack in central Europe. Neither danger can be dismissed as impossible, but a central nuclear war is not likely

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to be initiated deliberately; America certainly has the means to maintain a military posture that precludes any rational Soviet decision-making process from reaching a suicidally erroneous conclusion. Much the same can be said about the possibility of a massive conventional Soviet attack on Western Europe, given not only the complexities of calculating intelligently the real battle trade-offs between existing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces but also the high risk of nuclear escalation.

It must be hastily added that the reassessment of the level of the threat does not imply in the least any decline in the U.S. interest in the security of Western Europe or any significant U.S. disengagement from the defense of Europe. Indeed, the specific adjustments in strategic doctrine and in force posture that are proposed below focus on the central goal of reinforcing the overall credibility of the American strategic and conventional deterrent, of which Western Europe and also Japan are the principal beneficiaries.

To enhance deterrence in the current and foreseeable conditions, a doctrine and a force posture are needed that will enable the United States to respond more selectively to a large number of possible security threats, ranging from the strategic to the conventional.[1] On the strategic level it must be recognized that technological changes have wrought a revolution in the way nuclear weapons may be used in the future. They are no longer just crude instruments for inflicting massive societal devastation but can be used with precision for more specific military missions, with relatively limited collateral societal damage. The increased versatility of nuclear weapons is the consequence of the interaction between smaller warheads and highly accurate delivery systems. The result is that nuclear weapons are no longer primarily blunt instruments of deterrence but can also serve as potentially decisive instruments of discriminating violence.

As a result, in the future the United States should rely to a greater extent on a more flexible mix of nuclear and even nonnuclear strategic forces capable of executing more selective military missions. The central purpose of the strategy of discriminate deterrence is to heighten the credibility of American threats to respond to aggression by increasing the spectrum of

[1] For more on these recommendations see *Discriminate Deterrence*, Report of The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter, co-chairmen, Washington: G.P.O., January 1988.

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effective responses to such aggression, short of the inherently improbable option of simply committing national suicide. More specifically, this calls for greater reliance on highly accurate but less destructive long-range strategic weaponry, including procurement of the now-feasible non-nuclear strategic weapons. In addition, in order to deny to the potential aggressor the temptation of preemptively destroying U.S. strategic forces, it is also recommended that U.S. strategic forces be based on a prudent mix of both offensive and defensive systems, thus assimilating into U.S. force posture some initial elements of the much-debated Strategic Defense Initiative, marking an important break with the notions of MAD.

Space control is likely to become tantamount to earth control. There are striking parallels between the role of the navy in the emergence of American global power and today's incipient competition for a dominant position in space. The earlier competition among the Great Powers for maritime primacy involved rivalry for effective control over strategic space between the key continents. Control over such space was central to territorial preponderance. That is why the United States, in the phase of its geostrategic expansion, placed such an emphasis on the acquisition of dominant Atlantic and Pacific fleets, linked through direct U.S. control over the Panama Canal.

Today the equivalent of that naval rivalry is the competition in space. At the very minimum it must be the U.S. strategic objective to make certain that no hostile power can deny the United States, while retaining for itself, the means for using space for intelligence, early warning, reconnaissance, targeting, and command and control. Modern military operations are highly dependent on space assets performing these functions, and U.S. vulnerability in this area could be crippling. Thus, even short of seeking to exploit space control for offensive purposes against an enemy (e.g., by the use of weaponry deployed in space), the capacity to protect its nonlethal military space assets, or to inflict a denial of the use of space to the enemy, has become essential to an effective U.S. military posture.

On the conventional level similarly important adjustments are becoming necessary. The most probable threat stems from what are called low-intensity conflicts in areas where American forces are not permanently deployed. Thus, the United States must place less emphasis on prepositioned heavy forces in foreign bases and more on lighter forces, supported by en-

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hanced air- and sea-lift capabilities, poised for a prompt long-distance response. This would reduce the risk that in a crisis (such as during the 1973 Middle East war or the U.S. air raid in Libya in 1986) the freedom to use American forces stationed abroad would be restricted by political inhibitions on the part of U.S. allies.

More generally, the United States in the years ahead must take advantage of its enormous capacity for technological innovation to enhance its military flexibility. Over the last several decades the United States has gradually become a military Gulliver, enormously powerful yet clumsy and inert. Technology is certainly not a "silver bullet" for solving a variety of deficiencies. Neither is it a substitute for well-trained and motivated manpower. But it does provide the basis for effective and rapid coordination, for precision in operations, for enhanced intelligence and for prompt concentration of destructive power. America is almost uniquely equipped to exploit these technological capabilities.

These adjustments in our military strategy and posture will have to be pursued in the context of unavoidable budgetary restraint. It follows, therefore, that some standing priorities will have to be revised. It also follows from the foregoing analysis that the targets for budgetary reallocation will have to fall within three broad categories: less emphasis on offensive central strategic nuclear weapons; less concentration on the funding of new major systems for the individual branches of the armed services and more on technological force-multipliers for existing weaponry; and a reallocation of expenditures and heavy forces away from Europe-oriented missions toward greater flexibility and longer-range mobility in conventional responses to conflicts in regions where no U.S. forces are prepositioned.

The underlying purpose of these adjustments will be to sustain a strategy of more selective commitment and more flexible capacity for action. The era of the big stick is over, but the reality of violence in international affairs is still with us. Under these circumstances, while retaining a residual capacity for an all-out nuclear war to avoid being blackmailed by its threat, U.S. military power must be designed for more limited, prompt and even preemptive actions in areas clearly defined not only as vital but also as not capable of adequate self-defense. In brief, instead of planning to be able to fight two-and-a-half major wars (as not long ago was the case), the United States

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must be ready to deter one major war by having the means to fight it while also being able to respond effectively to more varied but less apocalyptic security threats.

III

These needed strategic adjustments go hand in hand with changing U.S. geopolitical imperatives. In the years ahead, three regions other than the far western and far eastern extremities of Eurasia are likely to become the central foci of American concerns. For much of the cold war the major U.S. fear was the possible Soviet domination of Western Europe. It now appears likely, however, that in Europe for the next decade the Soviet Union will be increasingly on the defensive ideologically and politically. The internal communist threat to Western Europe has passed, while the vitality of Western Europe's development stands in sharp contrast to the stagnation to the east. Western Europe's economic and political recovery represents a monumental success for America's postwar policy.

The next phase should therefore involve an increased assumption by Western Europe of the costs of its defense. The U.S. commitment to Europe's security is sacrosanct, but there is nothing sacrosanct about the level of U.S. military manpower in Europe or the proportion of the U.S. defense budget dedicated to Europe's security. Since Europe can and should do more for its defense, and since the United States has to make more of a defense effort elsewhere but cannot afford to do so, it follows that a gradual but significant readjustment in burden-sharing is necessary and will occur.

In the meantime, Eastern Europe is rapidly emerging as Europe's region of potentially explosive instability, with five countries already in a classic prerevolutionary situation. Economic failure and political unrest are becoming the dominant characteristics of life in Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and in non-Soviet-dominated but geopolitically important Yugoslavia. In any one, or even in several at once, a spark could set off a major explosion, given the intensity of popular dissatisfaction. Indeed, there are suggestive parallels between the current state of affairs in the region and the historic Spring of Nations of 1848.

Given the volatile state of the *perestroika* (restructuring) program in the Soviet Union itself, it is even conceivable that the systemic crisis of Eastern Europe will become a more general crisis of communism itself. Unrest has already surfaced

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in the Soviet-occupied Baltic republics, in western Ukraine, in Central Asia and elsewhere. Moreover, it could become more acute if current Soviet reform initiatives do not yield positive and tangible results but instead prompt, as is in fact likely, major economic dislocations, higher food prices, inflation and even large-scale unemployment.

In that context, a major eruption in Eastern Europe would almost certainly precipitate not only a Soviet intervention but the end of the *perestroika* itself. What could happen, therefore, is a matter of some importance to the West as a whole. It is not clear that the West has given sufficient thought to the longer-range implications of East European unrest. Gradual change in the region is certainly desirable, especially change involving the progressive self-emancipation of peoples who have long desired to be part of a larger Europe free of Soviet domination. But a large-scale explosion could have tragic consequences, not only for the region itself but also for East-West relations, by prompting a lasting revival of the most negative attributes of the Soviet system.

As a result the United States and its European allies should focus actively on an effort to forge a more stable relationship with Eastern Europe. A more coordinated Western policy of political and economic engagement should be designed to facilitate the evolutionary dismantling of the Stalinist relics in the region. But such a strategic approach is strikingly absent. Failure to develop one could confront the United States, and its allies, with explosive and eventually very dangerous circumstances.

The region's renewed geopolitical salience is likely to be maximized by growing speculation regarding Germany's future orientation. Already today in Paris and even in London the topic of concerned conversations is focused as much on the future of Germany as on the future of *perestroika* or the likely outcome of the American elections. Some of this may be dismissed as an outdated obsession with "the German question." But some of it does reflect an intelligent appreciation of the German angst over the country's unnatural division and of the traditional German yearning for a grand deal with Moscow.

Any major alteration in the German-Russian relationship would parallel in its geopolitical consequences the earlier American-Chinese accord that so shook the world and so gripped the Russians with the fear of strategic encirclement. It is, therefore, likely to be tempting to Soviet strategists. Moreover,

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it can only make Soviet economic planners salivate, for in one stroke a new German-Russian relationship would help to resolve the Soviet cravings for both investment and technological innovation.

Fortunately, however, the scope of any potential Soviet initiative toward Germany is constrained by the scope of the East European systemic crisis. In the present circumstances, releasing East Germany—as the price of seducing West Germany—would deprive the Soviet Union of its key bastion for the exercise of effective Soviet military and political control over Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. A neutralized Germany on the edge of an economically stagnant but politically restless Eastern Europe would be disruptive not only for NATO but for the Warsaw Pact as well.

In any case, because of the region's centrality to East-West relations, Eastern Europe is now likely to become increasingly an object of international anxiety and thus of America's concern. Its economic problems are so deep-rooted, its political structures so weak and its geopolitical moorings so shallow that for the next decade at least the region's problems are likely to be high on the statesman's agenda.

The second major regional focus of American concern will continue to be the Persian Gulf/Middle Eastern area. America's deep involvement in the problems of this part of the world stems from two major developments over the last two decades. One involved the emergence since about the mid-1960s of a tight American-Israeli connection; the second involved the gradual replacement "east of Suez" of Great Britain by the United States. The first has been, by and large, the product of domestic impulses in the United States itself, spurred on by very successful lobbying of Congress on behalf of Israel. The second was the result of the need to fill the geopolitical vacuum left by Britain and by the collapse of its U.S.-sponsored would-be regional successor, Iran.

The consequence was that the region's troubles have become America's burden: America is to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating the Persian Gulf region and also to preserve Israel's security. There is no reason to believe that in the years ahead these obligations will recede, and there is much cause to expect continued or even intensified conflicts in the area as a whole. Protection, mediation and deterrence will remain predominantly American responsibilities.

The Carter Doctrine, deliberately drafted to echo the words

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of the Truman Doctrine, was subsequently reiterated by President Reagan. It represents an unequivocal commitment to respond, in whatever fashion necessary, to any Soviet effort to gain a geopolitical presence in the Gulf. That Soviet goal, expressly confirmed by Stalin to Hitler in 1940 and implicitly by Brezhnev's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, can only be denied if America possesses the forces for rapid counterintervention. Only this capability would pose the prospect for Moscow of a direct American-Soviet collision. And U.S. ability to exploit this capability in turn depends on at least a minimal political relationship between the United States and the two geopolitically key barriers to Soviet expansion, Pakistan and Iran.

The creation of the Rapid Deployment Force was meant to meet the first need, and its further expansion has already been justified in the preceding discussion of changes in strategic doctrine. The second requirement was met in part by the extensive American-Pakistani collaboration that developed in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is important to register here the proposition that this collaboration should continue even if the Soviet forces are eventually withdrawn from Afghanistan. At that stage, the inclination is likely to arise, especially in the Congress, for a contraction of some aspects of the American-Pakistani relationship, particularly as some of the more contentious but lately repressed issues resurface (such as the Pakistani nuclear program or the question of internal democracy). In addition, there will be the temptation to sacrifice some aspects of the U.S.-Pakistani connection for the sake of a better relationship with India. Yet it is important not to lose sight of the simple fact that an isolated and hence weakened Pakistan could yield the Soviets geopolitical benefits that Soviet arms have not been able to gain in Afghanistan.

Equally important to the stability of the region, and to key U.S. interests, is the independence and territorial integrity of Iran. For the time being, and probably not until the Iranian-Iraqi war wanes or Ayatollah Khomeini dies, American-Iranian relations will remain antagonistic. But in the longer run some reconstitution of a more normal relationship is in the interest of both countries and thus is likely to take place. For most Iranians, current sloganeering to the contrary, the truly threatening "Satan" is the one to the north and immediately contiguous to Iranian territory. All Iranians know that over the last century and a half the principal hostile designs on their

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soil and independence have originated from Russia. Rhetorical fanaticism does not obliterate historical memory.

Under these circumstances, some eventual accommodation is likely and will carry opportunities for renewed economic American-Iranian cooperation and perhaps even some military connection. The latter will depend on how the Iranians perceive future Soviet policy and also on the nature of Iranian-Arab relations after Khomeini. One of the major tasks of American diplomacy in this area will be to seek to relieve some of the current antagonism, although the scope for any genuine regional accommodation will probably be quite limited for a long time to come. Much will depend on how long-lasting and dynamic the current wave of Islamic fundamentalism proves to be.

Until then, the more immediate task of the United States will be to make certain that the more moderate Arab states in the region are not destabilized. As events have already shown, this will require both active diplomacy and a significant military presence. There is no reason to believe that the need for either will significantly recede, and thus the American preoccupation with this region is likely to be prolonged, risky and costly.

Much the same can be said of the American involvement in the Israeli-Arab issue, given the incompatible views of the local parties on the Palestinian problem (the West Bank and Gaza) and regarding the Golan Heights. Even if the peace process is revived, it will require extremely absorbing and frustrating mediation. In brief, for America the prospect is a grim one: a continuing and seemingly endless involvement in a messy and dangerous conundrum of ethnic and geopolitical conflicts, in the realization that American disinvolvement from them would create even more dangerous consequences.

The foregoing two geopolitical concerns, as taxing as they are, may yet, and before too long, yield in priority to a third one much closer to home. Unless the United States can soon fashion a bipartisan and comprehensive response to the mushrooming Central American crisis, it is quite likely that in the years ahead the region will pose for the American public the most preoccupying challenge, diverting America from its other global concerns. Fashioning such a response may well become the most urgent foreign priority for the next president, especially since on the other critical strategic and geopolitical issues some ongoing strands of policy exist and some degree of national consensus supports them.

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The sad fact is that for the last 15 years the United States has been attempting to respond to the region's simultaneously nationalist and social revolution, and to the Soviet-communist exploitation of it, by partial measures and through proxies. It has sought solutions on the cheap. Though President Kennedy proclaimed the creation of a communist regime in Cuba to be an intolerable security threat to the United States, his response was to send three thousand Cuban patriots to solve America's problem—and then to abandon them promptly when the going got tough. Two decades later, another president, Ronald Reagan, similarly proclaimed the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime to represent a mortal threat to the United States. He turned to proxies for a resolution of the problem, with the U.S. Congress then abandoning them.

Neither response was worthy of a Great Power, especially when its vital interests were said to be involved. Kennedy failed to exploit the Soviet collapse of will during the subsequent Cuban missile crisis to insist on a neutralized status for Cuba. Reagan failed to define an equally legitimate U.S. goal regarding a neutralized status for Nicaragua. Both shrank from backing such limited objectives with U.S. national power. Instead, their reliance on proxies to achieve more ambitious goals for an otherwise passive America proved in the end to be self-defeating. In Nicaragua, moreover, the Congress failed to back military leverage with the needed economic development aid programs for the region, as recommended by the Kissinger Commission, with the result that the American capacity to use either positive or negative leverage became severely restricted.

It therefore appears altogether likely that in the years ahead political instability, and more assertively anti-U.S. nationalism, will surface more prominently also in other Central American countries. In Panama, instability will pose an immediate threat to a vital security installation. Moreover, just north of Central America and immediately south of the continental United States, Mexico has the makings of a political as well as economic crisis that could impinge most directly on America. Already Mexico's serious financial and demographic problems are increasingly becoming America's nightmares.

Inherent in this mushrooming crisis is an even larger danger: a direct, immediate impact on American society that could prompt a mood of panic and even isolationism. This is why the issue deserves a high priority, and this is also why the most recent conflict on the matter between the president and Con-

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gress was so destructive. The disturbing fact was that both sides adopted escapist stances, each avoiding a confrontation with bitter realities. The first chose indirect and evasive means to achieve a forced solution to a problem that went deeper than the presence of Soviet-backed communism. The second preferred to rely on wishful thinking regarding a solution to the real problem posed by the undeniable presence of a Soviet-communist regional challenge. The present political stalemate in Washington does not augur well for the emergence of the needed comprehensive regional strategy, one that combines attainable and legitimate goals with a determination to act effectively on both the geopolitical and the economic levels.

IV

America's capacity to cope on both the strategic and the geopolitical planes will depend ultimately on America's overall global position. The undeniable relative decline in American economic primacy, especially given the American-sponsored recovery of Western Europe and Japan, has already led some to suggest that the United States resembles Great Britain in the early twentieth century. Even more ominously, it is postulated that America is doomed to replicate the experience of other imperial powers, and that the painful process of degeneration is already under way.

It would be historical blindness to disregard warning signs based on past experience. Moreover, there is, alas, some justification for historical pessimism. It is, for example, disturbing to recall that in the initial phase of their decline the Roman, French and Ottoman empires were characterized by economic inflation and budgetary deficits, by a preoccupation with gold, by costly external (over)expansion, by domestic fatigue and political gridlock, by cultural hedonism and conspicuous materialistic self-gratification, and even by monumental architectural self-glorification. (The manner in which corporate and governmental America splurges on ostentatious monumentalism is strikingly reminiscent of the pompous architectural explosions in Paris, London and Vienna in their late imperial phases.)

But the differences between those circumstances and America's position today are equally important and are perhaps more suggestive of future trends. In almost all cases of imperial decline, economic attrition through war—leading to truly significant demographic depletion and eventually even to the

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collapse of the ruling political elite—was the major precipitating cause. This has not been the case with the United States. Even the recent massive expansion of defense spending did not raise its level above seven percent of the GNP. Though prompting for a while extensive social demoralization, the war in Vietnam did not cause massive casualties. In fact, the last several decades have seen a remarkable infusion of new and creative blood into the American social and political leadership previously dominated by the more traditional elite, notably first from the Jewish community and more lately through the remarkable attainments of first-generation Asian Americans. The dynamics of social renewal are still at work in America, with their impulses for creativity, innovation and sheer drive.

Even more important are two major external differences. The relative decline in American global economic preeminence occurred not in spite of America but because of America. It was the consequence of a deliberate and sustained American policy, pursued with strategic constancy over several decades. It was the American goal to further the recovery of Western Europe and Japan, and the current situation is the consequence of the successful attainment of that central goal.

To be sure, it can be argued that the above does not alter the fact of America's relative decline, and that it is the fact of decline that counts and not its origins or motivations. This is undeniably true. But it ignores an important aspect. The change in America's global economic position is neither the consequence of an antagonistic competition nor the result of a hostile rival for global primacy gradually attaining success in displacing America. Instead, it is the outcome of a cooperative policy initiated and sustained by the United States itself. That creates a rather different web of global relations.

Moreover, it leads directly to the other major and perhaps even more important difference. In the past the displacement of a dominant power usually led to the emergence of a replacement power, which then assumed the attributes of wide leadership. A decline and fall of one was part of a cycle involving also a rise and a peak by another. This time the United States does not have a rival that could be a successor. Western Europe simply will not become in the near future a united center of political power capable of filling America's global shoes. Japan's aspirations for military-political power are also modest. Thus, neither of the two principal economic beneficiaries of the

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progressive redistribution of global economic power is America's political rival for global primacy.

Neither is the Soviet Union—as this analysis has shown, it is a one-dimensional rival. It is a credible challenger in the military realm alone. But the price paid for that awesome military might is that as a result the Soviet Union is not competitive politically, ideologically, economically or socially. In fact, it is becoming even less of a rival in these domains, and that is the principal reason for the currently desperate efforts of the Soviet leadership at a *perestroika*.

Since it is unlikely that the Kremlin can greatly diminish its military exertions, it is quite probable that over the next two or three decades the Soviet Union will fade even further. As a result the global economic hierarchy by the year 2010 might be the following: first, the United States (with a GNP just under $8 trillion); second, the European Economic Community (with a similar or perhaps even larger GNP but lacking the attributes of a single political power); third, China (with a GNP of just under $4 trillion); fourth, Japan (with roughly the same GNP); and then only fifth in rank, the Soviet Union (with a GNP of just under $3 trillion).

The Soviet Union thus cannot replace the United States. The most it can do is displace it through the use of its military power, prompting a decisive geopolitical upheaval. But Moscow is simply incapable of becoming the world's financial center or the source of global economic manipulation. This has important implications. Given the fact that the international system cannot operate on the basis of goodwill and sheer spontaneity alone but needs some center of cooperative initiative, financial control and even political power, it follows that the only alternative to American leadership is global anarchy and international chaos. This would have the most destructive political and cultural consequences for those countries that are doing reasonably well in their socioeconomic development.

These considerations, in turn, underline the salience of the point made earlier: the relative decline in America's global primacy is in part the result of America's own policies and was effected cooperatively. This reality enhances the stake that other successful states will continue to have in an America that is able to exercise a constructive and cooperative global role. In effect, the fact that the only alternative to America is anarchy generates the vested interest that both Western Europe and

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Japan will continue to have in the preservation of some kind of a central American role.

Admittedly, that also implies major adjustments in both the style and substance of that role, as well as some significant efforts at revitalizing the American capacity to act. It is evident that in the years to come the United States will have to exercise its special world responsibilities by increasingly subtle, cooperative and even indirect means. The effective exercise of that role will depend on the cooperative stake of others in a reasonably controlled international environment. The analogy that readily comes to mind is not that of states intimidated by a global policeman but rather that of airliners cooperating with their air traffic controller.

That change has already been occurring, with the United States today sharing to a very considerable extent with West Germany and Japan the responsibility for international financial policy. The annual economic summit, despite its meager output in recent years, provides a further example of essentially indirect policy direction. In the military realm the required strategic changes will also enhance the role of the key European countries in NATO decision-making, with the American role becoming relatively less decisive. Consensual leadership, although still based on a central American role, is thus already becoming a fact.

The positive management of the East-West relationship is also likely to become a more collective affair. It is most improbable that a grand American-Soviet accommodation can take place. The interests of the two sides are simply too conflicting. The notion of a global U.S.-Soviet partnership for peace and development is even more illusory. More probable are partial accords on issues where the two sides do have reciprocal interests, in a setting of both continued geostrategic competition and some cooperation. In contrast our European friends, notably Germany, are likely to move further than the United States in exploring various forms of political and economic collaboration with Moscow.

Nonetheless, it is likely that in the foreseeable future the Soviet sphere will be preoccupied with a protracted systemic crisis, including major economic upheavals and perhaps even political unrest. Thus, the Soviet Union will remain internally too weak to become a partner for peace and externally too strong to be satisfied with the status quo. Under these conditions the East-West relationship will continue to represent the

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negative aspect of the global agenda—i.e., how to avoid growing tensions or conflicts—rather than its more positive, cooperative side.

The emergence in the meantime of a greater degree of pluralism in the West's decision-making is all to the good. It is also in keeping with long-standing American aspirations. But such consensual leadership still requires a vital, dynamic and powerful America. All concerned are aware that consensual leadership can otherwise easily degenerate into a gridlock. Thus even America's economic rivals have a fundamentally positive interest in America's economic health.

V

This is particularly true in the American-Japanese relationship. A greatly revitalized America can be nurtured by policies that exploit the special complementarity of American and Japanese interests, while also providing Japan with the safest route to continued growth. It is really quite striking how much the two countries' needs and interests match. The strengths of one compensate for the weaknesses of the other. Each needs the other; indeed, each is likely to falter without the other. Working together ever more closely, they can assure for themselves unrivaled global economic, financial and technological leadership, while reinforcing the protective umbrella of American global military power.

America needs Japanese capital to finance its industrial renovation and technological innovation; it needs Japanese cooperation in protecting its still significant global lead in creative R&D and in opening up new scientific frontiers for both peaceful and military uses; it needs Japanese participation in securing through enhanced economic development such geopolitically threatened yet vital areas as the Philippines, Pakistan, Egypt, Central America and Mexico. Japan needs American security protection for its homeland; it needs open access to the American market for its continued economic well-being and, through cooperation with America, secure access to a stable and expanding world market; it needs to maintain and even expand its collaborative participation in the vast American corporate and academic research facilities that are so central to Japan's continued innovation.

With Japanese investment in America growing, the Japanese stake in a healthy America will continue to grow. Japan for many years to come will be heavily dependent on American

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security protection, obtained by an American willingness to spend on defense a share of its GNP more than three times larger than Japan's; hence the Japanese stake in a globally engaged America will remain great. With America heavily indebted, the American stake in a productive and prosperous Japanese partner will also grow—but so will resentments over the trade imbalance and probably also over the increasing Japanese buyouts of American corporations and properties. Conflict between the two thus could grow even as the need for a joint partnership becomes more obvious.

While it is impossible to quantify the importance of the relationship to either of the two sides, over the last several years the American economic situation, given both the trade and the budget deficits, might have become untenable without the inflow from Japan of well over $100 billion. Even that rough figure does not account for the various other tangible and intangible benefits to America of the good political relationship that it has with the new economic giant across the Pacific. It is simply central to America's global geostrategic position.

For Japan, these incalculable considerations are even more important; indeed, they are quite literally a matter of life or death. Japan would simply not be—nor would it remain—what it is without the American connection. At the same time, on the narrow level of military expenditures, it can be roughly estimated that without American protection Japan would probably have to spend on its defense some additional $50 billion a year in order to feel truly secure (while at the same time alienating and frightening by such expenditures many of its neighbors).

It is important to restate these verities, for there is the possibility that in the foreseeable future domestic political pressures, especially in America, could damage the relationship—at the very stage when it is ripe for further development. Only through the deliberate fostering of a more cooperative, politically more intimate, economically more organic partnership—in effect, through the gradual and informal emergence on the world scene of a de facto new player—can these two major countries not only avoid a debilitating collision but also ensure that America continues to play the role the world system requires. In brief, the upgrading of the U.S.-Japanese relationship from a transpacific alliance into a global partnership is needed not only for the sake of the two countries concerned

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but also for the sake of the stability and prosperity of the international order as a whole.

Seeking a more organic partnership of global consequence will require overcoming the obvious cultural and institutional obstacles on both sides, penetrating the tight insularity of the Japanese society and rising above the inherent shortsightedness of the American political process. It will call for a series of sustained, minor steps toward an ever closer relationship, as well as perhaps one or two major acts designed to propel the process more significantly forward.

In the first category one might include the deliberate nurturing of a cross-participation of Japanese and Americans on respective boards of directors of major enterprises, mergers by major business institutions or banks, much expanded exchanges of scientific talent, joint investment schemes and widened collaboration in high technology innovation. Some of that is happening already, but much more could be done, especially as the linguistic barriers fade with the greater familiarity with English on the part of the emerging Japanese elites and also with the forthcoming availability of computerized pocket translating devices.

Perhaps even more significant in fostering the needed global partnership—which one can perhaps call "Amerippon"—would be some major, farsighted acts of statesmanship that in themselves would be beneficial to the international community while advancing the special interests of the partnership itself. While such efforts would require a very major initiative and a great act of political will, they are feasible.

One effort could entail a joint, comprehensive strategy for the development of either the Latin American economy as a whole, or at least its Central American and Mexican portions. Japanese leaders have at times spoken of a possible Japanese initiative on this front. A joint American-Japanese undertaking not only would give the effort greater dimension, but would also significantly upgrade the level of ongoing American-Japanese cooperation. In any case, the need for a major international effort in the region is well established, and the benefits, strategic and economic, to "Amerippon" of a major joint regional initiative—in an area of great potential importance to both—are also self-evident.

An even more ambitious goal might involve jointly setting a target date for an American-Japanese free-trade zone. This would involve a commitment by both sides to a relationship

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that moves deliberately in the opposite direction from protectionism. In today's climate it may appear utopian even to invoke this notion, yet the more farsighted thinkers on both sides recognize that movement in such a direction would greatly enhance the prospects of global multilateral cooperation while directly benefiting the two economies involved. This is why such a seemingly farfetched notion was quietly whispered about during the Japanese prime minister's visit to Washington in early 1988. It would be the logical outcome of a process that deliberately exploits the objective complementarity of the respective interests and needs of the two sides. The result would be not only the creation of the world's paramount economic unit but also inevitably enhanced global political consultations and joint strategizing.

VI

In the years to come no alternative to a leading American world role is likely to develop, and America's partners will continue to want the United States to play that role. But in addition, there will be creative opportunities for a renewed and revitalized American contribution to a more cooperative world system. That makes our historical context rather different from the experience of other major powers whose historical trajectories entered irreversible declines.

To seize these opportunities America will have to be guided by a geostrategic vision that accepts the need for more consensual leadership, that purposely shapes a new global partnership with Japan while also coping in the meantime on its own with new geopolitical and security challenges. All of this will call for major adjustments in the American global geostrategy, on a scale perhaps as great as took place in the late 1940s. That is the likely challenge facing America during the last decade of the second millennium. It is also a challenge that can be met.

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Caspar W. Weinberger

ARMS REDUCTIONS AND DETERRENCE

A recent, rather startling poll indicated that 71 percent of Republicans and 74 percent of Democrats believe that the United States can trust the general secretary of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. Trust in what sense?

Trust that Mr. Gorbachev will turn his back on the goals of the Soviet state? Trust that he is becoming more like us in terms of democratic values? Trust that the Soviet Union will never violate an agreement with the United States (the historical record notwithstanding)? Trust that Mr. Gorbachev is diametrically opposed to the precepts of the Communist Party that he leads—precepts which are of course diametrically opposed to Western values and principles?

All of this is highly unlikely. Mr. Gorbachev does appear to be committed to some significant, perhaps even historic, internal economic reforms: his *perestroika.* Many of these reforms are truly significant in that, taken at their face value, they represent major revisions in Soviet domestic policies. Mr. Gorbachev is clearly adept at public relations in international politics. There is great danger, however, that his approach will obscure the fundamental and unchanging nature of the Soviet system. Indeed, the poll results are testimony to the effectiveness of Mr. Gorbachev's courtship of Western public opinion. Just because General Secretary Gorbachev wears a smile and dresses fashionably does not mean there is any fundamental change in Soviet goals. To be sure, Mr. Gorbachev is making changes—and most likely he does want to buy some time from the West in order to stimulate his country's moribund economy—but *perestroika* aimed at constructing a more effective socialist regime, which is clearly the general secretary's goal, does not by any means translate into a move toward Western-style democracy.

A nineteenth-century Frenchman who traveled to Russia, the Marquis de Custine (a contemporary of Alexis de Tocqueville), remarked in his journal: "I do not blame the Russians

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for being what they are, I blame them for pretending to be what we are." That thought is particularly appropriate today.

Mr. Gorbachev may be in power for a short or long period. But no general secretary will be allowed to alter in any fundamental way the never-changing Soviet goal of world domination, or the nature of the Soviet regime. By the same token, nothing has happened that changes the measures the West must take if it wishes to preserve its freedom.

President Reagan came into office with the explicit intention of restoring our military and political strength, and doing so without apology. The United States has made enormous progress toward that vital goal. One of the primary results of that restoration became a reality with the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty last December. This restoration to the West's security must not be abandoned to an overly optimistic view of East-West relations.

It is of course necessary, particularly in the nuclear age, to negotiate on arms and to work toward a more constructive and stable relationship with the Soviet Union. President Reagan is firmly committed to that course. It should not be abandoned because of euphoric reactions or public opinion polls about the popularity of the current Soviet general secretary. Nor should America's security suffer because of the pressures of the approaching elections.

There is not a better example of the importance of negotiating from strength than the recently signed INF treaty. This lesson takes on great significance for the next discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union to cut strategic nuclear arsenals in half (the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, or START). There is not a better argument for President Reagan's defense policies than the INF treaty, which the president and I proposed in 1981. At the time the Soviets held this same proposal—the so-called zero option—up to scorn, knowing that America was weak militarily after a decade of neglect, and believing that we lacked the will to regain our strength.

In this regard, the opposition to the INF treaty has really missed the point. Most of the opposition seems to be based on fears of what may come next. Few have objected to the treaty itself. The INF treaty shows that the Reagan Administration's policies are correct. It shows negotiations and peace through strength works. It shows that by sticking with a negotiating position, refusing to be intimidated by Soviet walkouts, and not permitting America's goals to be linked to Soviet demands

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that weaken strategic defense, we can successfully achieve our security goals in a negotiation.

Verifiable agreements reducing armaments are an integral part of national security, but they are not an end in themselves. This should be self-evident, but it is often overlooked in the pressures of summitry, politics and the desire to achieve results. A START agreement may be within grasp, but as questions about our long-term security surface during this critical period, we must ensure that the mistakes of the 1970s—the "decade of neglect" and "détente"—are never repeated. The new relationship with the Soviets presents great opportunities as well as some great hazards. As we confront the new challenges ahead, we must draw upon some of the lessons we should have learned from the past.

George Orwell once said: "We have now sunk to a depth at which the restatement of the obvious is the first duty of intelligent men." As we are poised on the eve of a potentially new relationship with the Soviet Union, it is critical that we take stock of the lessons we have learned over the last two or three decades. My purpose in this article is to restate the obvious—and the not-so-obvious—lessons for the role of arms reduction agreements as an element of U.S. national security.

II

A great paradox of our national security posture is that without military strength, we have little leverage to secure real arms reductions. The Reagan Administration's goal when it took office was to demonstrate the will to rearm *and* to do so—rearm so that the United States could secure genuine arms reductions, and not the kinds of limits reached in the two Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements, which allowed the Soviets to add another 4,000 nuclear warheads to their existing arsenal.

National defense is, admittedly, expensive. It is also usually unpopular. As a former secretary of health, education and welfare, I understand the need for some social programs. However, for ten years we had been force-feeding social programs and starving defense. By 1981 America's deterrent capabilities were eroding. We could not risk further delay. The question was not whether we could afford to defend our nation, but whether we could afford not to.

Rebuilding U.S. military strength was a major theme of the 1980 presidential campaign, and from that campaign came a

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clear mandate: public support for increased military strength was at a postwar high. The Reagan Administration was given a clear mandate by the American electorate to carry out a massive, admittedly costly, defense program. The reason was readily apparent. In the 1970s the nation, trusting overly in the spirit of "détente," debated while the Soviet Union continued inexorably to arm. By 1981 the Soviet Union had not only matched our previous nuclear superiority—it had far exceeded our conventional military strength and was rapidly projecting its power beyond the needs of legitimate defense. The Soviet Union was succeeding because no one was challenging it. One need only cite the examples of its invasion of Afghanistan and its activities in Ethiopia, Angola, South Yemen and Cuba.

By 1981 we had to face the fact that we could not steadily cut defense investment, as we had throughout the 1970s, without serious consequences. We had neglected every category: ammunition, readiness, manpower, all major weapon systems, and research and development for new systems. Manpower reductions were particularly disastrous, putting at risk the all-volunteer system. Many felt it was time to resume the draft.

The West's decade-long reduction of military expenditures, and its good-faith effort to achieve stabilizing arms control, had been answered by unremitting Soviet actions increasing its military capabilities. The West could not allow the military balance to swing further in favor of the Soviets.

No one doubted that the NATO alliance *could* provide the forces necessary to meet the Soviet threat and to execute agreed NATO strategy. Collectively, the alliance had more than adequate resources—human, industrial, technological and financial—to provide a reasonable margin of security. What it often had lacked in the past was the will to provide the resources for the common defense.

In 1981 there was a new sense of resolve in America: the new Administration, which had campaigned on the issue of regaining and maintaining Western security, was determined to turn its mandate into a safer future for all.

The Reagan Administration was also committed to equitable and verifiable arms reduction. But the Soviet's steady addition of new SS-20 intermediate-range missiles made it imperative that the United States carry out the December 1979 NATO mandate to proceed with the deployment of the theater nuclear weapons while seeking by negotiations to eliminate those sys-

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tems. Our experience over the last two decades had demonstrated that we could not limit Soviet nuclear weapons unless they had an incentive to reduce. We knew we needed "to arm, to parlay" in Churchill's words.

The term "arms race" is very misleading. It clouds the distinction between why the United States builds arms and why the Soviet Union builds arms. We arm to protect our freedoms and, where we can, to extend them to others. We arm to deter attack upon us or our allies. The Soviets, with vastly more than is needed for self-defense and with continual additions, seem to arm for intimidation and aggression against free peoples.

The paradox of deterrence has been with us since our beginnings as a nation. The first principle and fundamental goal of our military accepts George Washington's notion: "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual ways of preserving peace." The problem is that if we are to lessen the likelihood of nuclear war, we must maintain the equation of deterrence.

There is nothing new about the idea of deterrence. The only thing that has changed over thousands of years of human history is that the stakes of deterrence have risen with the destructive power of war. Today mankind lives in the shadow of nuclear weapons. But to prevent nuclear war in a world that contains thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons, an adequate and credible nuclear deterrent must be maintained. This may be an uncomfortable form of keeping the peace, but at the moment it is the only way.

Arms control agreements or unilateral actions that do nothing to lessen the likelihood of war are empty and meaningless. In fact, they are worse: they undermine the balance which is the basis of deterrence and they lead the public to think that further defense investment is no longer needed.

Many claim that arms control is a more ethically justifiable course of action than rearming or attempting to strengthen deterrence through defensive weapons. But how can arms control in itself be either good or bad? It is obviously the consequences of arms control that are of concern, and not simply the process of negotiation. The "arms control process" can and has produced bad agreements, such as SALT II. So we must be realistic and learn from our mistakes.

III

We can learn some valuable lessons from our historical experience with arms control. These lessons go far beyond just

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how to negotiate with the Soviets. They should help to determine the very structure of the West's defenses over the coming decades.

This Administration understood the historical record. It was not willing to accept a form of arms control that lulled the United States into a false sense of security. As a result, it took the somewhat radical approach of trying to negotiate arms *reductions* with the Soviet Union. This approach has paid great dividends, and can continue to do so if America sustains its resolve. Arms control has been transformed, and the old and, I think it is fair to say, bankrupt concept of arms agreements has been discarded.

The Reagan Administration's approach reflects a return to more idealistic notions of disarmament. But it is an idealism based upon realism. Past American agreements have failed to recognize that reciprocity must be part of any sound agreement. There literally developed a feeling among many in the United States that any agreement was good, simply because it was an agreement with the Soviet Union. And in order to get an agreement all obstacles had to be removed—but "obstacles" in this context were Soviet objections. Now this cycle of wishful thinking and self-deception is being broken.

From the start the Administration insisted that it would settle for nothing less than genuine reductions. However, because it has been willing to take as long as necessary to conclude an agreement that would be in the interests of America and our allies, "experts" in the arms control lobby have labeled the Administration, until recently, as anti-arms control, suggesting that Moscow would never accept the new approach.

Indeed, critics viewed the goal of real cuts as disingenuous and unrealistic. They have pointed to their own arms control model: the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Yet those talks and the resulting agreements did little more than codify the highest levels of nuclear weapons the world has ever seen.

These very same "experts" must have been greatly surprised when, by the autumn of 1985, the media began reporting a Soviet willingness to consider a 25-percent, then 40-percent, and finally a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms. Moreover, at the Reykjavik summit conference, deep cuts became the heart of the agenda. The contrast with the Soviet attitude toward Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's offer of deep cuts to Moscow in 1977 could not be more stark. Then, the United States had not demonstrated the resolve to modernize its strategic nuclear forces. The United States had little leverage

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and less respect. The result: the Soviets rejected the 1977 offer out of hand. This is not surprising, given the fact that during the 1976 campaign, candidate Jimmy Carter had pledged as president to cut the military budget by as much as seven billion dollars.

IV

The Reagan Administration took a different approach from the start because it recognized that the United States had made a series of mistakes over the years in negotiating with the Soviets. Some of these errors had to do with how we negotiated with the Soviets. Other mistakes had to do with what we negotiated.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and SALT I are good examples of the problems of the substance of what we negotiated. The ABM treaty constrained defenses against enemy attack, and neither treaty required any reductions in offensive forces—indeed they permitted increases. These agreements codified vulnerability and attempted to put "limits" on the continuing growth of nuclear weapons, rather than reducing them. But the limits were far higher than existing arsenals. In fact, since SALT I, the Soviets, without violating the treaties, quadrupled the number of their strategic ballistic missile warheads.

The ABM treaty is a prime example of a flawed strategic concept designed to enhance nuclear stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty was based upon at least two assumptions which were not borne out: that there would soon be deep reductions in offensive weapons, and that both parties would give up defenses (except for specifically permitted narrow and basically not very effective systems). The Soviets upset both assumptions. They never stopped their buildup and modernization of nuclear offensive arms, and never abandoned defensive strategies. In fact, immediately after signing the ABM treaty they began working to develop the same strategic defenses they so violently object to when we pursue them. They also deployed and then modernized all of the defensive systems permitted under the ABM treaty, and violated it by the construction of a huge radar system at Krasnoyarsk.

These developments threaten the basic strategic concept the United States brought to the ABM bargaining table in the early 1970s: that defenses were destabilizing because retaliatory missiles must be able to retaliate. Given these assumptions in

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1972 when the treaty was signed, the hope was that the Soviets would then agree to deep reductions of their offensive missiles, and would not violate the treaty itself.

The preamble to the ABM treaty stated that its underlying premise was "that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms." Moreover, both parties declared "their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament." Gerard Smith, then head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chief U.S. negotiator of the ABM treaty, made it clear in a unilateral statement appended to the treaty that the United States expected progress in offensive weapons reductions within five years. It was a vain hope.

As the text of the ABM treaty suggests, the important issue—real reductions in offensive arms—was put off to some future date. That was perhaps the gravest error the United States has made over the past two decades.

Another serious misjudgment was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's belief that the Soviet Union would be satisfied with the concept of deterrence based on parity once it achieved nuclear equality with the United States. The decade of neglect—the 1970s—when our investment in defense declined 20 percent, had its roots in these errors of judgment. This was also the decade when we neglected, to the point of danger, to modernize adequately our strategic offensive forces. These misjudgments have cost America dearly.

Not only have the Soviets greatly expanded their nuclear arsenal but, almost from the day the ABM treaty was signed, they have been working intensively to secure strategic defenses for themselves, including work on advanced defensive technologies. This experience points to specific lessons about arms control, nuclear weapons and what constitutes stability.

There has been a continuing debate—a somewhat arcane and largely irrelevant one—about what the ABM treaty allowed and did not allow with respect to testing and development of defensive systems. This has the potential of tying our vital Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in knots. Indeed I believe that is the primary purpose of most of those who urge "strict construction" of the treaty.

The real focus of the ABM debate should be on whether the

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strategic conditions upon which the treaty was concluded have been materially altered, and whether it is in our national interest to exercise the withdrawal clause in the treaty itself.

As we look toward another summit, we must confront the issue of the future of the ABM treaty. The Soviets will try to lock us into a flawed treaty that does not serve our "supreme" interests and which they have violated. In fact, the Soviets are using the ABM treaty as a weapon to kill SDI. We should be discussing amending the agreement or withdrawing from it altogether. Under the provisions of Article XV of the treaty, the United States has a right to withdraw by giving six months' notice, "if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." We should be discussing opening up a new strategic relationship and a defensive transition, not quibbling over legalistic, hazy interpretations which effectively preserve the mistakes of the past and endanger our future security. Withdrawal clauses in treaties are not unusable. A signatory country should of course observe treaties, but conditions and assumptions on which treaties are based change. Hence we have withdrawal clauses.

There have been similar debates in the past, the most pointless of which was over the merits of SALT II. To characterize the president's decision to end observance of SALT II as a violation of a treaty, as many did, is truly Orwellian. The treaty was never ratified. Even if it had been, it would have expired in December 1985. And the Soviets repeatedly and flagrantly violated the major provisions of the treaty during the period in which it would have been in effect. Under international law, actions of the type undertaken by the Kremlin would be more than sufficient to release the United States from any obligation to observe the treaty—even if it had been ratified.

The Reagan Administration shared the view of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1980 that the treaty, by permitting the continued growth of Soviet strategic forces, gave the appearance but not the reality of moderation and restraint. The SALT II "limits," like the SALT I "limits" before them, were so high that they did not constrain the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup. The forces permitted on the Soviet side were more than enough to leave our land-based missiles vulnerable to Soviet attack. The apparent constraint on their deployment of "new" missiles was little more than an elaborate loophole

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through which two new generations of Soviet missiles then under development could easily pass.

Nevertheless, Congress has continued to try to mandate American compliance with various aspects of this treaty. For example, the House of Representatives fought to force the United States to comply with the SALT II sublimits on ballistic missiles armed with multiple warheads "as long as the Soviet Union did not violate them." For the first time in history, a legislative body of a democracy attempted to mandate compliance with an unratified treaty that was never honored by the other party to that agreement.

V

This moves us into the realm of how we negotiate. A broad lesson can be gleaned: too often America's bargaining positions are revised and altered because we continually negotiate among ourselves. Bureaucratic battles among agencies, disputes among allies and micromanaging by Congress all hurt our bargaining ability. All these players have a legitimate role, of course, and our problem reflects the fundamental differences between a democratic government and a totalitarian regime. Americans take a problem-solving approach to the exercise; the Soviets view negotiations as part of their endless competition with noncommunist forces. Another part of the problem is that our many competing agencies can rarely make up their minds as to what they really want; the Soviets talk only with one voice—since other voices there are crushed, literally or figuratively. We have no desire to emulate such a system. But we should be able to come to decisions, after debate, that will enable the United States to negotiate successfully with such a foe.

An old cliché encapsulates the Soviet approach to negotiations: "What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable." The former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene Rostow, has a colorful metaphor to describe Soviet negotiating tactics: "They would bring a cow into the parlor and then offer to negotiate to take it out."

This brings to mind an especially ineffective Soviet attempt to employ this negotiating device at Reykjavik with SDI, relinking it to all other progress at the summit. They were, in short, bringing the cow into the parlor, taking it out, then bringing it in again. The president understood this fully and, as a result, the SDI program was saved. But when Secretary of

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State George Shultz visited Moscow last fall to finalize the details of the INF treaty, the cow again reappeared. The Soviets again linked any agreement to the emasculation of the SDI program—despite the fact that the Soviets themselves had given assurances that they were separate issues. Soon thereafter, realizing the president's resolve and that international public opinion was against them, they dropped this eleventh-hour tactic. But, lo and behold, as we negotiate with the Soviets over a START agreement, we find that the cow is back in the parlor.

After Reykjavik, some "experts" believed that the Soviet SDI ploy had some success. In fact, one former arms negotiator, Paul Warnke, confidently predicted that there would be no strategic or intermediate-range nuclear weapons agreements without U.S. concessions on SDI. Further, he commented: "There's no question that SDI is a good bargaining chip. The question is when to play it. . . . We'll never get more for SDI than we could have gotten at Reykjavik. As a matter of fact, as the essential ludicrousness of the system becomes clear, we'll get less for it. We ought to play it now while it's still worth something."[1] But once again the "experts" and conventional wisdom proved to be unwise. What they said would never happen did. Moscow had to recognize America's firmness on the SDI issue, and they dropped their insistence that SDI be part of the INF talks. They also dropped all of their other "non-negotiable" demands once they recognized that that was the price of a treaty they wanted.

These and other examples of Soviet tactics point to some rather obvious—but often forgotten—lessons about how to negotiate with the Soviets.

First, the United States must bargain from strength. In 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson said: "The only way to deal with the Soviet Union, we have found from hard experience, is to create situations of strength." The INF treaty confirms that basic truth. The NATO alliance remained united, and successfully deployed the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles. This move was a prerequisite to successful diplomacy, for it demonstrated the West's ability to stand firm in the face of Soviet intimidation and blandishments aimed at forcing a deal that would have ensured Soviet global dominance in intermediate-range nuclear forces. Had NATO submitted to such tactics, had

[1] "SDI Concessions Urged by Warnke," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Oct. 16, 1986, p. 19.

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we listened to calls within our own countries for unilateral restraint or a freeze, we would face the wholly unstable and dangerous situation of overwhelming and worldwide Soviet superiority in intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Clearly, if the United States continues to engage in the kind of defense cuts seen in the last two years, mirroring those of the decade of neglect, we cannot expect to repeat in the START negotiations the kind of diplomatic success reflected in the INF treaty.

Second, patience is another essential in negotiations with the Soviets. It is instructive to recall that there were those in the Carter Administration who held the view that failure to get a SALT treaty in the president's first four years would be a "blemish on his record forever." Such an attitude gives all the leverage to the Soviets.

When President Reagan proposed the complete elimination of American and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles—the zero option—in 1981, critics said he was naïve. They said Moscow would never accept such an approach if French and British nuclear forces were not included. Eventually the Soviets gave up their cherished position on the inclusion of the French and British missiles, just as they also gave up their insistence that the United States kill strategic defense as a precondition for an agreement. They also gave up their "non-negotiable" demand to keep 100 SS-20s in Asia and their "non-negotiable" position against any on-site verification.

Even within this Administration some lacked patience at times during the INF negotiations. Some, for example, preferred the "walk in the woods" agreement that precluded deployment of the Pershing 2s and would have frozen Soviet INF deployments at higher levels. Had the United States settled for this type of "freeze," we would merely have locked in Soviet nuclear dominance of the European and Asian theaters.

The Asian missile issue was one of the most difficult internal bureaucratic battles during my time in office. Some officials believed that our "global zero" position—our demand that the Soviets remove their 100 mobile SS-20 intermediate-range missiles directed toward Asia—had to be dropped because the Soviets insisted on keeping these missiles. Fortunately, the right side won this internal disagreement, and the Soviets eventually accepted our insistence that the 100 SS-20s be removed as part of the broader INF agreement.

Those who now make the argument that a quick START agreement would be a fitting capstone for the Reagan Admin-

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istration, and must be signed by June, also forfeit leverage to the Soviets. We must not be pressured by the fact of a forthcoming summit, elections or political efforts to secure the president's place in history. That place is already assured. It must be understood that even if the next president—and not this one, due to Soviet intransigence—is successful in achieving a START agreement, the credit will belong to President Reagan. If an agreement is reached it will be as a result of his patience and his resolve to strengthen the U.S. military over the last eight years, and his determination to take as long as necessary to ensure that any agreement represents American interests.

Third, we must not forget that the decision-making system in the Soviet Union is very different from ours. General Secretary Gorbachev can make plans now for the year 2000 with at least a reasonable expectation that he will still be in power when they come to fruition. He does not have to worry about Congress, with its 535 defense strategists, nor does he have to worry about public opinion in his own country—none is permitted there. Most important of all, he does not have to worry about the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. There are no real elections in the Soviet Union, and there is no public opinion there that dares express itself. The only things written, printed or said in the Soviet Union are those the government allows. These are not enviable attributes, but they can give the Kremlin an immense advantage in negotiations.

Fourth, the fact that the Soviets have violated previous accords and exploited ambiguities and loopholes makes it clear that the United States must demand strict compliance measures in any agreement with them.

Verification is not a substitute for compliance. It is vital to know what the Soviets are doing and to be able to judge when violations take place. But verification does not guarantee compliance. Some of the most troubling violations are also the most easily verified. The Krasnoyarsk radar and the SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile are examples of violations that the Soviets must have known we would detect.

VI

It was once assumed that the Soviets would not violate arms control agreements because of the political repercussions. This has been proven false, and Soviet noncompliance with arms agreements has been well documented in reports to Congress.

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American negotiators must build the most strict and rigid verification and compliance provisions into any agreement into which we enter. Given the historical record, it is the only prudent course. We must take particular care in those areas where verifying compliance of an agreement poses great difficulties. The president is fond of quoting the Russian proverb, "trust but verify." It is an absolute prerequisite for any agreement.

There will always be very strong pressures to ignore violations rather than abandon treaties—or even to respond proportionally. The Soviets know this. A failure to respond immediately to small infractions often encourages larger ones. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick recognized this lesson when she told Congress that the INF treaty should be ratified but amended to allow for automatic termination if its terms were violated. This may not be the only mechanism available, but she has raised an important and often overlooked point.

If the Soviets should violate an agreement, the United States must be prepared to take the military steps that are necessary to protect our interests. Where possible, there should be an agreement with Congress on this in advance, so that we can respond to violations more quickly and effectively. In a democracy, such a quick response requires quick appropriations by Congress—and that, in turn, requires some kind of advance agreement.

Violations can only be deterred by responding to them in ways that are more costly to the Soviets than the gains they expect to achieve through cheating. Establishing in advance that the United States will respond, that we will impose costs to offset the benefits they hope to gain, has been made more difficult by years of indifference and congressional preoccupation with defense cuts. Even the decision to respond proportionally to Soviet violations requires great political courage, particularly if violations are not challenged early.

The Standing Consultative Commission, the body assigned by earlier agreements to deal with violations, has failed miserably to gain Soviet compliance. Nothing has happened to suggest that it will become more effective. Indeed, this approach for pushing compliance issues into the recesses of a confidential and ineffective forum has generally discouraged more effective measures to gain Soviet compliance.

It may appear paradoxical that a key to improving the prospects for real arms reductions is a vigorous American

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response to violations. But until we achieve the insurance we need by deploying the Strategic Defense Initiative, the advantages to the Soviets to be gained by cheating will become proportionally greater if we proceed with deep reductions in offensive forces.

VII

SDI is the boldest strategic concept since the Baruch Plan. It offers the hope of real and lasting reductions, greater stability between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a safer world. It provides a real solution to some of the risks of arms reductions and questions of verification and compliance. It also offers the United States some insurance against Soviet violations after the deep cuts envisioned in the START discussions.

The transition from our present posture to a deterrence that focuses more on defense than offense holds great promise. There can be an orderly transition to a defense-oriented world as the United States and the Soviet Union start to cut offensive nuclear forces. If both sides agreed to destroy a certain percentage of their nuclear strategic missiles as strategic defenses are deployed, it would signal that neither side is seeking a strategic advantage. In the long run, strategic defenses, combined with balanced and verifiable reductions in conventional forces, could help rid this world of the specter of nuclear holocaust. The vision of such a new strategic order must not be compromised by allowing the Soviets to force us to negotiate SDI away.

People have talked of this "grand compromise," but it has all been tried before with SALT I, SALT II and the ABM treaty. The primary purpose of the ABM treaty was to create an environment for scaling back offensive forces. The idea was that by giving up the right to deploy a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles, an arms race in offensive weapons could be avoided. Limits on defenses were viewed as the key to reductions in offensive nuclear arms.

The Soviets tried the more current form of the "grand compromise" at Reykjavik, when all the arms cuts were held hostage to limits on SDI. Without doubt, they will try it again during the START negotiations, recognizing that this Administration has less than a year left in office. They will also continue to try to divide the American people, noting the differences of opinion on this matter that exist in the Congress and in our society today.

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Moscow's aim is to keep its own strategic defense work hidden from view until it is ready to deploy, while waging a propaganda war using Western public opinion to pressure the United States into halting SDI. If that campaign were to succeed, it would be a nightmare for the West. We would face the massive offensive nuclear arsenal the U.S.S.R. now possesses, shielded by a defense against any retaliatory response—currently our sole means of deterring nuclear war. And without SDI, we would be utterly defenseless.

That nightmare need not become a reality. SDI technology gives us the opportunity to defend ourselves against a missile attack. We know that whatever we do, the Soviets will continue their own efforts to develop defenses. Our task, simply put, is to use our best minds as well as our material resources to defend our democratic society. It would be gross criminal negligence if we failed to deploy SDI, or if we bargained it away for some agreement the Soviets would violate whenever a few men in the Kremlin determined it was in their interest to do so.

The technological developments that make SDI possible will continue to move forward. The only question is whether we will provide the resources and sustain the will and the clarity of vision necessary to strengthen our security through SDI. A world in which both the United States and the Soviet Union came to rely more on defenses against nuclear attack and less on the mutually suicidal threat of massive retaliation would be a far safer place.

VIII

Agreements to reduce nuclear arms raise a simple question: When the missiles go, what is left? This is a particularly relevant and immediate question to ask as we examine the security requirements of a post-INF Europe. The INF treaty does not alter NATO's flexible strategy; that strategy remains intact and strong. But strategies are not self-sustaining. Since the birth of NATO in 1949, the alliance has been concerned with maintaining the proper mix of forces—both conventional and nuclear—that makes flexible response a credible deterrence strategy. Those concerns remain today, whether or not there is an INF treaty.

NATO cannot allow its force structure to stagnate, thinking that all problems have been solved with this treaty. We must, for example, go forward with the 1983 Montebello decision of

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the NATO defense ministers, which called for modernization of NATO's nuclear and dual-capable weapons.

Nothing in the INF treaty prevents NATO from fulfilling the Montebello decision, nor indeed does the treaty limit us from taking the host of other measures necessary to ensure our security, such as strengthening conventional forces. In fact, the conventional force imbalances between NATO and the Warsaw Pact take on greater significance in a post-INF world.

Negotiating conventional force reductions could increase stability in Europe. But these reductions would have to require very much larger Soviet cuts than Western reductions. Warsaw Pact forces hold a great advantage in numbers; only massive reductions of Soviet offensive ground forces in Eastern Europe could help create a balance between Warsaw Pact and NATO standing forces. In this connection one should be particularly wary of accounting tricks used by those who for whatever reason are determined to prove that the Soviets' four-and-a-half to one predominance in tanks over NATO, to take one example, does not give the Soviets an advantage.

These conventional reductions and verifiable agreements banning the use of chemical weapons are of at least equal importance to the West as the possible 50-percent reduction in nuclear arms, but the Soviets have never been willing to agree to the only type of conventional reductions that would be in the interests of the West. Our historical experience with the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks in Vienna, and other attempts to secure acceptable conventional reductions, suggests that NATO should not depend upon such conventional force cuts for its security. Unilateral NATO action to improve and modernize its present defenses is the only dependable path to security. Innovative approaches to improving NATO's defenses must complement a negotiated approach to eliminating the conventional imbalance.

A recent Pentagon initiative holds great promise as a creative means to make the most of Western strengths while exploiting Soviet weaknesses in the conventional theater in Europe. In short, it would seek to develop and fund those technologies and tactics that would provide the greatest advantage in deterring the Soviets on the central front and elsewhere. This initiative has the potential to disrupt Warsaw Pact operational concepts, as a recent study on how to improve the West's defenses in Europe demonstrated.

This "competitive strategies" program has the potential to

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minimize the risks associated with the INF agreement. To cite one example, "smart," stand-off munitions, which take advantage of the West's technological prowess, are being given a high priority under the aegis of the competitive strategies program. The recent report of The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy also argues the value of this type of approach. The study holds that "when we have identified an innovative, high-priority project that combines new technology with new operating concepts, we may want to set up a special 'fast track'."[2]

An example could be the unmanned "Tacit Rainbow" missile which could help compensate for NATO's quantitative inferiority vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact. It has the ability to linger over targets, such as enemy radar systems, waiting for them to be turned on so that the missile can hunt them down. It attests to the value of selected advanced, stand-off technologies as force multipliers in countering the threat.

Admiral William J. Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approves of competitive strategies. In recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, he argued: "The United States did make certain that the INF treaty would leave the door open for NATO to exploit fully emergent technologies. . . . It is imperative for the alliance to take stock of its military posture and to reassess the way it is preparing for the long haul." He is indeed right.

IX

After coming so far in improving America's defenses and reaching a meaningful arms reduction agreement, we cannot afford to return to the mistakes of the past. My real worry concerns what is happening now to the defense budget. We have made very considerable progress in regaining for America what was a vitally needed renewed military strength. It is responsible not only for bringing the Soviets back to the negotiating table but forcing serious negotiations. It has given us an arms reduction agreement.

None of this would have occurred without the major additions to our defenses that are a direct result of the president's leadership. To wash those all away and let our security erode again, as Congress is now doing, because of fears about a deficit

[2] *Discriminate Deterrence*, Report of The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter, co-chairmen, Washington: G.P.O., January 1988, p. 48.

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that could be cured if our domestic expenditures were cut, puts at risk our security as a nation. Most people who attack defense spending as the cause of the deficit do not understand that Administration domestic spending requests to Congress have been *increased* by the Congress by over $250 billion since 1982. But the president's defense requests have been *cut* $125 billion by Congress during that same time.

The problem of sustaining the consensus on defense spending involves more than just the deficit. It is basically an unpopular endeavor for a democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville pointed this out more than 150 years ago:

> The ever increasing numbers of men of property who are lovers of peace, the growth of personal wealth which war so rapidly consumes, the mildness of manners, the gentleness of heart, those tendencies to pity which are produced by the equality of conditions, that coolness of understanding which renders men comparatively insensible to the violent and poetical excitement of arms, all these causes concur to quench the military spirit [in a democracy].

The phenomenon De Tocqueville observed is understandable in a democracy. Yet we must recognize that nothing more nor less than our freedom is at stake. If we still value that freedom, and if we want to secure peace with freedom, we must be willing to make the really small sacrifices entailed in keeping our military strong and never letting our guard down.

As Congress reduces the defense budget, the Soviets will be watching. The Soviets will continue to watch to see if the United States will shortchange defense as we did in the 1970s. What they see will play a large role in their own calculations during the START negotiations. We cannot take $33 billion out of a presidential request for a modest three-percent increase in defense without very real harm to our security, and without adding substantially to the risks we face. These deep reductions are neither necessary nor safe. They are precisely what the Soviets want us to do.

There will be those within the Administration and in the West who will counsel compromise in order to reach some agreement during the next summit. But I know that President Reagan, as he has in the past, will walk away from such blandishments if the proposed agreement is not in our nation's interest.

The United States must remember what is needed to conclude a meaningful and verifiable agreement with the Soviet

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Union. The lessons of the past must not be ignored. We must take a realistic approach both to the requirements of Western security and the nature of the Soviet state. To believe that the U.S.S.R. has ceased to be a threat because it is making some effort to respond to its own internal economic difficulties would be dangerously naïve.

This brings us back to my opening question of whether we should "trust" Mikhail Gorbachev. Do I trust General Secretary Gorbachev? No. But in light of the realities of the Soviet regime, both the question and the answer are largely irrelevant. We must do what is necessary to keep peace with freedom—and this has little to do with whether the general secretary is trustworthy or not. If we ever allow ourselves to be dependent upon having to trust a general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for our security, we will have already lost our security.

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Lynn E. Davis

LESSONS OF THE INF TREATY

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, is certainly a success if measured against the West's proclaimed arms control objectives during the 1980s. In the face of opposition from both the Soviet Union and West European peace movements, NATO carried out its 1979 decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in five West European countries. Later, after the deployment was completed, NATO succeeded in securing Soviet agreement to all of its arms control goals, including the global elimination of Soviet SS-20 missiles and acceptance of very intrusive verification measures.[1]

Nevertheless, the INF treaty has provoked considerable unease in the West, by its provisions as well as by its implications for the future. Will NATO's strategy of flexible response remain credible? Will the imbalance between conventional forces in Europe now become more dangerous? Will the treaty unleash political forces leading to the denuclearization of the continent and American disengagement from NATO? It would be both ironic and tragic if this NATO success became the vehicle for a future alliance crisis.

The story of the negotiation of the INF treaty is well known.[2] What is important now is to consider the critical lessons of the INF experience.

II

The INF saga began in the late 1970s as a result of two West European worries. First, the Soviets were deploying new SS-20 missiles, which were mobile, accurate, equipped with multiple

[1] The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to destroy within three years an entire class of deployed intermediate- and shorter-range missiles: for the Soviet Union some 1,700 SS-4/5, SS-12, SS-20 and SS-23 missiles, and for the United States some 800 ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing 1A and 2 missiles.

[2] See Strobe Talbott, "The Road to Zero," *Time*, Dec. 14, 1987.

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warheads, and targeted on Western Europe. Second, the Americans were ignoring European interests in negotiating the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) Treaty, seeking limits only on the nuclear threat to the United States. President Carter's inept handling of the neutron bomb affair in 1978 exacerbated European concern, rekindling doubts about the American commitment to Europe and the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee.

Finding it difficult to address these underlying doubts directly, West Europeans and Americans focused on confronting the expansion of the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe and the deficiencies in the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Europe. In 1979 NATO decided to modernize its nuclear capabilities by deploying 572 Pershing 2 and ground-launched cruise missiles, and simultaneously to begin negotiations to reduce the Soviet SS-20 threat.

NATO governments argued that the capability to strike the Soviet Union with systems based on land in Western Europe was necessary in order to convey to the Soviet Union a real sense of risk from any aggression on the continent, and that only a new generation of INF missiles could provide such an assured capability. Because of their range, these missiles would also allow the United States to threaten the Soviet Union without immediately subjecting its territory to an all-out nuclear war. Critics of the INF deployment, on the other hand, suggested that the missiles were provocative and could undermine deterrence by theoretically permitting the United States to confine a war within Europe and to postpone or even avoid using its strategic nuclear weapons.

Underlying the 1979 decision was also the view that an American willingness to use its nuclear weapons would depend importantly on the location and type of nuclear weapons—hence the attraction of missiles based in Europe, compared with strategic weapons based at sea. An alternative view is that a decision to use nuclear weapons will be based on how Americans assess their interests and vulnerabilities rather than on the particular kind of nuclear weapon system. How one judges the strategic consequences of eliminating all U.S. INF missiles therefore depends in large part on which of these competing theories one believes. Supporters of the treaty argue that NATO's strategy of flexible response does not depend on any single weapon system.

The missiles represented a response to the political and

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military situation at the time. But their deployment created such serious divisions over nuclear weapons within many West European countries that NATO may in the future find it desirable, or even necessary, to look for alternatives to new U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe to assure the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee.

III

Soviet actions played a central role in the INF drama. Without the prior Soviet deployment of the SS-20s, NATO would almost certainly not have decided to deploy American INF missiles. After 1979 the Soviets undertook a varied but sustained campaign to prevent the U.S. deployment and, although their initial tactics failed, the Soviets succeeded in the end through the INF treaty. What changed was not their objective but their willingness to pay the U.S. price.

The Soviets initially sought to persuade Western publics that NATO, by introducing new INF missiles, was upsetting the balance of forces in Europe. They claimed that a rough equivalence existed if U.S. forward-based aircraft and British and French nuclear systems were included in comparative calculations of strength. They called for a freeze on new INF deployments but showed no willingness to give up their own sizable monopoly. When the first U.S. INF missiles were deployed in 1983, the Soviets walked out of the Geneva negotiations and announced that they would station SS-12 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. After negotiations resumed in 1985, Secretary Gorbachev—to most everyone's surprise—changed tactics and over the next two years acquiesced, in turn, to American demands for an agreement covering missiles and not aircraft, to establishing equal ceilings, to eliminating all INF missiles in Europe, to excluding limits on British and French nuclear forces, to including collateral constraints on shorter-range missiles, to banning INF missiles in Asia, and to requiring on-site inspections.

The Soviets were obviously determined to prevent the United States from deploying any INF missiles in Europe. Moscow argued that the missiles were destabilizing because of their long range and accuracy and, in the case of the Pershing 2, because of its short flight time. How seriously the Soviets viewed this threat is difficult to assess, particularly as U.S. strategic nuclear weapons pose a similar threat. A long-standing Soviet goal, however, is for the United States to withdraw all

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its nuclear weapons from Europe. The eventual Soviet willingness to eliminate all its SS-20s suggests that this was the overriding Soviet motivation. Soviet strategic nuclear weapons and medium-range aircraft can threaten all the targets currently covered by their INF missiles. Nevertheless, under the treaty the Soviets will destroy hundreds of existing ballistic missiles, thereby removing the threat that initially provoked the 1979 NATO decision.

The Soviets certainly saw opportunities for creating divisions in the West through their INF initiatives. Their intransigence in the years leading up to the U.S. missile deployments, their walkout from the negotiations and their attempt to link INF with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the end all failed to destroy NATO's solidarity. But it was a close call, and the political debate in Europe over INF has left serious wounds. Finally, Gorbachev probably saw the treaty as a means to enhance his international stature, to promote political and economic relations with the West and perhaps to free up, over time, resources in the Soviet Union for his economic reform.

The INF experience has shown what a formidable challenge the new Soviet leadership poses for the West and has demonstrated Gorbachev's personal skill and dexterity as a participant in Western public debate. He succeeded in putting the West on the defensive through his initiatives, even though he was the one making concessions. The treaty also shows that the Soviets, to promote their fundamental objectives, were willing to pay a high price; the West must be prepared for the possibility that the Soviets will agree to radical Western demands. As for Soviet strategic objectives, the INF experience suggests that there has been no significant change, for through the treaty they have taken a step toward their goal of removing all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe.

IV

The NATO decision in 1979, called the dual-track decision, involved parallel modernization and arms control policies. Implicit was a bargaining chip theory: NATO's missile modernization program would provide the foundation and leverage for achieving an arms control agreement; arms control, if successful, could at the same time modify the requirements for the modernization program.

Such a mixed approach was new for NATO. Politically there was really no alternative, as the Reagan Administration learned

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in 1981 when its reluctance to proceed with negotiations helped provoke mass public demonstrations in Europe. But Western political leaders, particularly President Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, believed that arms control would not succeed without the INF deployments. The public debate focused on whether multilateral negotiations or unilateral restraint best promoted peace. Within NATO, the issue was whether arms control talks should be given a chance before any firm decision was made to deploy. In both debates, the INF missiles became inseparably linked with arms control.

Some critics of the dual-track decision suggest that missile deployments were held hostage to arms control and Soviet manipulation. It is true that, by proposing negotiations, the West gave the Soviets a voice in determining whether the missiles would be deployed. The critical point is that the Soviets did not have the final say, because the 1979 NATO decision committed member governments to deployments *unless* arms control succeeded. In 1983, when the Soviet Union blocked progress in Geneva, the missiles were deployed; in 1988 they will be eliminated because the Soviets agreed to NATO's conditions. The bargaining chip approach worked.

The dual-track decision also represented a change in the responsibility of West Europeans for U.S. nuclear weapons and arms control policies. NATO collectively defined the elements of the modernization program as well as the overall negotiating objectives. Only after the NATO decision did the United States commit funds for the development and procurement of the INF missiles. As a result, four years elapsed before deployment, which many have criticized as providing too much time for public opposition to arise. Yet it is simply not possible to have both a real European role in decisions on new weapons and instant U.S. implementation.

However, the United States had responsibility for the actual negotiations, and at various times it took initiatives that left West Europeans with little choice but to agree. The most important was taken during the 1986 Reykjavik summit, when President Reagan retreated from his position that all INF missiles should be eliminated and agreed in principle to remove the INF missiles in Europe while leaving 100 SS-20s deployed in Asia. Few in Europe actually cared about the Asian deployments, but Reagan's step effectively foreclosed any possibility of an agreement that would permit some U.S. INF missiles to remain in Europe.

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The lesson seems to be that nuclear modernization and arms control policies in the West are inevitably linked, politically as well as substantively. This means the West will be vulnerable to Soviet manipulation, however formal or informal the link. That vulnerability was reduced in the INF case because the decisions on the two tracks were reached and implemented collectively by Americans and West Europeans.

V

NATO's principal problem during the debate over INF was its inability to agree on a consistent set of strategic and arms control objectives. The INF missiles were in the first instance a response to Soviet SS-20s and the political and military challenge they represented. For some, the missiles were simply a symbol of the American political commitment to defend Western Europe. Others argued that the missiles would fill a gap in NATO's land-based long-range nuclear capabilities, taking over some of the tasks of dual-capable aircraft and thereby augmenting NATO's conventional capabilities. American strategists were attracted to the flexibility of these missiles and their capability for militarily effective and discriminate nuclear strikes: the projected survivability of the missiles would promote stability by reducing pressures on both sides to preempt. And the opportunity which they presented for wide allied participation in their basing in five West European countries was seen as a major political attraction.

Discussions in NATO's High Level Group of senior defense officials failed to produce a more precise strategic rationale that was acceptable to both West Europeans and Americans. Everyone could agree that NATO's nuclear weapons aim to deter an attack by posing the threat of an incalculably costly response. To be credible, the enemy must view these weapons as militarily capable of inflicting those costs. But it is difficult to devise plausible scenarios for using nuclear weapons in Europe, and no one expects that a nuclear war could be "won" in the classic military sense. Some commentators saw the missiles as serving the military objective of repelling an invasion. Others posited a political objective: to demonstrate to the adversary the immediate and potential costs of continuing to fight, with the hope—though not the assurance—that he would reconsider his goals and stop fighting. Questions then arose as to whether the new missiles were to threaten primarily the SS-20s or some other types of military targets. The High

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Level Group simply enumerated multiple rationales and strategic objectives for the INF missiles. Political leaders in Western Europe and the United States found it easiest to sell the INF missiles as a response to the SS-20s.

As a result, the 1979 decision was ambiguous as to the precise relationship between its modernization and arms control tracks. If the strategic rationale was to reduce deficiencies in NATO's capabilities, then modernization was necessary regardless of the SS-20 deployments. But if these Soviet missiles were the stimulus, then arms control could provide a solution through reductions. The language of the 1979 decision itself tilted strongly toward the former argument, but in response to pressures from the West Germans and Dutch, it included the "theoretical possibility" that arms control could provide an alternative to any missile deployments. More recently, advocates of the treaty, not surprisingly, have emphasized the latter position.

In 1981 the Reagan Administration, with strong support from the West German government, proposed that the West's arms control objective be the worldwide elimination of INF missiles. This "zero option" had many attractions. It was dramatic, it responded to public opposition to INF missiles, and it put the Soviets on the defensive. It committed the Reagan Administration to arms control negotiations at a time when it preferred simply to build up the West's arms. The zero option was easy to explain and radical in its goal. No one seriously thought the Soviets would agree, so few worried about the strategic implications. But simultaneously with achieving a consensus on its arms control objectives, the West defined, by implication, the strategic rationale for the INF missiles: to respond to the SS-20 missiles.

European governments were always uneasy about the zero option, but they were never in a position to challenge the strong commitment of the Reagan Administration. Prior to 1983, setting a level other than zero would have had the effect of committing them to some deployments, come what may. It was easier to sell the missiles on the basis that they might not be necessary. That possibility remained attractive to European publics even after 1983, though the peace movements were highly skeptical. European leaders could not afford politically to be in favor of less arms control than President Reagan. They also feared that any criticism they might make could jeopardize his support for the negotiations themselves. Nevertheless, many

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privately hoped for an agreement leaving some U.S. missiles in Europe.

Opportunities later arose for the West to return to arms control objectives consistent with the other strategic arguments for the INF missiles. From 1983 to 1986 the West pursued an "interim" goal of reducing INF missiles to as low a level as possible. But in 1986, when Gorbachev offered to eliminate all Soviet SS-20s in Europe, the West was trapped. President Reagan did renew his call for a global ban, but this tactic did not in the end provide an escape from the zero option. For the Soviets simply refused to agree to any U.S. INF deployments.

In short, if the West now believes that the elimination of INF missiles undermines its strategy, it has only itself to blame for wasting six years of opportunities to revise its negotiating objective. The most important lesson of the INF experience is an obvious one: that the West should think in advance about the strategic as well as political implications of its arms control proposals. Simplicity in strategic rationales and arms control proposals will be attractive when responding to Soviet initiatives and public pressures. But dangers will arise when the West's arms control policies are inconsistent with its strategic requirements. In arguing that the INF treaty is a success because it has eliminated a whole class of nuclear weapons on both sides, the West now risks undermining public support in the future for strategies requiring the retention of some nuclear weapons irrespective of Soviet deployments and for less radical arms control proposals—specifically for options above zero.

VI

Political imperatives were primarily responsible for the West's other major objectives in negotiating the INF treaty. The British and French governments were adamant in their opposition to any inclusion of their nuclear forces. Despite certain sympathies on the left in West Germany and the United States for Soviet demands in this regard, NATO refused and the Soviets acquiesced. NATO solidarity was essential, but the Soviets probably also concluded (as they had in past SALT negotiations) that gaining constraints on U.S. nuclear forces was the more important goal.

The West's strategy does not require it to match the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons, and the NATO program of 572 INF missiles was far below the projected number of Soviet SS-20 missile warheads. But politically the West had no choice but to

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seek equality of rights and limits in any arms control agreement. The INF treaty not only established equal ceilings of zero, but required that the Soviets make much larger reductions—especially since the U.S. deployment was by no means completed.

The Reagan Administration, having accused the Soviet Union of violating previous arms control agreements, insisted upon very intrusive verification measures, and in this sense the treaty represents an extraordinary success. The Soviet Union agreed, albeit only at a very late stage in the negotiations, to an extensive exchange of data, far more detailed than in any previous treaty or negotiation. The data will cover the locations, numbers and technical characteristics of each side's intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems, and will be updated after the treaty enters force, as well as when the systems are removed from declared sites and destroyed.

The treaty provides for a specific number of on-site inspections of declared sites in the territory of the United States, the Soviet Union and their allies. These inspections will allow each side to count the other's missiles, launchers and support structures, to observe their destruction, to determine that no more are left, and (for 13 years) to check formerly declared facilities on short notice to ensure that no missiles have secretly returned. Each side will also have the right to station resident inspectors to monitor continuously a location where INF missiles have in the past been assembled, for the United States the SS-20 facility at Votkinsk and for the Soviet Union the Pershing missile facility at Magna, Utah.

The verification provisions are extremely detailed and include a schedule for reductions, procedures for removing the nuclear warheads and destroying the missiles, a description of the rights and responsibilities of the host and inspecting nations, and cooperative measures to ensure that no SS-20s are concealed within SS-25 garages. A Special Verification Commission will also be established to resolve problems relating to treaty compliance.

The verification regime will not remove all uncertainties or guarantee that the Soviets are not hiding INF missiles. The U.S. intelligence community does not know how many spare missiles the Soviets actually have. Short-notice inspections are limited to declared sites known to have housed the missiles. They cannot be required for any merely suspect site. The veteran arms negotiator, Paul Nitze, acknowledged that "only 'anytime, anywhere' inspection without a possibility of refusal

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would provide hope of such a guarantee, and we believe ceding the same right in the INF treaty to Soviet inspectors on our territory is not in our interest." In fact the United States backed off its initial sweeping inspection demands (put forward in the context of a proposed agreement allowing some INF deployments, production and testing) in order to protect sensitive facilities in the United States and Western Europe. Although some clandestine stockpiles of non-deployed systems are possible, the inability to test or train with these missiles would make secret retention of them militarily unattractive. According to Nitze, the verification provisions in the INF treaty aim to prevent the Soviets from moving beyond the limits in a militarily significant way without being detected.

The INF treaty, at the West's behest, spares the nuclear warheads and guidance systems of the missiles. Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) has asked why the treaty does not eliminate "the part of nuclear weaponry that kills people and destroys property." The answer is that the United States wanted to recover the nuclear material and safeguard secret information about the warhead designs.

The West also resisted Soviet pressures for a restrictive non-circumvention provision. The treaty simply states that the parties "shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions." One should nevertheless expect that the Soviets will continue to argue—as they have already begun to do—that NATO's modernization of its nuclear forces undermines the spirit, if not the letter, of the treaty.

A lesson of the INF treaty is that questions concerning nuclear weapons can no longer be debated and decided in the secrecy of NATO meetings. Publics became actively involved, and Western governments had to win their support. Critical to the West's success in the negotiations was NATO's solidarity and its success in persuading Western publics of the validity of its arguments. Whether the various precedents can be sustained in future negotiations will depend upon the circumstances, for the Soviets can be expected to renew their objections.

VII

The INF treaty singles out for elimination all land-based missiles of a specified range, once again accomplishing the West's goals of giving priority to the SS-20 threat and of reducing the complexity of the negotiations. The problem is

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that nuclear weapons of intercontinental range and those of shorter range, if in the right location, constitute an almost identical threat.

For this reason, NATO was particularly anxious in 1979 for SALT II to be ratified and for reductions in strategic nuclear weapons to accompany any limitations on INF. But Soviet-American differences over the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty have blocked progress in Strategic Arms Reductions Talks. While Gorbachev periodically sought to link the INF treaty with achieving constraints on SDI, he acceded in 1987 to the West's preference to proceed separately. As a result the Soviets have thousands of strategic warheads which can threaten the same targets in Western Europe as those previously covered by the missiles being eliminated.

When tabling the zero option, the United States included collateral constraints on shorter-range missiles (with ranges of 500–1,000 kilometers) to prevent the Soviets from circumventing an INF agreement through a shorter-range deployment in Eastern Europe. Subsequently the West indicated a preference for equal global ceilings on shorter-range missiles at unspecified levels. By the same logic, the United States should have proposed constraints on the residual short-range missiles (ranges less than 500 kilometers), but instead called for a commitment to further negotiations.

Gorbachev initially resisted Western efforts to limit shorter-range missiles. But once again the West's proposal provided him with the opportunity to promote his goals of ridding Europe of U.S. nuclear weapons and of creating divisions within NATO. He proposed a global shorter-range ban, including the destruction of American warheads on the 72 West German Pershing 1A missiles. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz favored the global ban on U.S. and Soviet shorter-range systems, as the Soviets had over 350 deployed missiles and the United States none. He let it be known that a West European rejection of a global ban would need to be accompanied by a commitment to deploy new U.S. missiles instead. West Europeans, and especially the West Germans, faced competing pressures. They were anxious to reduce the Soviet threat, but they were worried about the strategic implications of eliminating another category of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. In the end, public support for the "double-zero" option and prospective opposition to new U.S. missiles proved decisive. They really had no choice but to agree.

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As for the West German Pershing 1As, the United States argued that these were third-party systems with U.S. warheads, and neither were subject to limits in the INF treaty. But West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, responding to both domestic and Soviet pressures, agreed to dismantle the launchers "with the final elimination" of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles. Separately and outside the INF treaty, the United States made a commitment that the warheads would be subject to the procedures specified in the Protocol on Elimination. In both these cases, serious strains developed within the West. The agreement also established the dangerous precedent of a bilateral Soviet-American agreement including a separate understanding on third-country nuclear forces.

Because of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of distinguishing between missiles carrying nuclear warheads and those with conventional warheads, the treaty bans both. In return for the West's giving up the possibility of new conventionally armed missiles, the Soviets will destroy over 300 of their deployed shorter-range missiles. In light of the fact that worries about the threat posed by these and short-range Soviet missiles had over the past few years led some to recommend that NATO deploy an antitactical ballistic missile, the banning of all INF missiles seems to be to the West's advantage. It does, however, set a precedent for banning conventionally armed missiles in future nuclear agreements.

Over the course of the negotiations the West accomplished all its objectives. The political and military reasons for each of these can be explained by the circumstances at the time, and they remain persuasive. To reject the treaty now would risk undermining the public support which the West achieved for its strategic and arms control policies, and that public support is far more important to the credibility of the West's strategy than any INF missiles. Nevertheless, the worry now is that the net effect of the INF treaty may serve the longer term strategic goals of the Soviet Union more than those of the United States—hence the sense of unease.

VIII

Drawing the correct conclusions from the INF experience is certainly important, but the West does not have the luxury of calm reflection. The treaty has provoked a debate over how best to promote peace and security in Europe over the next

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decade. Americans and West Europeans are both questioning past strategies and approaches.

Americans have always been ambivalent about the central role nuclear weapons play in NATO's strategy. Most recently this has been manifested in calls by liberals for pledges of no first use and by conservatives for new nuclear weapons capable of limited and discriminate attacks. Putting aside the controversy over SDI, President Reagan reflected the preference of many Americans in seeking to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" and in suggesting during the Reykjavik summit the possibility of eliminating all nuclear weapons. Support is also increasing for reductions of American troops in Europe because of constraints on defense spending, frustration with West European defense efforts, and a desire to protect American interests in other parts of the world.

West Europeans are anxious about these developments and critical of many American foreign and economic policies. Once again they are searching for ways to promote their own military as well as economic cooperation. The Western European Union (WEU) has been revived, and in its recent "Platform on European Security Interests" called for "a more cohesive European defense identity." The French and West Germans have formed a Council on Defense and Security to coordinate defense policy and are planning to establish a joint army brigade. The British and French are considering cooperative programs on nuclear as well as conventional weapons, and they are studying the problems facing their nuclear forces. But many obstacles exist, and the rhetoric is still far ahead of concrete steps.

The WEU platform also affirmed the need for a strategy based on both nuclear and conventional forces, "only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk." But West Europeans do not share a common view on the future role of nuclear weapons. Both the left and the right in West Germany favor follow-on negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, while the British and French are strongly opposed. The INF treaty has reduced support for unilateralism among West European publics, but pressures will almost certainly arise for further reductions in nuclear weapons as the Soviet disarmament campaign proceeds.

The problem is that while Americans and West Europeans are both searching for a new approach to promoting peace and security in Europe, the West has no real alternative but to

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proceed on the basis of its current strategy. The Soviet Union and its allies will continue to possess large numbers of nuclear and conventional weapons, and with these they will be able to threaten Western Europe. The West too will have nuclear and conventional forces and in its military strategy will wish to have flexibility and options. American interests in Europe will remain vital, and West Europeans cannot alone provide for their own defense. Changes can therefore only be made on the margin of what is the current strategy of flexible response. Some changes are, nevertheless, inevitable.

In thinking about how best to proceed, the West needs to appreciate what the INF treaty will in fact mean for Europe. While eliminating all their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the United States and Soviet Union will each retain thousands of other strategic and theater nuclear weapons. These can all be modernized. The United States will have some 4,600 nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, including dual-capable aircraft, short-range missiles and artillery. Some 320,000 American soldiers are currently stationed in Europe, along with equipment for two or three more army divisions.

What is uncertain is how the West wishes to respond to growing pressures on both sides of the Atlantic to reduce reliance upon U.S. nuclear and conventional forces for the defense of Western Europe. Lacking is an overall approach defining a consistent set of strategic and arms control policies.

If the past is any guide, few will be attracted to defining an overall approach to these issues. Immediate problems always take priority. But such an approach would help the West in tackling all the specific questions now raised by the INF treaty and in responding to Gorbachev's arms control initiatives. Even more important, such an approach could provide the basis for gaining the support of Western publics for the measures that will be required in the future to assure peace and stability in Europe.

In the absence of agreement on a new approach, Western governments are simply making pronouncements about the need for improvements in nuclear and conventional forces without any clear objectives or concept of sufficiency. In arms control, they are setting up a variety of roadblocks to future agreements. Secretary Shultz, for example, has stated that reductions in battlefield nuclear weapons cannot be made until the Soviets make large cuts in conventional forces. The risk, to draw on the lessons of the INF treaty, is that Gorbachev will

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seize the opportunity to promote his goal of eliminating U.S. nuclear weapons and offer such a trade. He is not likely to agree to reductions sufficient to establish an overall conventional balance. But the West will again be on the defensive, not knowing whether it favors further reductions in nuclear weapons but facing public pressures to agree.

The most important lesson of the INF treaty is therefore quite simple: the West needs to define strategic and arms control objectives which are mutually consistent and serve alliance interests. An important first step would be to design an overall approach to assuring the security of Western Europe based on new judgments as to the respective roles of Americans and West Europeans.

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Jeffrey Record
David B. Rivkin, Jr.

DEFENDING POST-INF EUROPE

A substantial denuclearization of Europe is at hand. It takes the form of the U.S.-Soviet treaty that eliminates two entire classes of nuclear missiles (though not their warheads) now deployed in Europe and the U.S.S.R. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has profound implications for conventional deterrence and defense on the Continent. It is also likely to have major repercussions for NATO's cohesion, arms control negotiations and the future of U.S.-European relations.

Critics and skeptics, among them Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, Congressman Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.), recently retired NATO Supreme Commander General Bernard Rogers and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.), contend that any degree of denuclearization of Europe not tied in some way to a redress of the conventional military balance, which continues to favor the Soviet Union, could make Europe safe for conventional warfare on a scale not witnessed since 1945.

Even partial denuclearization, it is asserted, would work against NATO by removing many of the very weapons that the alliance for almost forty years has judged an effective and comparatively cheap means of deterring the Soviet Union's use of its numerically superior and geographically advantaged conventional forces in Europe.

Finally, critics are concerned over the treaty's direct and unfavorable impact on future modernization of NATO's conventional defenses. The treaty bans deployment of *all* ballistic and cruise missiles—non-nuclear as well as nuclear—with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Such a ban forecloses to NATO the preferred, long-term means of implementing its declared Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) strategy, which calls for deep

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interdiction strikes using conventional munitions on Soviet air bases, communications centers and westward-moving ground reinforcement echelons in Eastern Europe. Critics further point out that removal of theater nuclear missiles and banning of non-nuclear missiles will compel the alliance to allocate a significantly larger portion of its deployed tactical air power, already severely burdened by non-nuclear operational requirements, to theater nuclear strike missions.

Supporters insist that the treaty is a major arms control breakthrough that could help promote a comprehensive strategic arms agreement. It is further claimed that removal from Europe of U.S. Pershing 2 and Soviet SS-20 ballistic missiles, along with other ballistic and cruise missiles, will enhance conflict stability on the Continent by lowering the chances that a war in Europe, an admittedly remote possibility, would escalate to nuclear Armageddon. It is also argued that reduced reliance on NATO's nuclear "crutch" will at long last prompt greater NATO investment in Europe's conventional defenses, plagued for decades by deficiencies regarded as tolerable only in the presence of a robust theater nuclear deterrent.

Critics, however, manifest little confidence in NATO's willingness and ability to offset denuclearization by improving the alliance's conventional defenses. The history of NATO has in fact been a history of heavy reliance on nuclear weapons, driven in part by a congenital reluctance of NATO's European members to fund anything other than the minimal conventional force improvements believed necessary to keep the Americans happy. Since the early 1960s, the United States has sought conventional defenses in Europe that would be capable, in the event of war, of shifting the onus of escalation onto Moscow, or at least raising the nuclear threshold. The Europeans, in contrast, have resisted acquiring a strong conventional defense, in part for fear that it would serve to decouple the U.S. strategic deterrent from Europe's defense by eliminating equitable nuclear risk-sharing among alliance members.

Thus, deficiencies in the alliance's conventional force posture continue to be tolerated, notwithstanding the loss of strategic nuclear superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the 1970s, and even the prospect of substantial theater denuclearization. General Rogers has declared that NATO's present conventional forces probably could not mount an effective defense of the alliance's central front for more than a few days.

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II

How bad is the situation? Is NATO, as the standard "doom and gloom" analyses argue, actually inferior to the Warsaw Pact? Do not NATO's numerous qualitative advantages more than offset the pact's numerical superiority? Does it really matter how many extra divisions the pact has in its rear area, since the finite length of the inter-German border limits the number of divisions the Soviets can put forward?

In fact, recent "revisionist" literature argues that traditional "bean-counting" assessments of the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance are either misleading or irrelevant. Its underlying premises are that numbers of troops, tanks and airplanes are not decisive indicators of military prowess and that the Warsaw Pact's superiority in central Europe is insufficient to overwhelm NATO's defenses, since an attacker needs something on the order of a three-to-one superiority to achieve a breakthrough.[1]

Yet defense—even a numerically superior one—is not inherently superior to offense; if it were, the Germans would have been defeated in 1940, and the Israelis in 1956, 1967 and 1973. To be sure, a completely ready defender, with his forces fully deployed, fighting from prepared positions, and having robust operational reserves at hand, enjoys important and often decisive advantages over an attacker. But will NATO forces on D-Day be completely ready, fully deployed, ensconced in prepared positions and backed by robust operational reserves?

In reality, NATO's ground forces are maldeployed and dangerously short of operational reserves (all but one of the *Bundeswehr*'s 12 divisions are committed to the initial defense of the German border). Moreover, NATO's doctrine of forward defense commits those forces to a more or less rigid linear defense unaided by adequate fortifications or other physical barriers. The Federal Republic of Germany rejects any defense doctrine that would trade space for time in order to achieve greater operational flexibility, and Bonn continues to refuse to permit the erection of suitable barrier defenses along the inter-German border for fear of encouraging Germany's permanent

[1] Such judgments reveal a startling degree of strategic naïveté and historical ignorance. Against the spectacular German blitzkrieg on France and the Low Countries in 1940, the defenders enjoyed a numerical advantage over the *Wehrmacht* of 1.4:1 in men, 1.2:1 in divisions, 1.2:1 in tanks and 1.5:1 in artillery. The threat facing NATO today along the inter-German border, unlike that posed to France in 1940, is that of blitzkreig conducted by a *numerically superior* force.

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political division. Thus, even if NATO had adequate warning of an impending attack and acted on that warning in a timely manner, it could still easily find itself in a position worse than the French faced in 1940.

NATO's problems are further compounded by an inability to find a satisfactory response to the Soviet operational method, which has been specifically tailored to exploit NATO's mobilization and deployment problems, inadequate operational reserves and lack of barrier defenses. The Soviets long ago discarded their traditionally rigid steamroller approach to ground warfare in favor of a flexible, fluid, infiltrative method of detecting and exploiting weaknesses in NATO's defenses. Once a suitable gap has been found, it becomes the *schwerpunkt* (strong point) through which the Soviets pour available operational maneuver groups and reinforcements. NATO's ability to hold the line is further degraded by the lack of an effective response to the emerging Soviet capabilities to attack NATO air bases and other key military installations with conventionally armed missiles and aircraft.

But these and other conventional force deficiencies have been present since NATO's inception; given that thousands of nuclear weapons remain in Europe, does the INF treaty really lower the quality of NATO's deterrent? Here, much depends on what happens next.

Unfortunately, there is reason to believe that Europe's denuclearization will not stop with the treaty. The antinuclear rhetoric of the Reagan Administration, reinforced by the Reykjavik summit, a partial "demobilization" of the Soviet threat in the eyes of the West European public and the signing of the INF treaty, has set in motion a potentially irresistible process of denuclearization. As this process evolves, nuclear weapons will be devalued from the standpoint of *both* reassurance and deterrence, and resort to nuclear fire will be considered less and less thinkable by both our allies and our adversaries. One American strategist, Edward Luttwak, has already proclaimed a "post-nuclear era." He contends that, as far as deterrence is concerned, it really does not matter how far along the denuclearization continuum we have progressed: what is significant are the perceived trends, which may well cause decay in the quality of nuclear deterrence irrespective of actual changes in force structures and nuclear employment policies.

Some analysts believe that adverse trends bearing on nuclear deterrence can be partially offset or even neutralized by the

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projected growth in British and French nuclear forces. This argument, however, fails to take Soviet perceptions into account. While concerned about the British and French nuclear modernization, Moscow has always assigned far less value to European nuclear weapons than to the U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. The former were always perceived as weapons of last resort, incapable of substituting for any diminution in the credibility of American nuclear deterrence.

Concerns about the looming denuclearization of NATO's defenses should not be overblown. Nuclear deterrence, even in a weakened state, will endure as long as nuclear weapons exist. However, it is foolish to believe that nothing has changed and that we can proceed with business as usual.

Present West German attitudes suggest that denuclearization is not just a remote prospect. Long before the signing of the INF treaty, Bonn repeatedly warned the United States that inclusion of the "second zero" (i.e., elimination of shorter-range missiles with ranges of 500–1,000 kilometers) in the INF deal would jeopardize the 1983 Montebello decision of NATO ministers to modernize NATO's tactical nuclear weapons. This, indeed, is what has happened. The West German government's present position is that modernization of tactical nuclear weapons is undesirable and would spark a replay of antinuclear demonstrations. Accordingly, the stated German preference is for, first, reducing NATO and Warsaw Pact tactical weapons to equal levels and, then, eventually eliminating them altogether. Given strong Soviet (and East German) pressure for the "third zero," Bonn's position is particularly troublesome for NATO, especially since it pits the Federal Republic against the United States, France and Great Britain.

In sum, the INF treaty does indeed mark a watershed for NATO's nuclear deterrent: the long-standing deficiencies in NATO's conventional force posture are no longer tolerable.

III

The INF treaty places a premium not only on invigorating NATO's conventional forces but also on the need to give greater attention to actual warfighting capabilities as opposed to deterrence. This, in turn, suggests the need for both higher conventional force levels (Congressman Les Aspin has concluded that ten additional ground force divisions will be required) and resolution of NATO's major problems with its non-nuclear force posture.

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But herein lies the rub: it is highly likely, for reasons mostly having little to do with the INF treaty, that the non-nuclear military balance in Europe in the post-treaty era will be even more unfavorable to NATO than it is today. National force contributions, including those of the U.S. Army Europe, to the defense of the critical central front are far more likely to shrink (and shrink substantially) than to grow during the next ten years. There are, moreover, few grounds for believing that qualitative conventional force improvements will exceed the characteristically minimal and routine.

Significantly, defense budgets have not kept pace with inflation in many NATO countries, and for some countries budgets have declined in real terms. Of NATO's 16 nations, only Italy, Luxembourg, Norway and Turkey plan to increase real defense spending in 1988. Given the well-entrenched demands of West European welfare states and the projected sluggish growth of Western economies, sizable increases in NATO defense budgets are most unlikely.

These budgetary trends are reinforced by diminished perceptions of the threat. The new Soviet leadership has succeeded in greatly changing the Western public's assessments of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev has manifested both a keen appreciation of the importance of Western public opinion and an ability to manipulate it. Thus, for example, a recent *Pravda* article proudly noted that a growing number of West Europeans view the U.S.S.R. more positively than they view the United States, and predicted that this trend is likely to endure.

Demographic trends throughout NATO are also adverse. The most unsettling are in the Federal Republic of Germany, which has the lowest fertility rates in the world and whose 495,000 men under arms form the core of the alliance's forward defenses. There is virtually no possibility that the *Bundeswehr* can maintain its present strength beyond the early 1990s. The size of Germany's male population of military age (women are barred by law from bearing arms) has been dropping sharply for years and will continue to do so for the remainder of the century. The German army requires an annual replenishment pool of 225,000 new conscripts. Only 125,000 will be available by the early 1990s, however. This means that by 1995 the *Bundeswehr* could shrivel to a force two-thirds its present strength (i.e., to 335,000).

Though the present German government has mandated a number of remedial measures, including an extension of the

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first term of service from 15 to 18 months, Ministry of Defense officials privately concede that these measures offer no long-term solution to the manpower crunch. Within the next decade, they say, the *Bundeswehr* is almost certain to decline to a force of 400,000–450,000 men. A smaller *Bundeswehr* will weaken the defense of the central front, and could provide a perverse excuse for other NATO countries to cut their own forces. Certainly, unilateral German force cuts would provide powerful political ammunition to those in the U.S. Congress who have long favored U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe.

There may be reductions in other national force contributions. There are no prospects for Belgian or Dutch force expansion; indeed, Belgium, which in 1986 met only 38 percent of the key force goals NATO annually establishes for each member, is considering a reduction in the poorly equipped 30,000-man force it deploys in Germany. French defense nuclear programs, which have long starved French conventional forces of timely modernization, are likely to account for an even larger share of the defense budget than they have in the past.

Nor can a robust British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) any longer be taken for granted. British defense expenditure is declining in real terms, and for the first time in decades defense expenditure as a percentage of gross national product is headed downward. These trends, coupled with the Thatcher government's determination to modernize Britain's nuclear deterrent by acquiring the costly Trident, could make a reduction in the 56,000-man BAOR unavoidable. Some German Ministry of Defense officials believe that at least one of the BAOR's three divisions will be withdrawn from Germany within the next ten years.

Even the future of U.S. forces in Europe is in doubt. A number of factors seem to be converging on behalf of a sizable reduction in the American force presence in Europe by the end of the century. These factors include: (1) mounting political pressures on the U.S. defense budget, which has been declining in real terms since the Reagan Administration's first term; (2) growing demands on U.S. armed forces in the Persian Gulf and other places outside the NATO area; (3) adverse demographic trends that call into question the all-volunteer force's ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of qualified people over the next decade; (4) rising public and congressional anger over what is perceived to be Europe's continued

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unwillingness to bear its fair share of the common defense burden; (5) continuation of a comparative disinvestment in conventional force modernization and expansion; and (6) the possibility that a new American president would consider a strategic reallocation of U.S. forces overseas.

There is also the unpleasant fact that some of our NATO allies are no longer prepared to tolerate a significant U.S. force presence on their soil. Spanish expulsion of U.S. F-16 squadrons and the probable loss of U.S. bases in Greece will both degrade the southern flank's already porous defenses and fuel arguments in the U.S. Congress for U.S. troop withdrawals elsewhere in Europe.

Moreover, within the traditionally Eurocentric American foreign policy establishment there is growing division over the strategic wisdom and moral validity of continuing to maintain a large force presence in Europe which, together with forces withheld in the United States for Europe's reinforcement, consumes about one-half of all U.S. defense expenditure.

Until the 1980s, calls for pulling some or all U.S. troops out of Europe came almost exclusively from liberals, libertarians, and Midwestern and Rocky Mountain isolationists, some of whom opposed U.S. admission to NATO in 1949 as an unwise entry into the very kind of entangling alliance against which George Washington cautioned. The Mansfield resolutions and amendments of the 1960s and 1970s drew upon this sentiment.

Today, however, prominent members of America's foreign policy elite have joined the ranks of those who favor a reduction in America's present investment in Europe's defenses. Henry Kissinger, condemning Europe's excessive reliance on nuclear deterrence at the expense of needed improvements in conventional defenses, has talked of "a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion, perhaps up to one-half, of our present ground forces" in Europe. Zbigniew Brzezinski, bemoaning Europe's continuing status as "an American military protectorate some thirty years after Western Europe's economic recovery" from World War II, and wishing to build up U.S. military strength for Persian Gulf contingencies, has called for a withdrawal of up to 100,000 U.S. troops from Europe. Neoconservative commentator Irving Kristol, arguing that "NATO subverts Western Europe's will to resist and interferes with America's responsibilities as a global power," has proposed a U.S. "withdrawal from that commitment and the reconstitution of NATO as an all-European organization that would boost the

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morale of West European nations by affirming their independence and national identity."

Indeed, the view that Europe's defense should be de-emphasized in American military planning and resource allocation in favor of other contingencies seems to have gained widespread support among American strategic cognoscenti. A 1988 report prepared for President Reagan by The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy is highly illustrative in that regard.[2] The commission, whose members included Albert Wohlstetter, Fred Iklé, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, concluded that the possibility of a large-scale Soviet attack in central Europe was becoming increasingly remote, and therefore should no longer dominate U.S. strategic planning. The report called instead for increased attention to meeting threats posed by low-intensity conflicts and regional instabilities outside Europe, along with appropriate reallocations of U.S. defense budgetary resources.

More than a few Europeans also regard an open-ended major U.S. force presence in Europe as undesirable, politically unsustainable or both. Political opposition parties in Germany, Britain and other key NATO countries have declared themselves against a continued U.S. nuclear presence of any kind on their national territory, and have made it abundantly clear that they would shed no tears over a smaller U.S. ground force presence in Europe. Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a stalwart of the transatlantic military partnership during the 1960s and 1970s, has now concluded that:

> Dependency corrupts and corrupts not only the dependent partners, but also the oversized partner who is making decisions almost single-handedly. Most of the European governments rely too much on American nuclear weapons and most of them neglect their own conventional defense. An improved military equilibrium requires that the military equipment of the French reserve troops be increased. It also requires more British reserve troops. We need to strengthen the conventional usable German air force and to provide more conventional munitions for the German army. Under such qualitatively and quantitatively improved conditions, a partial withdrawal of American troops would not necessarily be a misfortune. The Europeans would be playing a role of their own.[3]

[2] *Discriminate Deterrence*, Report of The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter, co-chairmen, Washington: G.P.O., January 1988.

[3] "Saving the Western Alliance," *The New York Review of Books*, May 31, 1984, p. 25.

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IV

An alternative to needed conventional defense reform would, of course, be a program to restore NATO's theater nuclear forces to a pre-INF treaty level of prowess and credibility. This is probably an impossible order to fill, however, given the treaty's elimination of NATO's most deterring theater weapons.

The alliance's declared strategy of flexible response, which some observers including Schmidt contend "has long been obsolete," has traditionally rested upon strategic nuclear, theater nuclear and conventional forces—the so-called NATO triad. To be sure, INF aside, NATO still has some 4,600 nuclear weapons in Europe. The vast majority of them, however, are specialized or short-range weapons, including maritime nuclear depth charges, atomic demolition munitions, artillery shells with ranges of only a few miles, and aircraft-deliverable weapons. The longest-range ground-launched missile system remaining in NATO's inventory is the aging Lance (of which there are but 88 in Germany) with a range of less than 70 miles. Nuclear-armed aircraft, of course, are theoretically capable of striking deep into Eastern Europe and even western Russia. But their ability to penetrate formidable Soviet air defenses is far from certain and, in case of war, NATO's tactical air power would be overwhelmed by conventional mission demands. Overall, then, the INF treaty, by eliminating those theater nuclear weapons having the most deterrent value, moves the alliance far down the road to a diad.

There are nevertheless some conceivable additions to NATO's nuclear stockpile that might serve as powerful nuclear force multipliers. Some American force planners, for example, have long argued that NATO should develop a genuine warfighting capability in Europe based on tactical nuclear weapons. This could force the Soviets to disperse their forces and greatly slow down the tempo of offensive operations. This solution, however, whatever its military merits, has never been politically plausible (witness the fate of enhanced-radiation weapons), and is certain to be rejected by allied governments.

Given current sentiments about nuclear weapons among allied publics, the most that NATO probably can hope to do with regard to nuclear forces in Europe is to avoid a further slide toward denuclearization. Yet, even that objective may be difficult to attain. The alliance is deeply split over the issue of

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what to do with NATO's remaining nuclear forces, and Moscow can be expected to prey on these differences.

The British government (if not the average Briton) remains strongly committed to the implementation of the 1983 Montebello decision. Mrs. Thatcher has declared that London's support of the "double zero" deal is predicated upon a continuation of the NATO nuclear force modernization. Both France and the United States also strongly support this course of action. In the wake of the INF treaty, however, West Germany and some of the smaller NATO members, including Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, are strongly opposed to the *implementation of the Montebello decision.*

The two focal points of post-INF nuclear force modernization that have sparked controversy are tactical missiles and nuclear artillery shells. As far as the former are concerned, NATO has been considering replacing its aging Lance tactical missiles in West Germany with a force of several hundred longer-range missiles. There are also some 2,000 nuclear shells for 155-millimeter and 8-inch artillery tubes that need to be replaced. Less politically contentious are potential improvements in NATO's long-range nuclear delivery systems not covered by the INF treaty.

Toward that end, a range of possible force modernization packages is being discussed. One option is to deploy additional F-111 or even B-52 bombers armed with air-launched cruise missiles in Britain. A more modest alternative is to bolster the survivability of NATO's already forward-deployed dual-capable aircraft by equipping them with better electronic countermeasures gear and dispersing these aircraft among a large number of NATO bases. Also being considered is deployment of additional U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles, either on surface ships or on submarines. The ships themselves could be based in Great Britain—something to which the Thatcher government has already agreed. Because none of these options runs afoul of the INF treaty, and none involves systems based on German territory, Bonn has argued that NATO's nuclear security needs can be adequately served through their implementation, thereby avoiding the need to modernize tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Germany.

The German position on tactical weapons must be taken into account, since provoking a major fight with Germany is highly injurious to the long-term health of the alliance. Yet, Bonn's apparent yearning for the "third zero" cannot be allowed to

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become the fulcrum for Germany's eventual denuclearization via the old idea of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe.

Any major weakening of NATO's tactical nuclear forces—as a result of negotiated reduction or German refusal to permit modernization of weapons deployed in Germany—would also complicate conventional defense. Tactical nuclear weapons compel the Soviets to operate with tactically dispersed forces, thus facilitating conventional defense. This effect of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be fully duplicated by NATO's long-range nuclear forces.

To resolve this dilemma, NATO might consider offering a compromise to Bonn. Specifically, NATO could offer to drop plans for the full modernization of all tactical nuclear weapons in Germany in exchange for agreement to modernize a limited number of tactical missiles and artillery shells. To further ease German concerns, the new missiles could be deployed only with U.S. units, and the new nuclear shells could be stored outside of Germany as long as agreed procedures were developed for redeploying them to Germany in case of an emergency. It is important, however, that the United States not offer any new concessions prematurely; instead, we should strike a package deal with the Germans.

NATO's overall focus in the years ahead should be on maintaining a smaller, modernized force of tactical nuclear weapons and on bolstering its long-range nuclear systems which are not covered by the INF treaty. Such a program, if successfully implemented, would not restore theater nuclear deterrence to a quality now conveyed by the Pershing 2 and ground-launched cruise missiles; nor would it excuse conventional defense improvements. It would, however, stop any slide toward further denuclearization.

V

As for strengthening NATO's conventional defenses, the option of active-duty force expansion would seem out of the question for the reasons already discussed. There has nevertheless been a proliferation of suggestions on how to finesse the problem. While most of these ideas are not new, the INF treaty has prompted renewed interest in bold and innovative solutions to the alliance's old defense problems. The starting point for most reform proposals is the claim that NATO spends more on defense than the Warsaw Pact, but ends up with less to show for it because of inefficient resource allocation. This

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places a premium, it is argued, on greater national force specialization within NATO, with some allies concentrating on developing air and naval power, and others furnishing the bulk of the ground forces. In addition, it is claimed, greater investment ought to be made in mobilization infrastructure and reserve forces to generate an ability to mobilize rapidly ten to 15 more divisions, which could serve as operational reserves.

Often accompanying these proposals are calls for relaxation of the present doctrine of forward defense so as to permit greater operational flexibility. This would mean reducing forces committed to the initial defense of the inter-German border in favor of larger forces withheld farther back for purposes of counterattack.

Another set of proposed solutions would alter NATO strategy and doctrine more deliberately to capitalize on NATO strengths by pitting them against specific Warsaw Pact weaknesses. Samuel Huntington has recommended, for example, that NATO develop a retaliatory offensive strategy to send forces deep into the heart of Eastern Europe. He contends that NATO's current lack of large-scale offensive capabilities has enabled the Soviets to concentrate all of their own resources on offensive operations.

Still another suggestion is to implement FOFA fully and increase the overall spatial depth of the engagement with the Pact. The objective here is not just to strike at the Soviet second-echelon forces, but to coordinate deep strikes with the close-in battle so as to disrupt and slow down Soviet forces. Those who favor this approach also suggest that it be adopted throughout NATO, rather than be limited only to the U.S. forces. So far, however, the Europeans have embraced only a minimalist version of FOFA, which many allies still confuse with the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. To the extent they are interested in attacks beyond the battle line, their emphasis seems to be on short, limited strikes, directed primarily against Soviet forces inside NATO territory. West Germany has categorically rejected ground-based counterattacks beyond the inter-German border.

Many defense reform ideas have considerable conceptual merit. Yet, for a variety of political and bureaucratic reasons, they are unlikely to be adopted by the alliance. As John Hawes, a senior State Department official, recently observed: "There is no quick fix to NATO's problems; if there were, NATO would have adopted it long ago. NATO, for example, is not going to

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replace forward defense with heavily offensive or dispersed defensive strategies. Nor is NATO going to radically change its force structure."[4]

Prospects for greater Anglo-French and Franco-German military cooperation have also been cited as a means of strengthening both deterrence and defense in Europe. France has already proposed to Great Britain joint development of an air-launched nuclear weapon as well as a program to coordinate targeting of British and French nuclear forces. (Britain has accepted the former but rejected the latter.) France has also sought to strengthen defense ties with Germany, proposing formation of a Franco-German brigade (which, unfortunately, would not fall under the control of NATO integrated military command) and going to great lengths to assure Bonn of prompt French response to a Soviet attack on Germany.

These are welcome developments, to be sure. But prospects for truly effective European defense cooperation remain severely constrained by Germany's singular military relationship with the United States, France's refusal to place its forces under NATO's integrated military command and Great Britain's special nuclear ties to the United States. There are also the overall political constraints inherent in NATO, which make timely mobilization in response to an ambiguous strategic warning unlikely. Moreover, any attempt to bolster the European pillar of the alliance must start from a recognition that NATO's overall conventional defense "pie" is likely to be smaller in the post-INF treaty era than it is today. European defense cooperation will have to run hard just to stay in place.

What about technological remedies? Theoretically, NATO might make do with smaller conventional forces if it could achieve a decisive technological advantage over the Warsaw Pact in conventional arms. No affordable revolutionary technological miracle appears in sight, however. Moreover, the alliance has already demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to fund fully the acquisition of even those so-called emerging technologies deemed indispensable to its declared goal of achieving a robust FOFA capability against the Warsaw Pact.

Furthermore, it must be assumed that the Soviets will undertake, as they have in the past, whatever technological and

[4] "Improving the Balance of Conventional Forces in Europe," speech presented Mar. 27, 1987, at a National Defense University symposium, "The Future of Conventional Defense Improvements in NATO."

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operational countermeasures they deem necessary to prevent a decisive qualitative breakthrough by NATO. During the past twenty years NATO's technological lead over the Soviet Union in conventional weaponry has been eroding, not growing. In fact, in key categories of ground warfare technologies, such as reactive armor and mobile antitank systems, the Soviets now enjoy a decided edge over NATO. This is not to argue that NATO should cease to pursue such potential breakthrough technologies as low-observables, robotics, railguns and anti-theater ballistic missile systems; rather, it is simply to recognize that the history of NATO provides no basis for believing that technology can solve the alliance's long-standing conventional force deficiencies.

VI

The conclusion is that NATO is highly unlikely to make the conventional force improvements seemingly dictated by the INF treaty. This leaves open only one road to redressing the non-nuclear military balance in Europe: reduction of the Soviet threat. Such a reduction could come about via either unilateral actions by Moscow or arms control negotiations. Yet, there is little apparent prospect for unilateral Soviet action or an East-West arms control agreement that would reduce or eliminate the threat of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Europe.

Some Western analysts have argued that Gorbachev, having already taken bold steps in the nuclear arms control area, may move toward stabilizing reductions in conventional forces. The apparent assumptions behind this view are that Gorbachev wants to reduce Soviet defense spending, that he is not really concerned about the threat of war, and, hence, that he does not take Soviet warfighting requirements seriously. It also has been argued that, since the Soviets no longer believe an East-West conflict in the Third World would inevitably escalate or spill over into Europe, they are beginning to accept the desirability of a defensive posture in Eastern Europe.

There is little hard evidence to support such judgments. Soviet attitudes toward stabilization of the conventional force balance in Europe cannot be simply extrapolated from recent Soviet theater nuclear arms control decisions. It is most unlikely that Moscow, even though it decided to forgo some of its nuclear options, is now prepared to relinquish its conventional warfighting options as well. And no matter how low the probability of war in Europe may be in Soviet eyes, it is difficult to

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believe that Moscow would now be ready to rely indefinitely on a deterrence-only posture, with no provisions made for the failure of deterrence. It is also difficult to see what inducements there are for Moscow to give up its offensive conventional warfighting options since NATO has no offensive options of its own that it can exchange in a trade.

Some Western commentators nevertheless believe that a more restrained Soviet foreign policy prompted by the "new thinking" in Moscow will sooner or later result in a scaling down of Soviet military power and aspirations. This judgment merits close scrutiny, because there is evidence of emerging changes in the Soviet military planning and force posture, especially in nuclear weapons policy.

In the early 1960s Soviet doctrine postulated prompt escalation of any direct East-West conflict into an all-out war in which nuclear weapons would be used massively and with decisive results. By the late 1960s the Soviets began to acknowledge the possibility of a conventional phase in a world war and claimed that escalation, while still likely, was not inevitable.

By the late 1970s, however, the Soviets began to discuss the possibility of keeping even a major East-West conflict entirely conventional, a development reflected in Soviet adoption of an unconditional nuclear no-first-use policy and the staging of several all-conventional military exercises. In a 1977 speech in Tula, Brezhnev publicly renounced the value of nuclear "superiority," and by the early 1980s the feasibility and the desirability of seeking victory in a nuclear war had lost official sanction.

Whether Soviet rejection of its traditional nuclear emphasis represents a genuine change has provoked a talmudic debate among Western defense experts. But it is enough to note here that even a sincere Soviet rejection of nuclear warfighting does little to alter the threat posed by Moscow's conventional military superiority on the Eurasian landmass. Moreover, Soviet force procurement trends suggest a determination to retain the necessary flexibility to implement both nuclear and conventional options. Thus, Moscow continues to improve the accuracy of its ballistic missiles and to lower the yields of its nuclear warheads. It is already developing replacements for the SS-24 and SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles, even though deployment of the SS-24 and SS-25 is only now beginning, as well as replacements for the new SSN-20 and SSN-23 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. New nuclear submarines are also

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being built. By the mid-1990s the Soviet strategic inventory will consist almost entirely of these new weapons, of which some forty percent will be on mobile launchers. The Soviet bomber force is also undergoing rapid modernization with the deployment of new highly capable aircraft, endowing Moscow with flexible intercontinental and theater air attack capability. These activities, combined with a current Soviet development and production program for some elements of a countrywide ballistic missile defense system (the ABM-X-3), all clearly indicate Soviet willingness to invest the necessary resources in retaining some options, however imperfect, of prevailing in a nuclear conflict.

In conventional forces, the Soviet military is engaged in a major restructuring of ground and tactical air forces prompted in part by a relative de-emphasis of "divisional" level warfare. The Soviets evidently plan to give small-unit commanders greater autonomy and to develop smaller and better-trained forces. This shift may enable Moscow to cut back defense spending and is fully compatible with the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" proclaimed by the top Soviet political and military leaders. Moscow is also beginning to emphasize flexibility and opportunistic attack scenarios. Thus, newly constituted Soviet operational maneuver groups and other mobile formations are designed to flow through NATO forward defenses rapidly and disrupt the alliance's "soft" rear area. Last but not least, the Soviets are planning to use special forces and other unconventional warfare units to destroy NATO nuclear weapons sites, command and control centers, and "smart weapons" early in the conflict. All of this amounts to further growth, not diminution, in the Soviet conventional threat to NATO.

In sum, there are no visible changes in Soviet military doctrine or force structure that offer any comfort to NATO or offset the adverse impact of the INF treaty.

VII

What, then, of prospects for a negotiated reduction in the Soviet threat to NATO?

Once the INF treaty is ratified by the U.S. Senate, Gorbachev probably will launch a conventional arms control offensive to appeal to Western public opinion and capitalize on West Germany's growing anxiety about its unique vulnerability in a post-INF NATO.

Some of the specifics of Moscow's anticipated conventional

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arms control package are likely to reflect the substance of recent Soviet proposals. In April and June of 1986 the Soviets proposed deep reductions in military forces in Europe and replacing or supplanting the moribund Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) discussions with new talks on conventional arms that would cover the entire geographical area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. In 1987 NATO agreed to the proposed concept of new negotiations and began the so-called mandate talks to determine the parameters of these negotiations.

The specific Soviet proposals contained in the Budapest appeal of June 1986 were: reductions would apply to the ground and tactical air forces of European participants as well as to the corresponding forces of the United States and Canada stationed in Europe; initial reductions would consist of 100,000–500,000 men for each alliance; second-phase reductions would cut remaining alliance force deployments by another 25 percent. Third-phase reductions would deal not only with the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but also with the European neutral states.

The net effect of these Soviet proposals, however, would preserve the present military balance in Europe, which favors the Warsaw Pact, albeit at lower force levels. Gorbachev might also play to the galleries of West European public opinion by some dramatic opening gambit: for example, withdrawing unilaterally a few Soviet divisions from Czechoslavakia and even East Germany, with further reductions conditional on an appropriate NATO response. Removal of, say, three or four divisions could be undertaken without significantly diminishing Soviet offensive capabilities against NATO.

The Soviets also have indicated that they are prepared, in deference to long-standing Western wishes, not just to reduce conventional forces across the board, but also to concentrate on certain "destabilizing" categories of forces; that is, reductions in aircraft and armored forces could be given particular priority. Specifically, the Soviets have tentatively proposed a scheme of reductions in European-based aircraft. Airpower, however, has been NATO's conventional trump card, capable of neutralizing at least some of the Warsaw Pact's superiority in ground forces. Thus, even equitable and verifiable reductions in tactical airpower would, on balance, be to NATO's disadvantage. Finally, although Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has recently expressed a willingness to postpone

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temporarily cuts in remaining nuclear forces, he also made clear that Moscow envisions an explicit link between conventional reduction and further denuclearization of Europe.

There are several fundamental reasons to doubt the chances of success in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals talks. The Warsaw Pact enjoys considerable conventional superiority in Europe, and Moscow is fully aware of the fact that NATO cannot expand its active-duty conventional forces—indeed, that those forces are likely to shrink. Robert Blackwill, the former U.S. representative to the MBFR talks, has observed that "to believe that Gorbachev will rescue the West from its conventional inferiority is to be on the lookout for Santa." Gorbachev does face considerable economic pressures, but the Soviets can unilaterally reduce their forces, cut defense spending and still retain a range of warfighting options against NATO. East European political considerations also could impose major constraints on Gorbachev's ability to pull forces out of Europe. Thus, Soviet reductions in forward-deployed forces would have to be modest in size and gradual. In short, it is likely that the Soviets, for the foreseeable future, will merely seek to "repackage" their military superiority in Europe.

VIII

The anticipated Soviet European arms control offensive will fall upon a vulnerable and divided NATO. The alliance has yet to grapple with the INF treaty's specific long-term implications for conventional deterrence and defense. There is general agreement within NATO that the INF treaty's substantial denuclearization calls for a compensatory reinvigoration of conventional defenses. However, demographic, political, budgetary, and force deployment trends on both sides of the Atlantic portend a worsening of the non-nuclear military balance on the Continent. Thus, negotiations could become an alibi for not implementing conventional force improvements.

The arms control process contains additional potential pitfalls for the alliance. Attractive Soviet proposals are likely to strain the cohesion of the alliance and to heighten tensions between conservative NATO governments and opposition parties.

These issues aside, NATO appears to have trouble developing a broad conceptual vision of what kind of conventional arms control regime would be beneficial to its security. NATO has to maintain a certain force-to-space ratio along the inter-German

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border; it cannot afford major reductions in forward-deployed forces. Yet, as demonstrated in a recent RAND study, small reductions, even if tilted in NATO's favor, would further worsen the conventional balance.[5] Any reductions in U.S. forces would also entail problems. Rebasing U.S. ground forces from Europe to the United States is likely to be costly and will encourage Congress to reduce the authorized strength of the U.S. Army.

Some commentators have proposed establishing common ceilings on tanks and artillery in central Europe. Such figures as 10,000 tanks and 4,000 artillery tubes for each alliance have been discussed. This approach has the seeming advantage of sparing NATO from having to make more than nominal cuts in its force levels. Yet, it is unclear whether a mutual disengagement from central Europe would appreciably change the magnitude of the Soviet military threat. The reductions cannot change the Soviet Union's proximity to central Europe, or deprive the Soviet military of the advantages that accrue to the attacker. Most significantly, Moscow would retain tremendous reserves in its western military districts, which could be used rapidly to reinforce remaining Soviet forces that are forward deployed in Europe. This threat could be eliminated only by stripping those western districts of most of their reserves. It is most unlikely that Moscow would agree to go that far.

All of this means that NATO will have to learn to live with a lower order of both deterrence and defense in Europe in the post-INF treaty era than that to which it has become accustomed. The alliance has painted itself into a corner, and the paint will not dry. Though willing to accept a substantial denuclearization of its European defenses, it is unwilling or unable to put its non-nuclear defenses in order. Nor can NATO expect the Soviet Union to offer a way out.

These admittedly pessimistic conclusions, however, should be placed in proper perspective. A lower quality of deterrence does not mean that chances of a future war in Europe are appreciably greater than they are today. NATO remains a remarkable alliance, and one which, despite periodic changes in both conventional and theater nuclear force balances, has managed to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe. There is no reason, barring major mistakes by Western decision-makers and force planners, to doubt that it will continue to do so.

[5] James A. Thomson and Nanette C. Gantz, "Conventional Arms Control Revisited: Objectives in the New Phase," December 1987. RAND Report No. N2697-AF.

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Benjamin Lambeth
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THE KREMLIN AND SDI

Since President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative in March of 1983, it has dominated Western discourse on international security. Throughout this debate, the issues addressed have ranged from technical feasibility to fiscal practicality to the implications of SDI for America's alliance relations and the strategic balance. It is hardly surprising that SDI has provoked such controversy. Broadly speaking, the program entails a far-ranging effort to explore new concepts for ground- and space-based defense against ballistic missiles that might, in the president's words, eventually render these weapons "impotent and obsolete."

Naturally, given its implications for the East-West deterrent relationship, SDI has been a lightning rod for Soviet criticism. Although much of its commentary has been patently propagandistic, the Kremlin's pronouncements have also reflected deeper concerns about what SDI may portend for Soviet prospects in the long-term competition. That the program has figured so centrally in Soviet rhetoric and behavior speaks powerfully of its potential for influencing a broad array of Soviet interests in both the near term and the longer run.

Yet little attention has been paid to the Soviet side of the equation. True enough, there have been numerous efforts to predict the hardware options the Kremlin might pursue in an effort to evade, emulate or neutralize future American strategic defenses. However, in this rush to itemize and contemplate the various *technical* solutions available to the Soviets, few analysts have given much thought to how Moscow perceives SDI in strategic terms or what it implies for Soviet foreign and defense policy.

The programmatic and policy dimensions of Moscow's response to SDI will be crucial in determining the ultimate practicality and fate of the American venture. Moreover, insofar as

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Soviet planners regard SDI as a significant threat, their expectations will largely dictate the leverage SDI offers the West over Soviet force deployments and arms control behavior. For both reasons, it is essential to understand the nature and depth of Moscow's concerns about SDI and the implications it presents for the full scope of possible Soviet responses.

II

The Soviets did not react immediately to President Reagan's original SDI speech. Like most Americans, they were caught off guard by the announcement. The first rejoinder by General Secretary Yuri Andropov came four days after the president's statement, suggesting that the Kremlin needed more than the usual amount of time to put its official thoughts together.

Andropov went to special lengths to characterize the president's speech as yet another manifestation of Washington's alleged hope to reestablish military superiority over the Soviet Union. In this respect SDI was linked to earlier Administration comments on "prevailing" in nuclear war and similar notions which, in the Soviet portrayal, reflected an American defense policy at best irresponsible and at worst downright fiendish. Yet Andropov's remarks also stressed other points that were to become recurrent themes in the subsequent Soviet line. Most prominent was the charge that SDI was not, as advertised, "defensive" in intent but rather indicated a revived American effort to acquire a nuclear first-strike capability.

Before long Soviet pronouncements came to reflect such consistency as to suggest that high-level guidance on approved language had been carefully crafted. Despite the many controversial features of SDI there has been no evidence either of conflicting Soviet "schools" on the subject or of any notable change in the Soviet position, save for a toning down of the more virulent rhetoric coincident with Moscow's return to the Geneva arms talks in January 1985. On the contrary, the various signals emanating from Moscow show every sign of having been orchestrated to play up a number of common themes. Their arguments have uniformly portrayed SDI as an American subterfuge for developing a war-winning capability. This, the Soviets allege, will bring the world closer to nuclear war—or at least an intensified arms race—by obliging the Kremlin to pursue offsetting measures, the result of which will be to undermine the strategic balance.

A more insidious effort has been to blame the United States

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for aggravating the arms competition while suggesting that the Soviet Union has forsworn interest in homeland defense. This pleading is totally at odds with long-standing Soviet operational doctrine, to say nothing of an amply funded Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) development program and comparable investments in other homeland defense efforts, notably air and civil defense. Nevertheless, the Soviets have repeatedly implied that Moscow now embraces classic Western deterrence theory, with its emphasis on mutual assured destruction, at a time when the United States is allegedly abandoning this worthy strategic outlook.

This is a virtual echo of American concerns over the threat of *Soviet* offensive and defensive programs that have been expressed by every U.S. administration since 1965. Perhaps it is not surprising that the same Soviet scientists who have occupied the front ranks in Moscow's campaign against SDI have also been long-standing participants in the U.S.S.R.'s own effort to develop a defense against ballistic missiles. Yet by putting the United States on the defensive with an argument that commands wide appeal among those critics of SDI inclined to believe it, this refrain has given Moscow an edge in propaganda. Whatever one may think about the merits of SDI from a technical or policy perspective, this double standard in Soviet rhetoric must be recognized if the real meaning and worth of the program are to be properly evaluated.

III

It is likely that the Kremlin's public arguments against SDI mask the real concerns of the Soviet leadership. Their claim that SDI will "wreck arms control," for example, has merit only if they allow it to do so through their own unwillingness to countenance significant offensive force reductions in the face of a continuing SDI of some sort. This appeared to be their going-in position at both the Reykjavik and Washington summits. Likewise, their intimation that any American deployment of space-based missile defenses will make nuclear war "inevitable" is a gross exaggeration. Indeed, there are good reasons for believing that Moscow's apprehensions over SDI as a *military* threat are distinctly subordinate to more pressing concerns of a political and economic nature.

Of course, the most troublesome long-term ramifications of SDI are military. Yet, barring a truly miraculous development, such as the leakproof "astrodome" originally alluded to by

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President Reagan in his 1983 address, the ultimate ability of the Soviet Union to retaliate against the American urban-industrial base will not be eliminated. Even should such a serious erosion of this now-established foundation of deterrence eventually occur, it probably would not happen for at least several decades.

The advent of SDI at this juncture almost has to be regarded by the Soviet high command as less significant, in terms of its ultimate repercussions and threat potential, than might have been the case two decades ago, when a struggle for some measure of strategic superiority was still under way (or, more correctly, when the outcome of such a struggle mattered more). Today, both superpowers have acquired diversified and highly capable nuclear arsenals. Truly meaningful change in the equilibrium comes both in smaller increments and at longer intervals. This has not, of course, eliminated Moscow's need to think through the many operational issues presented by SDI. On the contrary, the number of ways SDI could unfold is quite large, and many troubling possibilities doubtless exist in the Soviet Union's playbook of contingencies. But the immediate military significance of SDI is not so great.

Far more prominent on Moscow's list of SDI worries is the economic aspect. SDI threatens to shift a major part of the arms competition away from areas in which the U.S.S.R. holds clear advantages toward one in which the United States might gain leverage from its greatest strengths. By forcing the Soviets into a contest in which they are least qualified, strapping them for resources and undercutting any plans they might have for exploiting their technological strides in the civilian economy, such a competition could prove highly favorable to the West. Were the Soviets nevertheless determined to press ahead in such a contest, they might be forced to suffer additional resource diversions, abandon other pursuits inimical to the West, and perhaps settle for arms control arrangements to the net benefit of the United States and its allies.

Even these considerations, however, are only likely to make their influence felt over the longer haul. For the nearer term the resources and technologies at issue are not beyond the means of either side. It is the extended, multiyear competition that SDI and its offshoots can potentially impose that would most likely confront the Soviets with an economic crunch. For that reason, although such forebodings have undoubtedly captured the attention and concern of Soviet planners, they are

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probably not yet viewed by the leadership as warranting any immediate radical diversion of current investment priorities.

By far the most likely source of Soviet agitation over SDI has to do with high-level concerns that continued progress of the U.S. program may undermine worldwide appreciation of Soviet military prowess, irrespective of any technical problems SDI may encounter along the way. Military power is the sine qua non of the Soviet state. It has singularly bestowed upon the U.S.S.R. its claim to "equivalence" with the United States. Toward that end the Soviets have invested heavily in their strategic nuclear posture over the past two decades. Insofar as SDI aims, in President Reagan's expression, to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," it threatens—at least from the Kremlin's vantage point—to render worthless the very foundation of the U.S.S.R.'s superpower status.

For the Soviet Union, significant SDI progress could also have discomfiting implications for other aspects of the military competition, including the competition in non-nuclear forces. The most obvious case in point, and one not likely to be overlooked by Soviet planners, concerns analogous theater defense functions. Although some SDI components might not be particularly appropriate in a theater setting (such as certain space-based defenses, given the shorter flight time and lower apogee of tactical reentry vehicles), others could prove notably helpful in relieving current and emerging Western vulnerabilities.

For example, high-speed data-handling capabilities essential for effective battle management against a large-scale ballistic missile attack might have applications in other areas as well, such as NATO air defense. The same applies in the case of certain sensor technologies to detect, track and direct conventional munitions to deep theater targets such as Soviet armored vehicle concentrations. In short, the Soviets have ample ground to be nervous about the long-term implications of any technology base that might develop as a result of the SDI program, whatever eventually happens to SDI itself.

The Soviets often boast that they can match SDI easily if need be. Such asides have had a tone of nervous whistling in the dark, however, and suggest some abiding private fears that, in fact, the Soviets cannot so easily (or affordably) counter SDI. Moscow has gained considerable propaganda advantage from statements by Western scientists who insist that SDI will never work. Yet the continuing Soviet political effort to subvert the program constitutes powerful evidence of an underlying con-

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cern that, in the end, SDI will work only too well—or well enough to compel heavy Soviet spending in response.

IV

Should SDI continue to the point of forcing Moscow to proceed beyond R&D hedges, the Kremlin's options will be bounded first and foremost by the constraints of Soviet technology and engineering style. For the period until about the mid-1990s, any Soviet response will necessarily draw on concepts and capabilities already in hand. For the decade following, the menu of options becomes richer. Even then, however, the Soviets will be limited by technologies and design concepts generated by investment choices that will be made in the next few years.

One of the problems posed for the U.S.S.R. by the multilayered defense scheme envisaged by SDI is the need to react not only to a demanding threat but also to a multifaceted one. By concurrently exploring a broad range of boost-phase, midcourse and terminal intercept configurations, SDI could force Moscow to concentrate its resources against each of these hurdles simultaneously in order to vouchsafe the offensive capabilities it currently enjoys. Such a challenge would strain Soviet R&D far more than would the need simply to negate a single American ballistic missile defense component.

Moscow's response will also be affected if SDI becomes an arms control bargaining counter. Up to now, the U.S. government has insisted that SDI research and testing will not be presented as a bargaining chip, regardless of anything the Soviets might offer in return. Yet the Reagan Administration undoubtedly appreciates the enormous potential of SDI to drive Soviet strategic programs away from directions harmful to Western security interests, as amply attested by the enthusiasm of Moscow's arms control offerings to date. The Soviet Union has rarely before shown itself willing to trade existing capabilities of its own for only potential American capabilities. Usually, the situation has been the other way around.

It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the Reagan Administration or its successor will eventually yield to certain SDI restrictions as a fair price for an arms control accord that imposes reciprocal limitations on Soviet strategic offensive power. Of course, in the absence of any way to anticipate such a development, there is no telling how the arms control process will affect Moscow's response to SDI. Whatever comes of the

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present U.S. position on SDI as arms control currency, however, Soviet planners will be keenly interested in the outcome of the strategic arms talks as they go about framing their hedges against SDI.

V

There are other factors beyond the capabilities and limitations of Soviet technology and the vagaries of the arms control process. One has to do with Moscow's estimate of SDI's future based on the Soviet memory of past U.S. behavior with regard to strategic defense. Although the Kremlin faces many problems with respect to SDI, the urgency of these problems may be eased by the fact that the United States has not shown a notable record of sustaining controversial military programs over multiple budget cycles. This has especially held true in the case of strategic defense.

There is a precedent for American involvement in continental defense during the 1950s and 1960s that, for its time, was as long on technological wizardry as SDI is today, yet in the end proved to be much shorter on programmatic and doctrinal durability. Of course, any Soviet effort to evaluate SDI in light of past American behavior must contend with our proclivity for abrupt shifts in priorities, often unpredictable stabs at experimentation, and the pursuit of unclear or even incoherent policies on what must appear, to a Kremlin planner accustomed to great regularity, to be a scale occasionally bordering on the incredible. Nevertheless, Soviet planners will make at least some effort to couch SDI in the context of broader U.S. strategic conduct when it comes to designing and carrying out their own responsive force policy.

Deterrence by the threat of retaliation has been a central theme of American strategic policy since the dawn of the nuclear age. A major focus of U.S. defensive planning has accordingly been concerned with assuring the viability of our nuclear counterattack options. Any Soviet assessor mindful of this history will be inclined to conclude, and rightly so, that most of the important programmatic shifts in U.S. strategic defenses have involved warning and related functions in support of the offense.

What may be of greatest concern to Soviet planners charged with interpreting SDI, therefore, is that the offensive inclinations of American strategy have all too often masqueraded as "defensive" enterprises, at least as the Soviets might view it.

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This may go far toward accounting for the almost reflexive Soviet depiction of SDI as a reflection of alleged American "first-strike" ambitions. U.S. defenses over the past three decades indeed *have* shown a strong pattern of having been pursued mainly to help get our retaliatory forces out of harm's way in case of war. Yet even in this subordinate role, defenses have also typically been the first to go when budgets have become tight or when Americans have identified higher military or social priorities. Consequently, a well-informed Soviet observer would not be making predictions wildly out of keeping with the historical record if he bet on the low staying power of SDI over the long haul.

There are enough unique circumstances surrounding SDI, however, to raise uncertainty in the mind of a Soviet planner regarding the validity of past trends as a basis for projecting future American behavior. One area that will be watched with special interest by any Soviet analyst will be the bureaucratic setting. The formation of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization is something very new in this regard and portends some important departures from past practice. First, the mere existence of such an agency should assure more sustained fiscal support for strategic defense than previously. Second, a centralized management entity like SDIO should improve the integration and direction of the overall enterprise. Third, SDI's increased institutional visibility should lead to greater accountability—and perhaps even higher programmatic status. Fourth, the unified and directed nature of SDI should contribute to a steady growth in its priority compared to other efforts. Last, we can expect greater coherence in various associated development activities, such as high-speed computer software and hardware, that will gain heightened prominence as a result of their connection with SDI. None of this will be lost on the Soviets.

Another dimension that will figure importantly in Moscow's assessment of SDI's seriousness will be the stability of the funding support it receives, particularly under the administration that succeeds the present one. For Americans, SDI may seem to represent a major break from the past because of the low priority we assigned to strategic defense for many years preceding it. In fact, however, there have been times when considerable sums were invested in U.S. continental defense.

This presents the Soviets with a vexing analytical dilemma. On one hand, any Soviet planner familiar with the peregrina-

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tions of American defense activities over the past four decades will have good reason to foresee two alternatives: (1) that SDI, as presently conceived, could change dramatically in its characteristics and goals over time, or (2) that the program could slip in key development and procurement decisions—and even be canceled altogether.

On the other hand, Soviet planners must recognize the remarkable persistence of SDI since President Reagan announced it five years ago. It has acquired a substantial bureaucratic foundation, consistently generous budgetary support and the unambiguous backing of the president, who has personally taken the lead in giving the program direction and vitality.

Based on the American track record, however, the smart Soviet planner will probably put his rubles on some forecast which allows for SDI not to follow any road map currently in vogue. Moreover, since U.S. defenses have been intimately tied to U.S. offensive force planning since the early 1950s, the Soviets will almost surely continue to discount American assertions that the goal of SDI (perhaps in conjunction with arms control) is the general elimination of the nuclear specter. More likely, they will be inclined to view SDI as, at best, a camouflaged attempt to enhance U.S. nuclear employment options and offensive potential at the Soviet Union's expense.

VI

Still another determinant of Moscow's response to SDI will be the ultimate outcome of internal Soviet political maneuvering over the multiple resource allocation choices that any response will entail. Granted, the U.S.S.R. is not subject to many of the domestic influences that often complicate defense management in pluralistic societies like our own. Nevertheless, there are numerous institutional and bureaucratic constituencies with competing interests in whatever decisions the Soviets may eventually reach.

An institution with a particular stake is the Strategic Rocket Forces, whose weapons stand to be most directly threatened by the prospect of an American defense against ballistic missiles. The SRF has over the years acquired a reputation for carrying significant weight in Soviet military circles and has remained largely immune to public displays of incompetence of the sort that have recently afflicted the Soviet air defense establishment. It will naturally feel strong compulsions to assure the continued relevance of its ICBM force through warhead proliferation or

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other offsetting measures before acquiescing in responses to SDI that would redound to the benefit of other Soviet services.

Beyond that, consideration of alternative counters to SDI will almost certainly become caught up in the debate over the relative weight to be ascribed to nuclear and non-nuclear forces in Soviet strategy. One possible indicator of such resource conflicts to come was the uncharacteristic silence of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov regarding SDI during his last year and a half as chief of the general staff. As an advocate of a Soviet arms development policy emphasizing conventional forces, he may have been disinclined to help legitimize SDI as an excuse for precisely the sort of continued SRF programs about which he had long expressed reservations. Ogarkov's dismissal in September 1984 may have been a net gain for the SRF as far as the question of countering SDI was concerned. Yet the debate over this issue within the Soviet defense community is far from over, and any Soviet effort to craft a serious response to SDI will be bound to complicate that debate even further.

VII

Soviet military doctrine promises to influence Moscow's reaction to SDI not only by shaping the operational preferences of the high command, but also by coloring the way the Soviets read American motivations for pursuing SDI. On this score, the point that matters concerns the prospect of the Soviet Union's acceding to any agreement (whether through negotiation or tacitly) that seeks to replace the current nuclear standoff with a new relationship dominated by defenses on both sides.

It has been suggested that the Reagan Administration's desired transition to a defense-dominant world should be rendered that much easier by the "natural" preeminence of the home defense mission in Soviet military thought. Unfortunately, this expectation reflects a misunderstanding of the role of strategic defense in Soviet military planning. Soviet military theory has long placed great weight on strategic defense, far more than has been the case with American military policy. That emphasis, however, has typically occurred within the context of a continued parallel stress on the indispensability of overwhelming offensive forces.

The offensive remains the linchpin of Soviet strategy. It is only through well-endowed intercontinental attack forces that Soviet planners contemplate surviving any war they may have to fight in the wake of a catastrophic failure of deterrence. In

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this outlook, active defenses are merely seen as a backstop for what remains essentially a counterforce strategy. Defenses certainly are not viewed as a substitute for offensive forces or as suitable guarantors in and of themselves of Soviet security.

It is not, of course, inconceivable that out of a desire to avoid worse alternatives, the Soviets might eventually recognize the wisdom of joining the United States in a cooperative effort to alter the current foundations of deterrence. After all, they found it convenient enough to sign the ABM treaty when doing so served their perceived security interests, notwithstanding the persistent injunctions of their military doctrine, which tended to point the other way. Yet in all likelihood, any serious Soviet willingness to participate in a joint transition to a defense-dominated strategic world will require their acceptance of a concept of security very different from the one that currently undergirds their force modernization. We could wait forever for Moscow to embrace the logic of defensive emphasis within the context of existing Soviet doctrinal proclivities.

VIII

Perhaps the most important factor that will determine Moscow's response to SDI, after all allowances are made for technical wherewithal and the inevitable disputes that will arise over resource allocation, is the availability of fiscal assets which the Kremlin will be able to mobilize against the problem. Among the many truisms that abound with regard to the Soviet Union today, one of the most common is that the ruling elite—after two decades of sustained force modernization—is finally having to confront the looming presence of real limits to further military growth.

Economic reform is not just one of the most urgent priorities of the Gorbachev regime; it is an imperative if the Soviet Union is to remain a competitive global power in the 21st century. Although Soviet military expenditure has risen each year since the beginnings of the buildup in 1965, there has been a mounting decline in the rate of military investment, more or less in tandem with the general decline in the rate of annual Soviet economic growth (now at around two percent, down from six percent in the 1950s and four percent just a decade or so ago).

For this reason, SDI would have come as bad news for the Soviets in any event. But there are even further problems posed by competing demands within the military sector itself.

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Before SDI the Defense Ministry was already grappling with the thorny issue of how to fund a number of increasingly pressing requirements that promised to stress the Soviet defense budget mightily. There was the growing hard-target challenge to Soviet ICBMs posed by the U.S. MX and Trident D-5 missiles. Beyond that, the already permeable Soviet air defense net was becoming even more penetrable with the specter of cruise missiles, the B-1B bomber and the Advanced Technology (Stealth) Bomber.

Finally, Moscow's traditional strength in Europe—its overwhelming numerical dominance in ground forces—was increasingly coming under pressure from a variety of emerging U.S. technologies in conventional arms that promise an effective denial of Moscow's advantages. The costs of further naval expansion (which the Kremlin has since apparently decided to curb), a growing manpower crunch, Third World military aid and the drain of operations in Afghanistan no doubt added up as well. It was on top of these and other already existing trade-off dilemmas that the Kremlin was presented with SDI and its implied threat to open up an entire new category of arms competition.

This situation would, by itself, constitute ample grounds for Soviet pessimism, but the problem is worse. Whatever course SDI ultimately takes, Moscow's response will occur in a deteriorating economic environment. Since 1976 there has been a pronounced decline in productivity growth as the Soviet economy has found itself simultaneously confronted with slackening investment, unanticipated shortages in energy and raw materials, and transportation bottlenecks. In an effort to deal with this problem, Gorbachev proposed at the April 1985 plenum of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that greater attention be devoted to the machine-building sector, particularly that part concerned with electronic engineering, machine tools, computers and instruments. A problem confronting this ambition, however, is that these investment items compete directly with the production of high-technology strategic systems. As a result Gorbachev's effort to revitalize the civilian economy by stimulating growth through the application of technology may be severely hampered by the competition between that goal and the existing high-technology Soviet defense effort.

Some have cited this evidence of Soviet economic duress to argue that now may be a good time to try to "spend them into

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the ground" by means of SDI. Unfortunately, history has not been kind to the United States with regard to such efforts. Unlike most of their Western counterparts, the Soviet leaders do not consider defense spending to be an unavoidable form of social overhead. On the contrary, they enjoy the comparative luxury of not having to regard such spending as a "burden" until and unless they define it as such.

All the same, the prospect of having to react to a U.S. space-based ABM confronts the Soviets with some uncongenial policy choices. If Gorbachev's campaign to improve the economy fails, yet Moscow still seeks to maintain high investment growth, the Soviets will experience a decline in consumption even if their defense spending continues along the lines of the past decade. In the more stressful case of a Soviet programmatic response to SDI coupled with unsuccessful economic reform, the result will almost surely be a near-term decline in consumption.

IX

This brings us to the difficult task of anticipating future Soviet behavior with regard to SDI. Obviously, the less finely we tune our predictive scope, the more reliable any ensuing forecast of Soviet conduct will appear. In the case of alternative Soviet counters to SDI, we can identify three broad clusters of plausible SDI fates that fairly well cover the range of possibilities:

(1) We can postulate a situation in which SDI progresses on a sustained basis through the midterm future. In this scenario the program would proceed roughly in the direction originally intended in President Reagan's March 1983 speech, even though the specific phases, technologies employed, military context and other factors might prove very different from those that SDI supporters today consider most desirable.

(2) Alternatively, SDI could run out of steam in fairly short order. This would not necessarily preclude the program from realizing some payoff (possibly even a significant one) for such applications as antitactical missile defenses for NATO or some sort of terminal defense for vulnerable national command centers and ICBMs. But the nationwide SDI scheme originally contemplated would be brought to an end in the fairly near term, perhaps before 1990.

(3) One can imagine still another case in which SDI eventually collapses, but not before causing substantial compensatory behavior on both sides. In this instance SDI would proceed apace

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for a number of years. An appropriate mix of technical achievement, budgetary commitment, adjustment to the ABM treaty, alliance support and public opinion would deny Moscow any confidence that the program could be easily sidetracked or manipulated into oblivion.

For the time being, the Soviets are directing their main efforts toward helping to bring about the second of these contingencies: namely, the early political dissolution of SDI. Having largely failed in their propaganda attempts to erode American and West European support for continued SDI research, the Soviet leadership now appears to have changed its tune and instead seeks leverage through the arms control forum. In this respect the earlier stress of Soviet pronouncements on the theme of "countermeasures" has been toned down, and the Soviets have adopted a more positive attitude emphasizing the Kremlin's commitment to negotiated solutions to the arms competition.

Should Moscow's diplomatic and arms control efforts fail in the next few years to halt the progress of SDI toward a deployable system, the Kremlin will feel mounting pressure to begin laying the foundations of an infrastructure capable of developing at least those longer lead-time items that will be required for any SDI countermeasure scheme. Even then, however, the Soviets will have plenty of time to continue monitoring the direction and progress of SDI before committing themselves to any programmatic response. During that period, they will also be able to continue a rearguard effort to subvert SDI politically in the hope that the third scenario noted above might be realized, namely, a gradual dissipation of SDI *after* substantial progress has been made.

For Moscow the worst case is one in which the ABM treaty becomes superseded by the imminent deployment of an American SDI network. Should this occur, the Kremlin will almost certainly give up its reliance on rhetoric and take action. One Soviet alternative, in the continued presence of an aggressive SDI, would be to abandon further pretense at restraint and leap into a full-fledged ABM breakout, vigorously pursuing all varieties of exotic technologies and expanding the Moscow ABM into a nationwide defense based on then-existing radars and interceptors.

In our judgment, however, such a development is unlikely. It would be too costly compared to more modest offsetting measures. Beyond that, an excessive concentration on matching

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SDI at the expense of overcoming it would be inconsistent with the offensive thrust of Soviet military doctrine. Finally, a Soviet ABM breakout seems unlikely simply because of the great extent to which the U.S.S.R. has been able thus far to improve its technology base within the constraints of the ABM treaty.

Of course, in the event of an outright abrogation of the treaty by the United States, any such consideration would become moot for the Kremlin. But that is a remote prospect. Short of it, a Soviet breakout would merely strengthen support for SDI throughout the United States and Western Europe, yielding precisely the outcome the Soviets seek to avoid. Although continued R&D in various technologies at a lower level can be expected of the Soviets, they are more likely to accommodate SDI, at least in the immediate decade ahead, through continued public diplomacy and arms control efforts.

Even the need to pursue an offsetting response to SDI may not seem as pressing to the Kremlin as many in the West assume. Indeed, the Soviets may have inadvertently told us as much through the unusual enthusiasm with which they have "warned" us about what countermeasures they might undertake. Normally they do not even hint at military programs they actually have under way or may be considering, in keeping with their traditional penchant for secrecy.

Soviet planners undoubtedly appreciate that SDI could follow such an erratic course that they could end up chasing a blind lead were they to leap prematurely into any programmatic response. Indeed, Soviet Americanologists may be privately advising their Kremlin bosses to continue a high-visibility stance of indignation against SDI but otherwise to keep their deeper fears under control in light of the continuing possibility that SDI could die a natural death at the hands of the American budgetary process, with perhaps some generous assistance from Soviet propaganda and covert action.

X

Perhaps the worst outcome, from an American perspective, would be one in which the domestic consensus behind SDI collapsed *after* enough momentum had gathered to drive the Soviets into vigorous offsetting measures that could not be easily turned off, and which might indeed assume heightened attractiveness to Soviet planners in the absence of an opposing U.S. defensive capability. In this case, we would have in effect a Soviet response to a U.S. non-program, as with the SA-5

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surface-to-air missile and MiG-25 interceptor, both conceived in the late 1950s as Soviet answers to the abortive American B-70 bomber. While the SA-5 and MiG-25 are of less than prepossessing concern today to U.S. planners, a substantially expanded Soviet offensive posture (including greater numbers of warheads, bombers and cruise missiles), along with a more capable Soviet ABM system, could give Moscow precisely what we originally sought to deny it through SDI, namely, a credible first-strike capability that could be invoked with great coercive effect in a crisis.

An even more disconcerting harbinger of what could happen were SDI terminated after Soviet compensatory measures had begun is the adverse situation that has resulted from our failure to proceed with an orderly deployment of the MX, with the original plan to field 200 in a survivable basing mode. We might now confront the Soviets with a hard-target kill capability much like the one they have long presented to us, a threat that we remain incapable of reciprocating even a decade later. Moreover, we would be enjoying a renewed lease on the survivability of the ICBM leg of our triad to match that promised to the U.S.S.R. by the mobility of its SS-24 and SS-25 missiles, both of which were evidently inspired by the MX.

Moscow's agitation over SDI seems sufficiently genuine to suggest that the United States can hardly go wrong by continuing to play its SDI card closely, pending a better assessment of just how much the Soviets might be willing to pay in the currency of both strategic and conventional arms to head it off. In combination with other trends in U.S. nuclear and general-purpose force modernization, SDI has placed the United States in a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than at any time since the Kennedy-McNamara buildup of the early 1960s. The challenge posed by SDI may also have an important political dimension for Gorbachev personally and could heighten his desire to avoid a costly arms competition.

Obviously one can never be sure. In light of the manifold dilemmas SDI puts before the Soviet leaders, an important challenge for the U.S. is to develop a strategy that brings SDI into step with our diplomacy toward the Soviet Union so that we might elicit the greatest possible political leverage from it, even as we continue to press for a validation of the many technological concepts being explored.

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Walid Khalidi

TOWARD PEACE IN THE HOLY LAND

The uprising that began in December 1987 in the territories Israel has occupied for over twenty years ranks as the fourth major attempt by the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine to stem the Zionist colonization of the country. First was the rebellion of 1936–39 against Britain's policy, exercised under its League of Nations mandate, for a Jewish National Home; then came the resistance to the 1947 U.N. General Assembly resolution to partition Palestine, which developed into a civil war before the regular war that broke out when the British left on May 15, 1948. Third, from 1964–65 onward, came the rise among the Palestinian diaspora of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and guerrilla movements against the status quo.

Today, in contrast to the three earlier instances, the Palestinians on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip are face-to-face with their perceived dispossessors, with no third party or geographic distance intervening. While the Israelis wield all state powers, the chief weapons of the Palestinians are the stones of the countryside. If the areas of Israel proper and those in the occupied territories already colonized, requisitioned or annexed are subtracted from the total area of Mandatory Palestine, the Palestinians in the occupied territories today stand on no more than 15 percent of the soil of the country.

In a statement read out at a Jerusalem hotel on January 14, 1988, which might be called the Jerusalem Program, leading representatives of the uprising outlined their aspirations and demands for lifting the oppression of the occupation and achieving "real peace" between Israel and the Palestinian people.

A certain Masada-like poignancy attaches to this latest manifestation of the Palestinian collective will, and with it a legitimate claim to the attention and concern of the outside world.

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II

The Palestinian national identity had already begun to take shape at the beginning of World War I. It crystallized during the British Mandate (1918–48) in the resistance to Zionism. The notion that the Palestinians were a people, and merited a national state of their own, was evident to those members of the United Nations, including the United States, that voted in 1947 for the partition of Palestine. Since the beginning of the Palestinian diaspora in 1948 the sense of Palestinian nationality has been vastly strengthened; the rise of the PLO only gave expression to an existing reality.

For four decades since the establishment of Israel, the Palestinians have been pushed and pulled together by a multitude of shared experiences which have created a sense of national community rare in the Middle East and the Third World: it has transcended geographic dispersion, village, clan and sectarian loyalties, as well as the pressures of Arab host governments and Israeli occupiers. Endowed with skills surpassing those of most Arab peoples, the Palestinians long ago crossed the threshold of nationhood, and, like so many other peoples in history, are irreconcilable to living in a limbo of permanent statelessness. It is this, rather than any brilliance in the leadership of Yasir Arafat, which has frustrated all attempts to foist an illegitimate leadership upon the Palestinians or fob them off with substitutes for a sovereign place under the sun. It is this which constitutes the umbilical cord between the Palestinians of the occupied territories and the diaspora.

The Palestinians have more than tripled in number, from 1,300,000 in 1948 to 4,500,000 today, and their rate of increase is not declining. In the Gaza Strip alone they number some 600,000 and are destined there to reach 900,000 by the end of the century. All the psychological and physical pressures bearing down on them the last twenty years to leave the occupied territories have failed. The Palestinians under occupation have drawn the obvious lesson from the fate of their countrymen who left in 1948 and 1967. Even for those who want to leave, the absorptive capacity for Palestinians in the Arab countries has been strained to the limit: Lebanon and Syria no longer qualify as havens for Palestinians; Jordan's King Hussein is already obsessed with the nightmare of a massive Palestinian influx into his country. Egypt hardly has

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standing room for its own people, and opportunities in the countries of the Persian Gulf have been circumscribed.

Some Israeli leaders contemplate a policy of thinning out or expelling the Palestinians. But to where? Northward into the Shi'ite heartland of Lebanon or across the Golan Heights toward Damascus? Southward into Sinai? Eastward across the Jordan River? Even hard-liners in Israel might balk at the first two suggestions, and the third is also problematic. It was one thing to drive out a civilian population amid the confusion of large-scale military operations, as happened in 1948; it would be another to do so in an environment where no fighting by regular armies was taking place. It was one thing to drive refugees across the river from their camps in the Jordan Valley in the wake of the retreating Jordanian army, as happened in 1967; it would be another to uproot the inhabitants of the towns and villages of the highlands. Even before the recent events in the occupied territories, Palestinian conduct in Lebanon in the face of siege and bombardment showed that Palestinian civilians do not panic as readily as they did in 1948.

The extraordinary courage displayed in the occupied territories since December, especially by Palestinian youth, is but one indicator of the resistance an Israeli policy of mass expulsion would face. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the bulk of the Palestinians in the occupied territories will remain *in situ*, and that they will increase in number, even as the acreage at their disposal continues to dwindle with Israeli foreclosures and their political frustrations mount in the absence of a general settlement. Given the resonance between the Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories, continued denial of Palestinian nationhood is unlikely to lead to the diminution of its intensity or the moderation of its expression. It would therefore seem that, just as Israel is a reality which the Palestinians and the PLO must accept, Palestinian nationhood is a reality which Israel must accept. As Israel is here to stay, the Palestinians are here to stay, too.

III

Over the years the Palestine problem has generated concentric circles of expanding conflict. From the early 1880s to 1948 the conflict was preponderantly between the Jewish community of Palestine and the indigenous Arab Palestinians. From 1948 to 1967 the conflict was preponderantly between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries. In the period since 1967 the

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struggle has grown to new dimensions despite the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty some ten years ago. Even a cursory look at this last period would reveal the adverse—and often bizarre—effects of the persistence of this conflict on regional stability, Western interests and superpower relations.

The rise of Middle Eastern radicalism, for example, is not altogether unconnected with the continued non-resolution of the Palestine problem. Libyan leader Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, like most of his Arab contemporaries, was suffused in his youth with anger at the perceived injustices suffered by the Palestinians. The rise of the radical PLO in the mid-1960s was as much a revolt against moderate Arab regimes and their Western sponsors as against Israel. The PLO strategy of seeking bases in the Arab countries for operations against Israel led to the destabilization of Jordan in 1970–71 and contributed to the disintegration of Lebanon. It took the PLO's operations from Lebanon against Israel and Israel's scorched-earth strategy against southern Lebanon (which was designed to pit its Shi'ite inhabitants against the PLO) to make a new breed of Shi'ite militants receptive to Ayatollah Khomeini's message and install Iranian-style fundamentalism on Israel's northern borders. The oil embargo of 1973, with all its consequences, was motivated by the Arab perception of American support for Israel during the Middle East war of that year.

The Israeli hope of dealing a death blow to Palestinian nationalism by the military destruction of the PLO led to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon; for the first time, Israel laid siege to and occupied an Arab capital. The perceived opportunity afforded by the departure of the PLO from Beirut induced the United States (with not a little encouragement from Israel) to assume the anachronistic task of reconstructing Lebanon around the Maronite Christian minority, in colossal disregard of the other Lebanese sects and the heritage of the ancient city of Damascus next door. The result was the tragic loss of American and other lives and the first military skirmish in history between America and Syria, in which two American planes were shot down and an American pilot was taken prisoner.

The bizarre chain of events only grew longer. Lebanon's central institutions broke down totally, creating an ideal environment for anarchy and the unfettered pursuit of vengeance through the taking of American and other Western hostages. Eventually the trail led to White House preoccupation with the

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release of hostages and to the scandal of the Iran-contra operation.

Israel's need for the mass immigration of Jews to offset Palestinian demographic growth supplies part of the motivation for focusing international attention on the plight of Soviet Jewry. This issue impinges on U.S.-Soviet relations and figured prominently during General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's December visit to Washington. The powerful opposition of the American Jewish establishment toward U.S. arms sales even to moderate Arab countries affects the credibility of the United States with these Arab regimes, as well as the viability of their pro-Western orientation; it drives some of them to seek alternative sources of supply in Moscow, further weakening Western influence.

With competitive support from the two superpowers the arsenals of Israel and some Arab radical countries have grown exponentially. A nuclear alert was declared by the United States in 1973, in response to a threatened Soviet intervention at a time of heightened Arab-Israeli tension. Meanwhile, we have growing reminders that Israel has crossed the atomic, if not the thermonuclear, threshold, while evidence of biological warfare capabilities in the region also mounts.

The likely harvest of human and material devastation in a future Arab-Israeli war is a cogent argument for the need to defuse the Palestinian problem from which the conflict between Israel and the Arab states derives. This need is all the more compelling because of the increasingly religious aspect that the struggle for Palestine is assuming.

Religious undertones have always been present in the Palestine conflict. To be sure, Herzlian Zionism has remained explicitly secular in orientation despite the implicit premise of divine right in Zionist polemics. Palestinian opposition was primarily motivated by the political objectives of Zionism, even though some religious fears were voiced among Palestinians concerning the Muslim sanctuaries of Jerusalem and Hebron. Even after the creation of Israel and the expansion of the conflict to include the Arab states, Arab reaction did not assume a Muslim coloring per se—and this despite the historical analogy uppermost in the Arab mind, of Israel as the reborn Crusader kingdom of medieval times.

The reason for the secular thrust of Arab reaction was the vigor of pan-Arab ideology as preached in the 1950s and the 1960s by the Baath Party from Damascus and Baghdad and

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the Arab National Movement from Beirut, and the adoption of this ideology by Gamal Abdel Nasser until his death in 1970. Pan-Arabism posited the existence of one multi-state Arab nation to which the peoples of the individual Arab states belong. The components of the nation are a common language and history, and shared sentiments and interests.

As opposed to pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism stresses the unity through faith of all Muslims, whether Arab or not. Religious fundamentalism has been precipitated in the Arab world in the last two to three decades by a number of developments and factors, not least being the growth of Jewish fundamentalism in Israel and the occupied territories. There is also the continuing grinding poverty of tens of millions, despite the oil wealth; there is the profligacy of the life-styles of the rich and powerful, coupled, especially in Egypt, with claustrophobic demographic pressures. A newly educated and relentlessly growing army of university graduates has emerged with few economic opportunities and little knowledge of the West. Some Arab rulers are perceived as subservient to the United States, particularly in matters pertaining to Israel. And Israel is perceived as enjoying an intolerable freedom of action throughout the Arab world, as when, for example, it launched air raids on Baghdad and Tunis in 1981 and 1985, respectively.

Ultimately, secular pan-Arabism failed to achieve a convincing semblance of unity, and the raison d'état of individual Arab states conflicted to the point of causing internecine disputes; these Arab countries seemed powerless in the face of continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese territory.

These are the circumstances in which the appeal of Ayatollah Khomeini resounds. His appeal is not restricted to Shi'ites, but extends to the Sunni masses and intellectuals, inasmuch as his rallying cry is not Shi'ism but Islam, and the targets of his attacks include both the great powers and the Arab dynasts. His constant reference to the liberation of Jerusalem is as effective as it is deliberate.

Religious fundamentalism is both a reactive and assertive phenomenon in the face of challenge and failure. It is partly a search for a bulwark against engulfment by alien values, partly a protest against tyranny whether foreign or indigenous, and partly a revolt against underdog status and frustrated expectations. The context in which religious fundamentalism has taken hold in the Arab world is wider than the Arab-Israeli

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conflict, but that the conflict exacerbates the pace and intensity of fundamentalism's evolution is undeniable.

Palestinians both inside and outside the occupied territories have been affected by this change in the political climate. The competition between Muslim fundamentalist groups and PLO sympathizers under occupation (which, ironically, was encouraged by Israeli intelligence authorities) has been replaced by growing solidarity and operational coordination between the two groups.

This is in part an index of the general shift in the Middle Eastern political mood away from secularism, but it is also a response to the paramount necessity of closing ranks in the face of escalating Israeli pressures. It is not too difficult to understand why, at times of great adversity or challenge, believers might seek a deus ex machina in Allah. The immediate and omnipresent stimulus for such a trend in the occupied territories lies in the biblical pronouncements, posturings and conduct of the Gush Emunim—the spearhead and the hated symbol of Jewish fundamentalist willfulness, particularly in the ancient quarters adjoining the Muslim sanctuaries of Jerusalem and Hebron. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict may have already crossed the threshold of their metamorphosis into a 21st-century version of the Crusades.

IV

Within living memory, the United States was looked upon by Arab public opinion as the most friendly and trustworthy Western power. Unlike Britain or France, which took control of much of the region after World War I, the United States was unencumbered by any legacy of imperialism or conflict with any Arab people. But with the assumption by the United States of its new global responsibilities at the end of World War II, this idyllic state of affairs was unlikely to persist, and it did not. Nevertheless the depth of alienation from the United States of contemporary Arab public opinion (among both the masses and the intellectuals), even in moderate states with friendly official relations with Washington, has elicited little concern in the West. This alienation is a grave harbinger of things to come.

What strikes one most about this state of affairs is its sheer gratuitousness: two of the principal objectives of the United States in the Middle East—access to Arab oil and the preven-

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tion of Soviet domination of the area—do not necessarily militate against cordial Arab-American relations.

No Arab state wants to see the area dominated by either the United States or the Soviet Union; geographic proximity to Russia argues the prudence of cultivating the friendship of the more distant superpower. Pan-Arab parties have been locked in often mortal combat with the local communist parties, and even in radical Arab countries these parties live at the state's sufferance. The Soviet penetration that has occurred in the Middle East cannot be dissociated from the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab need to balance American support of Israel with support from the Soviet Union. Similarly, with oil, the Arabs need American and Western markets no less than the West needs Arab oil. The most disruptive political impingement so far on the supply of oil to the West has been a result of American policy toward Israel.

For four decades now the Arab world has pondered the nature and motivation of this policy. Probably no other topic has been discussed at greater length in Arab political literature or debate. Three principal hypotheses have emerged: (1) U.S. policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict is the reflection of unchangeable American cultural and religious values; (2) the American pluralistic political system gives leeway to competing groups, including the powerful pro-Israel lobby; (3) as a capitalist, imperialistic system the United States is intrinsically inimical to the interests of the Arabs.

The Arab circles most concerned for the future of Arab-American relations have clung to the second hypothesis; we have come under harsh attack for the naïveté of our implicit faith in the possibility of a change for the better in American policy. We have long argued the need to distinguish between harsh-sounding election promises and the policies subsequently pursued, and have stressed the learning potential of political incumbents and the existence of an institutional memory and regional expertise in the State Department and other American agencies which tend to balance domestic political calculation. The experience of the Reagan Administration—even in a second term when reelection was not a factor—systematically knocked down each of our arguments. To be sure, the Administration's Middle East diplomatic initiative of September 1982 gave momentary demonstration of the goodwill of the United States, but unfortunately this effort soon petered out.

The effect of all this on the consciousness of Arab intellec-

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tuals has been a direct identification of the United States with Israel: when Israel confiscates, colonizes or invades, it is the United States that is seen to be behind these actions. Not only does this threaten to eliminate the United States as a disinterested third party which can mediate, referee and act as a court of appeal, but for Arabs it casts the United States in the same mold as the enemy. The pervasiveness of these perceptions is not annulled by the comfort taken by some Arab rulers in the presence of American warships on the horizon or AWACS aircraft overhead.

A deep emotional alienation from the United States is developing in the Arab world, buttressed by a hardening conviction that the U.S. government is structurally incapable of being fair. The stereotyping of the Arab in U.S. popular culture and politics grows apace, giving little incentive to American leaders to be more forthcoming toward the Arab world. It is not altogether a coincidence that U.S. citizens have been specifically targeted by radical Arab groups in these last few years.

A major assumption of American policy has been that a strong Israel is more likely to make concessions toward a peace settlement. With both Egypt and Iraq neutralized and Syria bogged down in Lebanon and at loggerheads with the PLO, Israel is as near the zenith of its military might as it will probably get. Yet the essence of even the Israeli Labor Party's position would seem categorically to preclude accommodation to the minimal demands of the Palestinians and the substance of the consensus forged at the Fez summit of the Arab League in September 1982: a sovereign Palestinian state within the 1967 frontier, in binding, internationally guaranteed coexistence with Israel, a solution which could be fashioned in such a way as to eliminate any threat to the security of Israel, as I have argued previously in this journal.[1]

To the best of my knowledge, the furthest the Labor Party seems willing to go would be the creation of Palestinian "enclaves" in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. These enclaves, separated from one another by Israeli settlements and suburban blocs as well as by various military enclosures, would amount to 60–70 percent of the Gaza Strip and about 40 percent of the West Bank. The Jordan River would constitute

[1] "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," July 1978, pp. 695–713; and "Regiopolitics: Toward a U.S. Policy on the Palestine Problem," Summer 1981, pp. 1050–1063.

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the international frontier behind which the Israeli army would remain in control. Municipal or quasi-municipal functions would devolve to local Palestinian representatives in these enclaves, but internal security would remain in Israeli hands. Jordan would be invited to "co-police" the enclaves with Israel and presumably to extend its citizenship to all the inhabitants. This attenuated and selective Jordanian presence would be the justification for calling the arrangement a "territorial compromise." Face-to-face talks with a Jordanian delegation containing local Palestinians virtually chosen by Tel Aviv would negotiate this settlement at an otherwise ceremonial international conference.

This, to the best of my understanding, is the essence of the Jordanian option to which the United States and the Labor Party of Israel seem wedded, as at once a conduit, a repository and final destination. Strategically it would absolve Israel of acknowledging a Palestinian nationhood, past or present, embracing the occupied territories and the diaspora, with all the attendant political, juridical and moral implications. Tactically it would keep the PLO, symbol of Palestinian nationhood, out of the peace process, drive a wedge between the PLO and Jordan, present a "conciliatory" Israeli face to the outside world, and throw the burden of rejectionism and "missed opportunities" on the Palestinians.

This Jordanian option is but a latter-day version of an almost hallowed tradition for solving the Palestine problem over the heads of the Palestinians. Theodore Herzl established the tradition in his talks in 1898 with Kaiser Wilhelm II. Chaim Weizmann followed the pattern in his dealings with Lord Balfour (1917) and with Emir (later King) Faisal in 1919. Throughout the 1930s Zionist leaders persisted on this course via non-Palestinian pan-Arab leaders in Damascus, Beirut, and Amman. Like the Balfour Declaration fifty years earlier, U.N. Resolution 242, passed in 1967, made no reference to the Palestinians, while the Camp David accords settled their future without their participation. With impressive monotony the same recipe is tried again and again despite the catastrophic consequences that each attempt brings in its train, and the invalid arguments heard at each juncture.

Even *full* Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) during the period between 1949 and 1967 was not viable. The alleged dichotomy between the Palestinians in the occupied territories and those in the diaspora is in the

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eye of the beholder; I argue that the bonds between those Palestinians are as intimate and indestructible as the bonds between Jews inside and outside Israel. No West Bank or Gaza "leader" anointed by the United States or Israel could look his compatriots in the eye, much less negotiate away their birthright. Far from stabilizing Jordan, the Jordanian option would strike at the very roots of the regime. It would involve it in mortal combat with all factions of the PLO and pit it against last-ditch Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories. Nor would the détente between Amman and Damascus survive such developments. Syria's Hafez al-Assad may encourage Jordan to isolate Yasir Arafat for his own tactical reasons, but no conceivable consideration of ideology, self-interest or prudence would lead him to implement the Jordanian option. As the senior statesman of the Arab world, King Hussein must know this, and his sound political instincts will lead him to the obvious conclusion.

V

The sad events in the occupied territories since December 1987 confirm this analysis. And while it is too early to say what new leadership (if any) will emerge, certain assessments can be offered with reasonable assurance.

There is evidence of an extensive organizational infrastructure emerging at the grass roots, an intermeshing of formal and informal groups of the kind described in classical writings on revolutions. The activist leadership seems to be typically diffuse, anonymous, decentralized and non-pyramidal, with heavy representation from the younger urban, rural and refugee camp generations in relatively equal proportions. A new psychology seems to have gripped the bulk of the population, partly induced by the anniversaries falling in 1987–88 (the 20th of the occupation and the 40th of the establishment of Israel), partly by the immobilism of the Israeli political scene, the ultra-hawkish stance of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, the perceived indifference of Washington and the loss of momentum in the peace process. The November 1987 Arab League summit in Amman seemed preoccupied with the Iran-Iraq war, and the PLO leadership was locked in its perennial crisis of relations with Assad and Hussein.

Within this psychology, three new elements can be singled out. Factional and ideological differences among Palestinians (e.g., the business sector versus the radicals, secularists versus

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fundamentalists, some PLO factions against others) are being overcome. These differences had hitherto impaired the effectiveness of resistance but now seem to have been subsumed under a national consensus of unprecedented scope and cohesion.

A barrier of fear has been broken. This is the result of a sense of immunity acquired incrementally over two decades against the worst the occupation could do. Well over half of the entire adult male Palestinian population of the occupied territories must have seen the inside of an Israeli prison. In the extended family networks that prevail in the territories only a minority will not include a relative who has been manhandled, humiliated, injured, imprisoned or exiled, or had his or her home demolished. When every detail of one's daily personal, social, economic and professional life is governed by one or more of the 1,210 ukases (of competing absurdity) issued so far by the military governors of the occupied territories, one's response is bound to be a deepening contempt for the system and its keepers—as a necessary condition for surmounting one's fear of them.

Finally, we see growing awareness of the need for self-reliance, or rather a compelling realization that in the last analysis salvation is self-generated. This phenomenon should be familiar to Jews in particular. For too long the Palestinians in the occupied territories have waited for St. George to come from across the border. For too long they have seen themselves as minor actors (if actors at all) in the shaping of their own destiny. That the occupation has succeeded in activating the moral outrage of the population is self-evident.

The flavor and weight of this occupation, the motivation and forces behind the current uprising, and the thrust of the population's aspirations may be gathered from the Jerusalem Program—the statement read out at a press conference in January at the National Palace Hotel in Jerusalem by a spokesman for the "Palestinian National Institutions and Personalities from the West Bank and Gaza Strip."

The statement contains a long political preamble and 14 specific points. Three deal with the immediate crisis: the release of those recently arrested, "especially the children," the return of four Palestinians deported amid wide criticism, and the lifting of the siege of the refugee camps. Five points deal with human rights: they call on Israel to adhere to the fourth Geneva Convention; to release people under administrative detention

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and house arrest and facilitate the reunion of families; to cease the demolition of houses; to initiate formal inquiries into the behavior of soldiers, settlers and security men who have "unduly caused death or bodily harm to unarmed civilians"; and to grant the political freedom of meetings and conventions including "free municipal elections" under a neutral authority.

Two points address religious fears: the curtailment of "provocative activities" in the Old City of Jerusalem and the preservation of the status quo of the Muslim and Christian holy sites. Two others address the loss of land and water: they call for the cessation of settlement activity and land confiscation and the release of land confiscated, as well as the rescinding of measures "to deprive the territories of their water resources." Two address taxation issues: the cancellation of the Israeli value-added tax and all other direct taxes, and the release of "monies deducted from the wages of laborers" inside Israel, in the absense of commensurate social services. The statement also calls for the removal of restrictions on building permits, industrial projects and agricultural development programs, including the digging of artesian wells. Discriminatory trade policies are also addressed: either the free transfer of industrial and agricultural produce from the occupied territories into Israel should be permitted or "comparable restrictions" should be placed on such produce entering the territories from Israel.

The political preamble states the obvious, that the occupation cannot last forever, and that "real peace" can be achieved only through the recognition by Israel of Palestinian national aspirations to which the uprising is committed. These include "the rights of self-determination and the establishment of an independent state on our national soil under the leadership of the PLO as our sole, legitimate representative." Continued occupation will lead to further violence, bloodshed and the deepening of hatred. The only way "to extricate ourselves from this scenario," the preamble states, is an international conference with the participation of "all concerned parties including the PLO as an equal partner" as well as the five permanent members of the Security Council "under the supervision" of the two superpowers. "To prepare the atmosphere for the conference," Israel is called upon to comply with the demands outlined.

If this statement represents the uprising's demands (and the indications are that it does indeed) no one could accuse the Palestinians under occupation of not knowing what they want;

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nor do the leaders of the uprising seem to be grooming themselves as substitutes or proxies for the PLO.

The tone of the Jerusalem Program is firm but sober. There are no maximalist territorial demands or flamboyant formulations about an unrealizable democratic secular state. The aim is clearly a negotiated peace with Israel on a nation-to-nation basis. Perhaps the most interesting demand of the Jerusalem Program is for the removal of restrictions on political contacts with the PLO, to allow for "participation of Palestinians from the territories in the proceedings of the Palestinian National Congress in order to ensure a direct input into the decision-making process." Such input is more likely to be in favor of pragmatism than not.

VI

Despite Arab disarray and the tumultuous fortunes of the PLO since 1982, the Arab and Palestinian stance today is more propitious for an honorable and viable settlement than ever before. The pity is that neither the Israeli nor the American government yet seems able to see this, or if either does, it has yet to find the way to nurture and build upon it.

In the first place, the resolutions of the September 1982 Arab Fez summit remain a remarkably forthcoming, collectively articulated Arab peace plan, enunciated at the level of the heads of state (only Qaddafi absented himself). Skeptics are invited to compare the resolutions with, say, the pronouncements of the 1967 Khartoum summit to see the political light-years traveled by the Arab countries in the direction of pragmatism. There was absolutely no precedent for the Fez summit in collective Arab diplomacy. Its orientation was unmistakably conciliatory toward a peaceful, nontransitional and guaranteed settlement on the basis of coexistence with Israel within the 1967 frontiers. There is still nothing like it on the Israeli side at such an authoritative and comprehensive level. Likewise, the PLO position as fashioned under Arafat's leadership has evolved within the framework of the Fez resolutions and reached a new level of refinement during the PLO-Jordanian talks of January-February 1986.

I was but a marginal and informal participant in those talks, but my distinct impression was that they broke down not because Arafat was averse to accepting Resolution 242, negotiating with Israel or denouncing terrorism—the three conditions set by Washington and relayed by Amman. Arafat specif-

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ically accepted Resolution 242 alongside "other pertinent U.N. resolutions." He specifically mentioned the Israeli government as a party with whom he was willing to negotiate a peaceful settlement within the context of an international peace conference and on the basis of his February 1985 accord with King Hussein. He reaffirmed his denunciation of operations outside the occupied territories and Israel.

There was one fundamental sticking point: Amman absolutely insisted (presumably at the behest of Washington) on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, that acceptance of Resolution 242 should be "without trimmings," i.e., with no qualifications whatsoever. This raised the obvious question of the quid pro quo, which, Arafat was told, was U.S. acquiescence in the participation in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the international conference of Palestinians who were not themselves PLO officials but were approved by the PLO. "What about Palestinian self-determination?" the PLO asked. This, Amman replied, was a matter between Jordan and the PLO. Would that it were! In the circumstances Arafat asked that in return for accepting the three conditions, Amman should obtain assurances from Washington (not Tel Aviv) about Palestinian self-determination on the basis of the Jordanian-PLO accord of February 1985. Amman could not see its way to doing that—hence the breakdown of the talks.

Is it really so outrageously perverse of Arafat to have balked at unilateral, unconditional, unreciprocated recognition of Israel, which the Israeli government itself has not solicited and has declared its intention to reject? Or is his perversity more in his hesitation to place his hope blindly in a U.N. resolution that does not even mention his people by name, to stop resistance to Israeli occupation and to give up PLO presence at the peace conference? Is he so lamentably wrong to hesitate to forget all U.N. resolutions favorable to his cause, to delegate Palestinian representation to Amman, and to throw himself upon the noblesse oblige of Tel Aviv and the empathy of Washington?

The 18th meeting of the Palestine National Congress (PNC) held in April 1987 in Algiers demonstrated, with the return to the fold of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the fundamental solidarity between the central Palestinian factions that constitute the PLO, isolating the dissident factions sponsored by Syria. The admission for the first time of the repre-

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sentatives of the Palestine Communist Party to the PLO Executive was counterbalanced by the admission of two specifically Muslim representatives to the General Council, thus broadening the popular base of the PLO. The Abu Nidal group was denied admission to the various PLO bodies. The 18th PNC meeting confirmed Arafat's status as primus inter pares.

The PNC position on Resolution 242 was a retreat from Arafat's specific but qualified acceptance of it during his talks in Amman. But the Congress' rejection of the resolution was reasoned rather than categorical, on the grounds that 242 considered the Palestine problem as a "question of refugees" and ignored the "inalienable national rights" of the Palestinian people. On the other hand, the PNC reaffirmed support of the 1982 Fez summit peace plan and called for the development of relations with "the democratic forces in Israel" which are against "Israeli occupation and expansion." Equally significant, because of the presence of the Popular Front and the Democratic Front, was the Congress' readiness to participate in an international peace conference "on a footing of equality" under the aegis of the United Nations, with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and "the concerned parties in the region," i.e., Syria and Israel. The distinctive relations between the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples were reemphasized, as was "confederation between two independent states" as the principle for future relations between Jordan and a Palestinian state in the occupied territories. In sum, the Algiers PNC meeting left the door open for peaceful negotiations while specifically acknowledging the need for a constitutional link with Jordan.

Between the PNC meeting in April and the Amman summit in November 1987, several initiatives were undertaken to reduce the tensions between the PLO and Damascus. This was partly necessitated by the festering wounds in Lebanon, but largely by the need dictated by common sense to coordinate with the "concerned party" of Syria before any international conference. One early result of these initiatives was the absence of a PLO-Syrian confrontation at the Amman summit; another has been the lifting of the siege of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

My impression as a participant in these initiatives is that while the gap in perceptions between Damascus and the PLO is considerable, both parties are equally keen to bridge it. A rapprochement between the PLO and Damascus is a sine qua

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non for serious Arab preparation for peace talks. Of the three Arab core parties to the conflict (Syria, Jordan and the PLO), Syria is the senior coalition member. This is a function of its geographic position, history, traditional role and its military strength and preparedness. As to whether President Assad is committed to peace talks, the answer is that he is a signatory to the Fez summit peace plan but, like many others, is very skeptical about the outcome of the negotiations with an Israel that is so preponderant militarily and enjoys perceived unlimited and unconditional American backing. Can anyone credibly blame him for this?

The West has misinterpreted the significance of the Amman summit's preoccupation with the Iran-Iraq war and the green light it gave for the resumption of relations with Egypt. This summit was a special session, summoned specifically to address the Gulf war. No regular Arab summit has been convened since 1982 because of tensions between Syria and the PLO and between Syria and Iraq.

The true significance of the Amman summit, therefore, is that it was held with the presence of Assad, Arafat and Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and that it paves the way for a regular summit meeting to address the Arab-Israeli conflict—a necessary preparatory step to the peace talks. Egypt's "return" may increase its military, political and economic role in the Gulf countries, but it does not necessarily enhance its role or credibility in the decisions that have to be taken collectively by the three main Arab parties in the conflict: Syria, Jordan and the PLO.

VII

For several years now much time and energy have been expended on the issue of an international conference versus direct talks. This has been at the expense of any crystallization of substantive principles for the resolution of the conflict. There is little difference between direct talks with or without the umbrella of an international conference if such a conference is purely ceremonial. It is difficult to see what attraction a ceremonial international conference would have to the Syrians, the PLO or, for that matter, the Soviets. Conferences, qua conferences, do not solve conflicts. Surely the key to a successful international conference (ceremonial or not) and even to direct talks is intensive, high-level albeit quiet pre-negotiations with and between all the principal protagonists (Syria, Israel,

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Jordan and the PLO) with maximal persuasiveness exerted by the superpowers on their respective friends.

In the light of historical experience accumulated since the Balfour Declaration, the recent uprising in the occupied territories and the configuration of power in the Arab world, the building blocks of what seems to me an honorable and pragmatically just settlement would appear without equivocation to be the following:

—the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights to the international frontiers, with demilitarization of the evacuated areas under U.N. supervisory observers and contingents stationed therein;

—the territorial partition of Mandatory Palestine along the 1967 frontier;

—a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (linked by a non-extraterritorial road), living in peaceful coexistence alongside Israel. This Palestinian state would be in confederation with Jordan and precluded from entering into military alliances with other countries, whether Arab or not;

—the designation of West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Extraterritorial status and access to the Jewish holy places would be assured, and a Grand Ecumenical Council formed to represent the three monotheistic faiths (with rotating chairmanship), to oversee interreligious harmony. Reciprocal rights of movement and residence between the two capitals within agreed-upon limits would be negotiated;

—an agreed limited return of 1948 Palestinian refugees to Israel proper and their unrestricted right of return to the Palestinian state. Those unable or unwilling to return would be compensated;

—agreement that the Jewish settlements existing in the occupied territories in 1948 would remain under Palestinian law, the others to be evacuated but not dismantled;

—explicit reciprocal recognition between Israel, the PLO, Jordan and Syria;

—Arab summit and Islamic summit guarantees of the settlement as the *point final*;

—superpower and great power guarantees (inside and outside the U.N. Security Council) with sanctions;

—an interim transitional period of fixed and limited duration.

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Important sectors of Israeli public opinion, not only on the left of center but at the center itself, favor a settlement that might be acceptable to most Palestinians. They are aware of the dangers of indefinite domination of another people, but this is not the thrust of popular Israeli sentiment nor of the thinking of the Israeli leadership. The Israeli scorpion is determinedly uncognizant of the Palestinian fellow creature in the same bottle. Paradoxically, a Palestinian state in the occupied territories within the 1967 frontiers in peaceful coexistence alongside Israel is the only *conceptual* candidate for a historical compromise of this century-old conflict. Without it the conflict will remain an open-ended one between the maximalist concepts of Zionism and those of its Arab and Muslim hinterland, whatever palliative measures are taken in the meantime.

One would have thought the Jewish genius capable of grasping effortlessly the need for an honorable and viable settlement in light of the geographic, demographic and ideological realities of the Middle East. Even archaeology adds its imperative plea in the form of the debris of so many past regional empires. The path to integration into a region would not seem to be via emphasis on extraneousness and escalating dependence on the outside. The breaking of bones is no passport to peace.

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Selig S. Harrison

TAIWAN AFTER CHIANG CHING-KUO

The uncertain outlook in Taipei following the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo on January 13 has underlined the dilemmas confronting American policymakers as they seek to develop stable ties with the People's Republic of China while at the same time fulfilling U.S. obligations to Taiwan. When the United States and China established diplomatic relations nine years ago, they were able to paper over their differences on the future of Taiwan. Increasingly, however, this sensitive problem has become a focal point of conflict between Washington and Beijing.

Characterizing its policy as one of noninvolvement, the United States says that it does not care whether, or how, the island is reunified with the mainland, so long as force is not used. Reagan Administration spokesmen have carefully remained within the confines of the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972, in which the United States "acknowledges" that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China."

Secretary of State George Shultz has resisted continuing pressures to endorse Deng Xiaoping's "one country, two systems" model for reunification. He made a cautious gesture to Beijing in early 1987 during a visit to China, when he said that the United States "welcomes" the current growth of trade and contacts across the Taiwan Strait, expressing support for "a continuing evolutionary process toward a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue." But P.R.C. leaders argue that the American role in Taiwan obstructs progress toward an accommodation. Pointing to U.S. sales of weaponry and military-related technology to Taipei, which have totaled more than $6 billion since 1979 and will approach $800 million in the 1988 fiscal year alone, Beijing contends that Washington continues to be deeply involved in what is the final stage of the Chinese civil war.

Selig S. Harrison is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the author of *The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy* and *China, Oil and Asia: Conflict Ahead?*

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The potential for growing U.S. policy problems concerning Taiwan is increased by the political transitions now taking place in both Taipei and Beijing. Chiang Ching-kuo's iron control suppressed demands in Taiwan for "self-determination" that have begun to intensify since his passing. Similarly, although Deng Xiaoping has subordinated the Taiwan issue to other priorities, a powerful, xenophobic nationalism lurks just beneath the surface of Chinese politics. In the factional infighting likely to follow his death, dissatisfaction with Washington's Taiwan policy could quickly become a weapon in the hands of domestic critics of close economic, military and intelligence-sharing ties with the United States.

II

"C.C.K.," who became president three years after the death of his father, Chiang Kai-shek, directed a remarkable transformation during his ten years in the presidency and an earlier 13-year apprenticeship as defense minister, vice premier and premier. He accelerated the process of modernization that has given Taiwan a 13-percent growth rate, an annual per capita income of $4,600 and foreign exchange reserves of $76 billion, the world's second largest. Adapting with surprising ease to the role of politician, Chiang shed the hard-line image acquired as army political commissar and secret police chief from 1950 to 1965. He developed a folksy political style; a baseball cap and turtleneck sweater became his trademark. Above all, he recognized the need to make political concessions to a rising middle class and Taiwan-born majority that resents domination by the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) in-group of post-1945 mainland immigrants. His death came just as he was beginning to liberalize the political process in the face of stiff conservative resistance.

Three years ago, in order to head off a takeover by the party's ultraconservatives, Chiang Ching-kuo banished their most determined leader, former army political commissar Wang Sheng, by naming him ambassador to Paraguay, a post he still holds. In December 1985 the late president formally announced that it would be incompatible with the constitution for a member of his family or a military officer to succeed him. His choice as successor, 64-year-old technocrat Lee Teng-hui, a Cornell-trained agricultural economist, has been on the Kuomintang Standing Committee since 1979 and was appointed vice president in 1984. Lee enjoys strong public sup-

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port as the first native Taiwanese to hold the presidency. However, he has no political base of his own, in contrast to former vice premier and interior minister Lin Yang-kang, the leading Taiwanese machine politician in the KMT, who has been shut out of the party's inner councils in recent years.

In naming Lee, Chiang Ching-kuo did not disturb the authoritarian institutional structure of KMT rule, in which the armed forces, the intelligence services and the powerful presidential secretariat share power with the nominal party leadership. In particular, he did not face down the army chief of staff, General Hao Pei-tsun, who was permitted to remain in office beyond the previously enforced three-year limit. General Hao occupies a central position in the emerging Taiwan power struggle.

In a conversation when he was still vice president, Lee Teng-hui spoke knowledgeably and with easy confidence about both domestic and foreign policy problems. His dispassionate and well-informed approach to developments on the mainland, especially in the economic field, differed markedly from the standard rhetoric of Taipei officials. On many issues, however, he took a more cautious stance than the one ultimately adopted by Chiang Ching-kuo. He elaborated on the obstacles to permitting the formation of an opposition party. Several months later, in December 1986, the new Democratic Progressive Party was in fact allowed to participate in elections to the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly, and won 23 percent of the vote.

Since inheriting Chiang Ching-kuo's term of office, which expires in 1990, Lee has attempted to strengthen his public support by adopting a new, open style. His decision to hold a full-scale press conference in late February was a marked departure from past practice. Of potentially greater significance was his suggestion that "new concepts" were needed to improve relations with Beijing, and his guarded support for athletic and cultural exchanges with the mainland. However, Lee's power is circumscribed. While clearly more than a figurehead, he is likely to play a limited mediating role between virtually independent power centers. A key test will be whether he is named KMT president at the next party convention in July. If he survives over time, it will be as the fulcrum of a collective leadership.

The first phase of the succession has been encouraging. But the longer-term issues now emerging are whether a collective

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leadership can remain stable, and whether the KMT, with its entrenched old guard, can keep in step with rapidly growing pressures for democratization.

III

The terms "mainlander" and "Taiwanese" often confuse discussion of Taiwanese politics and the unification issue. Ethnically, 16.2 million of the 19.4 million people of Taiwan are Han Chinese, like most of the people of the mainland; 13.3 million of these ("Taiwanese") are the descendants of immigrants who came from Fujian province across the Strait in earlier centuries, while 2.9 million ("mainlanders") are post-1945 immigrants and their children, who trace their origins to a variety of mainland provinces. There are also 3.2 million Hakkas, a sinified, non-Han minority who migrated from Guangdong province in the nineteenth century, and 325,000 aborigines.

The cleavages between mainlanders and Taiwanese are often exaggerated. Most of the younger mainlanders were born on the island. During four decades of Kuomintang rule, many of the cultural and social barriers between new and old immigrants have been reduced through intermarriage and a common educational system. To be sure, the heavy-handed repression practiced by the KMT regime, especially in its early years, aroused strong resistance from the established island populace. The KMT had a bunker mentality, and it excluded Taiwanese from positions of importance. In this setting the fight for democratic rights was a black-and-white struggle of the Taiwanese against the mainlanders. But a significant change has occurred. The regime has increasingly sought to broaden its base by appointing some Taiwanese to high positions in the government and the armed forces, a trend epitomized by the elevation of President Lee. Similarly, while the opposition parties get most of their support from Taiwanese, some of their leaders and supporters are now drawn from the younger generation of mainlanders.

The driving force behind the recent upsurge of the opposition parties is a popular desire for majority rule and an end to one-party authoritarianism, not for the assertion of a Taiwanese national identity. It was because Chiang Ching-kuo recognized this reality that he had begun to initiate significant moves toward political liberalization. To the extent that his policies are carried forward, moderate opposition leaders led

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by Kang Ning-hsiang and You Ching are likely to win increasing power in the legislature. An informal coalition could well develop between the moderate opposition and rising Taiwanese elements within the KMT. The pro-independence minority in the opposition would then be relegated to the fringes of political life.

But another scenario is perhaps more probable. Conservative KMT elements identified with General Hao Pei-tsun may well rein in the more liberal party secretary-general, Lee Huan, and his Taiwanese allies, President Lee and Lin Yang-kang. Should old-guard elements succeed in blocking meaningful liberalization, the frustrated opposition forces could become progressively radicalized. Advocates of independence could then plausibly argue that the political and constitutional underpinnings of the Republic of China are inherently incompatible with majority rule, making a sovereign Republic of Taiwan necessary.

The most critical test of liberalization will be whether there is significant reform of the R.O.C. constitutional structure, with its built-in limitation on majority representation. Since the KMT continues to claim jurisdiction over the mainland, it preserves the fiction that R.O.C. legislative bodies should represent all of China. Thus, more than two-thirds of the members of the key Legislative Yuan were elected on the mainland in 1948, and nearly half of these are over 80 years old. An average of 14 members have died each year between 1980 and 1986. In response to popular pressures, supplementary elections have been held periodically to add members from Taiwan. But out of 312 there are still only 73 members from the island, and of these, only 13 represent the newly organized opposition Democratic Progressive Party.

The DPP and other opposition groups are demanding that the original members be pensioned off, opening the way for a fully representative legislature. Moderate opposition leaders have proposed a variety of compromise formulas designed to guarantee specified levels of representation to mainlanders. At the time of Chiang's death, however, the KMT had rejected the idea of opening up all mainland seats at one stroke in the next election, scheduled for December 1989. Instead, proposals for an incremental expansion of 20 to 50 seats are under discussion.

Conservatives argue that the replacement of the present members requires a constitutional amendment that only the

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
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

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

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members themselves can enact. However, KMT liberals and opposition critics point out that the R.O.C. has functioned on Taiwan under "Temporary Provisions for the Period of Communist Rebellion." Just as these provisions have suspended constitutional requirements for elections on the mainland, they contend, so a similar measure could now define new constituencies for the Legislative Yuan, stipulating that elections for these seats shall be held on the territory under the effective control of the Republic of China until elections can be held on the mainland.

Moderate opposition leaders are prepared to retain the name "Republic of China" if the reality of majority rule is conceded. As Kang Ning-hsiang put it, "in American cities, zoning laws may require that you keep the facade of an historic building, even if you renovate the interior. We can do this to save face for the Kuomintang and to avoid precipitating a crisis in relations between China and the United States." However, advocates of de jure independence believe that compromise with the KMT will never yield more than token concessions. Only by creating a "Republic of Taiwan," in this view, can the majority overturn the existing order and establish an equitable political system. "If we don't get the name," said Cheng Nan-yong, editor of the magazine *Freedom Era*, "we won't get the system."

Chiang Ching-kuo's liberalization moves produced a major change in the atmosphere but relatively limited concrete results. His most popular reform gives civilians accused of national security offenses the right to be tried in civilian rather than military courts. When the Democratic Progressive Party surfaced, he took the unprecedented step of permitting it to compete openly in the 1986 elections. But the government has yet to adopt formal legislation authorizing opposition parties. Controversial election laws, including one restricting campaigning to ten days, have not yet been revised.

Martial law was lifted in July 1987, a symbolic step of great importance, but a new national security law keeps the substance of martial law restrictions largely intact. Critics emphasize that ubiquitous KMT political commissars keep a watchful eye on the bureaucracy, the military, the educational system and the press. So far the government has failed to fulfill promises to liberalize regulations that keep the opposition from starting new newspapers and radio stations. While it is preparing to allow modest increases in the number of Legislative Yuan members repre-

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senting Taiwan, the KMT is resisting demands for the direct election of the president, now chosen by a National Assembly (originally elected in 1947) which meets once every six years for this purpose. Direct elections for the governor of Taiwan province and the mayors of two major cities, Taipei and Kaoshiung, are also ruled out. When Lee Teng-hui said that such elections would come "someday," I asked him whether they would occur within five years. "Maybe five or ten years," he replied.

The most serious tension between the government and the opposition concerns the issue of "self-determination." In its 1986 platform the DPP declared that "Taiwan's future should be determined by all residents of Taiwan according to the principles of freedom, self-determination, universality, justice and equality." The government warns that this provision violates the R.O.C. constitution, which vests sovereignty in all R.O.C. nationals, including the people of the mainland, and bars "territorial changes" without their approval. But DPP leaders emphasized in interviews that the party is not committed to any specific future for Taiwan. "'Self-determination' simply means that we would not accept 'foreigner determination'," said You Ching. "It is not equivalent to independence. What we are saying is that the KMT and the Communist Party should not make a deal over our heads. When we win power, we will review the situation at that time and decide what is in our interests."

Stressing the "important differences" between his party and independence advocates, Kang Ning-hsiang has observed that "the relations between Taiwan and the mainland must be very good and intimate in the future. For the past 35 years we have been set in postures of mutual confrontation. This is not a natural situation, but one which was created by the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. The first task now is to get rid of this emotional burden."

The Hong Kong model, Kang said, is "very similar to the traditional model which existed in the past between China and its vassal countries. These countries had completely different political, economic and social systems, but they recognized China as 'big brother.' If that is what China wants now, then we can find a way to accommodate them."[1] Asked whether this

[1] Corinna Barbara Francis, "Interview With Kang Ning-hsiang," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1986, p. 63.

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implied a recognition of Beijing's sovereignty, he replied, "not necessarily." Gau Jeng-ju, chairman of the DPP's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, dismissed the idea that there is such a thing as a Taiwanese nationalism: "This concept cannot be scientifically sustained. Culturally, all of us are Chinese, but the fact that industrialization came to Taiwan so much sooner than to the mainland has created significant differences, so that at least for the present, we should remain two countries."

When the DPP was formed, pro-independence advocates attempted unsuccessfully to get "Taiwan" into its name. As KMT conservatives point out, however, the map of Taiwan is shown on the party flag. National Security Bureau Director Soong Chien-lien said that "most" DPP members secretly favor independence, whatever their stated position. President Lee is closer to the truth when he contends that "very few" of them do, though "they use 'self-determination' as a shock absorber for other issues." The government has taken no legal action against DPP leaders for general references to "self-determination." However, two leaders of a militant pro-independence group were sentenced to long prison terms in January of this year for explicitly advocating a sovereign Taiwan.

The DPP has taken a more positive stand on opening up contacts with the mainland than the KMT. It was the DPP that first raised the issue, using it to attract mainlander support in the 1986 election. This provoked a bitter controversy within the ruling party that continued until the partial relaxation of travel restrictions in October 1987. Younger party leaders, pointing to the flood of unpunished covert visits, warned that the government would look increasingly ridiculous at home and abroad unless it relaxed its policy. They argued that permitting limited contacts would help to counter pro-independence sentiment and would prevent the DPP from preempting the issue.

The modified policy adopted last October permits travel by those with relatives on the mainland but continues to ban tourism, trade and other contacts. By contrast, a DPP policy statement urges the government to permit mail and telephone contacts with relatives as well as "a wide range of nongovernmental exchanges and competition of a cultural, academic, artistic, scientific, athletic and economic character."

While supporting more contacts, the DPP, like the KMT, rejects the "one country, two systems" concept in its present form. Unlike Hong Kong, which as a colony had no sovereignty

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to lose, Taiwan has exercised sovereignty for four decades. Thus, Taipei does not regard Deng Xiaoping's proposal, which would reduce it to provincial status, as a compromise. Not surprisingly, mainlanders and Taiwanese alike question whether Beijing's autonomy pledges would be honored in practice and are waiting to see what happens in Hong Kong. More important, given the contrast between their standard of living and that on the mainland, with its per capita income of only $300, they question Deng's central argument that reunification would be economically beneficial, though they would like to have more economic contacts without a political union.

The R.O.C. continues to maintain diplomatic relations with 23 countries. At the same time, Taipei increasingly plays down the idea of retaking the mainland, and KMT Secretary-General Lee Huan has even suggested that "while we want to promote political and economic democracy on the mainland, we are not seeking to replace the Communist regime as such."[2]

IV

Viewed from Beijing, the consolidation of "one China" is a patriotic mission of transcendent importance left over from history. Disunited and weak, China was unable to maintain its control over Taiwan in the face of European, Japanese and American inroads. Spanish and Dutch adventurers established outposts on the island during the Ming period, and the Qing dynasty, which ruled Taiwan loosely for two centuries beginning in 1683, was forced to cede it to Japan in 1895 as the price for ending the Sino-Japanese war. No sooner had Japan been defeated in World War II than American support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime once again blocked national unity. Just as past humiliations in Taiwan symbolize the impotence of earlier Chinese regimes in this perspective, so reunification would demonstrate that a strong, unified China has now arrived on the world stage.

Soon after the normalization of Sino-American relations in January 1979, Beijing shifted to its present emphasis on peaceful reunification, gradually unveiling the "one country, two systems" proposal. The revised P.R.C. constitution, adopted in 1982, contains a new clause specifically designed for Taiwan and Hong Kong. Both would become Special Administrative

[2] *Taiwan Jihpao (Taiwan Daily News)*, Sept. 5, 1987, p. 1.

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Regions with a "high degree" of autonomy. They would be free to maintain their existing economic, political and social systems and their own administrative and judicial machinery, "including the power of final adjudication."[3] They would issue their own currency, operate under their own budgets and levy their own taxes. They would be exempt from any taxation by Beijing. They would have unfettered control over "the proprietary rights and lawful rights of inheritance of private property, houses, land and enterprises," including the rights of foreign investors.[4] While the P.R.C. alone would represent China in international forums, Taiwan and Hong Kong would have "considerable diplomatic powers to handle some external affairs," especially in the economic and cultural realm.[5] As local governments, it is emphasized, they would not have "inherent" powers. Their powers would be "granted by the central government" under the constitution.[6]

In one critical respect Deng's proposal accords more favorable treatment to Taiwan than to Hong Kong. Taiwan would maintain its own armed forces; Hong Kong would not. Moreover, P.R.C. forces would be stationed in Hong Kong but not in Taiwan.

Deng's reunification strategy focused initially on the settlement of the Hong Kong dispute with Britain as a necessary first step toward negotiations with Taiwan. By making good on its autonomy pledges in Hong Kong, he said repeatedly, Beijing will reassure doubters in Taipei. Once the Hong Kong issue was settled, Deng began a massive program to promote contacts and trade with Taiwan. In mid-1985 he created a new steering committee in the Communist Party leadership with broad powers to coordinate all government efforts relating to reunification. Known as the "Taiwan Operations Small Group," the committee, under Deng's personal control, gave the party's United Front Department unprecedented money and manpower to expand its activities.

In earlier years the reunification offensive was directed solely to winning over the dominant, Kuomintang-led mainlanders

[3] Deng Xiaoping, Interview With Yang Liyu, Professor, Seton Hall University, *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)*, July 30, 1983.

[4] *Deng Xiaoping Lunshu 'Yige Guojia, Liangzhong Zhidu'* (*Deng Xiaoping Discusses 'One Country, Two Systems'*), Beijing: Beijing Publishing House, October 1984, pp. 67–72.

[5] Jia Qiyan, "'One Country, Two Systems' Points the Way to Reunification," *China and the World: 7*, Beijing Review Foreign Affairs Series, Beijing, 1986, p. 49.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 50–51.

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who took refuge in Taiwan beginning in 1945. Now it is a dual-track program addressed simultaneously to the post-1945 immigrants and the Taiwanese majority.

To contact KMT-oriented elements in Taiwan, the United Front Department seeks to enlist the help of the estimated three million mainland residents with relatives on the island. The "reach out and invite back" campaign is said to involve 350,000 volunteers organized in some 2,800 local chapters. Its purpose is to stimulate letter-writing to relatives and to arrange for the completed letters to be taken to Hong Kong, where they are mailed to Taiwan. These letters not only urge visits but also enclose government circulars offering to restore abandoned properties.

The United Front Department estimates that 25,000 former Taiwan residents now live on the mainland, many of them political exiles. This group, organized in the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots, is spearheading the campaign to promote contacts with the anti-KMT *dangwai* (literally, "outside the party") political forces in Taiwan. Lavishly financed missions frequently visit the United States, where there are 300,000 Taiwan Chinese, and Japan, where there are 80,000. Seven new "social" organizations have been formed among overseas Taiwan Chinese communities during the past two years to promote contacts with the mainland. These groups have been systematically sending their members to Taiwan for quiet missionary work that is not easily detected or controlled by the KMT authorities.

While covert P.R.C. operations in Taiwan appear to be growing, they are no longer dedicated to subverting the government, as in earlier decades, since the incumbent regime is viewed as a brake on groups seeking de jure independence. These operations now focus largely on intelligence collection and on promoting support for more contacts and trade with the mainland. Insulating Taiwan from P.R.C. penetration is all but impossible. Fishing boats from the island regularly visit some 70 coastal P.R.C. "reception stations" that serve as hubs for illicit trade and espionage. Fujian province, immediately opposite Taiwan, is the busiest center for both overt and covert contacts. Taiwanese of Fujianese origin flock to Taoist temples and ancestral shrines in Fujian.

In 1987 indirect trade with the mainland through Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo totaled $1.9 billion, and smuggling accounted for another $300 million. The P.R.C. imposes

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few restrictions on the content of this trade. In addition to imported electronics and other consumer goods, shops and sidewalk stalls in China are permitted to sell the latest novels, fashion magazines, video cassettes and popular song recordings from Taiwan, all of which are in great demand.

Most visitors from Taiwan get visas for Japan, the United States or Hong Kong and then travel secretly to the mainland on separate permits issued by China. Beijing estimates that more than 100,000 people have come in this fashion since 1979. This figure seemed to me to be wildly exaggerated until Director General Soong of Taiwan's National Security Bureau asserted early last year that "about 10,000 a year" were going illegally. Since Taipei partially relaxed its travel ban, an estimated 14,000 people per month have been traveling to the mainland legally.

V

P.R.C. officials have no illusions concerning the prospects of early negotiations on the future of Taiwan. They are painfully aware of the negative attitudes on the island toward the mainland. In a definitive exposition of P.R.C. thinking on Taiwan, Li Shenzhi, director of the Institute of American Studies of the Academy of Social Sciences, acknowledges that the Cultural Revolution and "leftist mistakes in our policies have aggravated these attitudes."[7] At the same time, Li, like every Chinese official I met, blames the United States. Both Taiwan and Hong Kong, he said, are "products of certain imperialist policies. Taiwan has a unique form of de facto dependence on the United States, like that of Hong Kong on the United Kingdom, although their de jure relationships are different." Vested interests in Taiwan will resist reunification, Li declared, "so long as they have the tacit support provided by your arms sales, and so long as it is your policy, in general, to freeze the status quo in Taiwan." Li expressed the suspicion that the United States wants to keep open the option of installing military bases on Taiwan if the United States loses its present facilities in the Philippines.

Underlying Beijing's perceptions of the Taiwan issue is the basic conviction that economic and other interchange would eventually lead to peaceful unification if the United States

[7] "Taiwan in the Next Decade," a paper prepared for a conference on Taiwan sponsored by the Atlantic Council, March 14–16, 1985, p. 2.

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would adopt a genuinely detached posture. The disparity in living standards between Taiwan and the mainland is viewed as a serious but transitory problem. Huan Xiang, director of the State Council's Center for International Studies, reacted sharply to the suggestion that this disparity might make reunification impracticable. "If we are to reason that way," he said, "why not divide the United States into three or four countries on the basis of per capita income?"

The option of using military force to achieve reunification is not ruled out. In response to American pressures for a commitment to peaceful methods, China reaffirmed its "fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification" in the so-called second Shanghai Communiqué of August 1982, in which Washington and Beijing attempted to resolve the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. American officials, defending the communiqué, argued before hostile congressional committees that the word used for "fundamental" in the Chinese text (*da zheng fang zhen*) implies "unchanging, long term, a great guiding principle."[8] But P.R.C. leaders emphasize the word "striving." If the United States continues to block reunification, they say, force might become necessary.

Since 1982, Deng Xiaoping has avoided direct threats but has repeatedly reaffirmed China's "sovereign right" to retain the option of using force. In 1985, then General Secretary Hu Yaobang declared more expansively that "if we are economically powerful in seven, eight or ten years, we shall be in a position to modernize our national defense. If the broad masses of the Taiwan people wish to return and a small number do not wish to return, it will be necessary to use some force."[9]

Discussions of the Taiwan issue in Beijing reveal differing points of emphasis among contending elite groups. The armed services and affiliated foreign policy think tanks tend to play it down, stressing the need for Sino-U.S. defense cooperation. Technocrats and reform-minded economic officials show concern that the issue could erupt but stress their own priorities. Hard-line sentiment appears to be strongest in the ranks of politically conscious youth, especially in the universities, and among a wide spectrum of Communist Party leaders and activ-

[8] Testimony by Ambassador John H. Holdridge, in *U.S. Policy Toward China and Taiwan*, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Aug. 17, 1982, p. 23.

[9] Lu Keng interview with Hu Yaobang, published in *Bai Xing (Common Man)* (Hong Kong), Dec. 25, 1985, p. 13.

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ists. Open criticism of Deng for not pushing reunification with sufficient vigor and for "pandering" to the United States was expressed at the 1986 session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. There is little evidence of a "generation gap" on this issue. To be sure, many mainland Chinese of all ages are now more interested in the "four modernizations" than in politics. But conversations with widely varied groups evoked frequent outbursts of latent nationalistic emotion relating to Taiwan and certain other issues, notably relations with Japan.

As Taiwan's democratization process has advanced, P.R.C. concern over the growth of pro-independence forces has steadily grown, producing an ambivalent response. Yang Shangkun, vice chairman of the Communist Party's Central Military Commission, emphasized recently that Beijing has "always supported the efforts of the people of Taiwan in winning democratic rights" and gives "full consideration to all groups in Taiwan, not only to the Taiwan authorities." At the same time, *Beijing Review*, describing the opposition parties in Taiwan as representatives of a rising middle class, warned that the democratic movements, encouraged and supported by the United States, "grew last year enough to tip the balance of Taiwan's politics."[10] In time, the *Review* said, political instability "may eventually lead to the toppling of the present regime to be followed by a critical, chaotic situation."[11]

While the prospects for an accommodation between Beijing and Taipei still appear extremely remote, beneath the surface powerful economic forces are steadily drawing them closer together.

Beijing is seeking to make its autonomy offer attractive by advancing explicit suggestions for economic partnership. *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)* repeatedly emphasizes that China is ready to provide oil, coal and other raw materials at "domestic" prices, cooperate with Taipei in developing East China Sea petroleum, expand duty-free imports from Taiwan, and give Taiwan businessmen preferential access to mainland investment.

Taipei authorities have given the green light for trade, so long as it is conducted indirectly. The only businessmen arrested in trade cases have been those who attempt to deal

[10] "Taiwan Symposium: Scholars Take a Close Look," *Beijing Review*, May 4, 1987, p. 24.
[11] "Taiwan: Prospects for Reunification," *Beijing Review*, Mar. 17, 1986, p. 16.

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openly with Beijing, bypassing Hong Kong middlemen, or who ship goods that are not repacked in Hong Kong to disguise their origins. But Taipei is resisting broader economic relationships that would entail governmental contacts or would lead to an uncontrollable escalation of economic dependence on the mainland. Beijing is not really interested in economic interchange as such, they argue, but in using such interchange to set the stage for a political dialogue.

VI

What policies would best serve American interests in dealing with the Taiwan issue?

In my view, the United States should continue to resist an activist role, neither endorsing nor promoting the "one country, two systems" concept. At the same time, if Washington wishes to stabilize its relations with Beijing, it should show greater sensitivity to the deeply held conviction in the P.R.C. that the present American posture toward the future of Taiwan is not genuinely detached.

A modest but significant initiative would be the removal of residual legacies of America's former "two Chinas" concept, especially with respect to U.S. policy toward Chinese representation in seabed disputes. In normalizing relations with the P.R.C., the United States recognized Beijing's jurisdiction over the mainland and "de-recognized" the R.O.C. as a regime with such jurisdiction. At the same time, the United States carefully stopped short of recognizing Beijing as the sole legitimate spokesman for China in its extensive seabed boundary disputes with its maritime neighbors. On the contrary, with respect to the East China Sea, where Beijing, Taipei and Tokyo have conflicting seabed boundary claims, the United States has continued to treat Taipei as one of three co-equal disputants, ignoring established international law principles. A continuing policy of calculated ambiguity on the part of the United States is impeding the resolution of the Sino-Japanese seabed dispute. This, in turn, forecloses the possibility of cooperation in seabed petroleum development between Taipei and Beijing that could open up broader vistas of economic cooperation.[12]

The sensitivity of the issue of arms sales to Taiwan does not arise only from its impact on the military balance across the

[12] For a detailed discussion of these disputes, see: Selig S. Harrison, *China, Oil and Asia: Conflict Ahead?*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

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Taiwan Strait or on Taipei's attitude toward negotiations. It has become a rasping psychological irritant to the entire American relationship with Beijing. To Beijing, it symbolizes American bad faith, coupled with a patronizing posture in which the United States assumes that it holds all the cards and takes China's friendship for granted.

This perception is explained by the history of the arms sales issue. The United States insisted on retaining the right to sell arms to Taiwan when it "de-recognized" the Republic of China and opened relations with the People's Republic. But Congress went a step further, enacting the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires U.S. sales of weaponry to Taiwan "sufficient" for its defense. This led to festering tensions with Beijing until U.S. and Chinese leaders signed the August 1982 joint communiqué. The United States declared that it "does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan" and pledged that its arms sales to Taipei "will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms" the level of those supplied since 1979. In deliberately ambiguous language, the communiqué said that the United States "intends gradually to reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution."

Charges of bad faith erupted when China learned in 1985 that the United States had begun to license exports of sophisticated technology for the manufacture of weaponry by Taiwan much more advanced than its existing military hardware, including late-model tanks, guided-missile frigates, fighter aircraft and six different types of missiles. Beijing dismisses American arguments that the accord does not cover transfers of technology. In an early 1986 discussion, Hu Yaobang, flanked by Vice Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen, said that "even though they are not mentioned directly, they are clearly covered in the reference to 'qualitative' increases. What is the difference between arms sales and the transfer of technology for the manufacture of armaments? 'Transfer of technology' sounds better, but it is the same thing."

Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian demanded American acknowledgment that the communiqué covers technology in a July 1986 exchange of letters with Secretary of State Shultz and in a September meeting with him at the United Nations. When Wu failed to obtain results, Deng raised the issue with Shultz as part of a tense exchange on Taiwan during the latter's 1987 visit, prompting the secretary's speech on mainland-

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Taiwan contacts. Yang Shangkun, in his subsequent visit to the United States, urged the Reagan Administration twice in each of his major speeches to "strictly abide" by the 1982 communiqué, warning that "failure to handle the Taiwan question properly is bound to cause new twists and turns in our relations."

In keeping with the ban on qualitative upgrading of arms sales in the communiqué, the United States has refused to sell Taiwan aircraft more advanced than its current F-5E fighter. However, the qualitative superiority of the indigenous fighter being built with American components and technology is undisputed. The projected aircraft is often described as a smaller version of the F-16. Similarly, Taiwan's new generation of indigenous tanks, guided missile frigates and antiaircraft missiles are all being built with late-model U.S. technology. The fact that Washington is approving new export licenses for the tank, frigate and missile programs has now produced an open collision.

Suspicions of bad faith are magnified by the fact that the U.S. government does not reveal the nature of its arms sales or issue differentiated statistics showing the value of military-related technology transfers. Officials state that some technology transfers are classified as "weapons" and are included in arms sales totals, but the extent of these and other transfers is not disclosed. China believes that U.S. figures showing a $20-million annual reduction in arms sales—which totaled $720 million in fiscal 1987[13]—would be invalidated by adding technology transfers. But even on the basis of U.S. statistics, Beijing argues, it would take the United States 36 years at the present reduction rate to phase out its sales.

As its access to U.S. military technology has increased, Taiwan and its supporters in the U.S. Congress have muted their criticism of the 1982 communiqué. Taipei's security concerns are now focused on U.S. sales of arms and military technology to Beijing, especially sales of torpedoes and other naval weaponry and a $450-million program to upgrade fighter aircraft. Such military links, it warns, coupled with the expanding American role in China's economic modernization, will bolster

[13] This figure covers foreign military sales (FMS) transactions and commercial sales requiring export licenses under the Munitions Control Act. Defense industry sources and publications estimate that sales of military-related technology not classified as "weaponry" and thus excluded from this figure will surpass $100 million in 1988.

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Beijing's capabilities for the forcible annexation of Taiwan. The Pentagon responds that its arms transfers to both China and Taiwan are carefully tailored to serve defensive purposes alone.

The United States properly refused to include a timetable for the termination of arms sales to Taiwan in the 1982 communiqué, and any attempt to define one now would be a violation of the Taiwan Relations Act. In pledging gradual reductions "over a period of time," Washington did not become committed to reductions every year. Thus the United States could now reduce sales somewhat more rapidly in response to the continuing decline of tensions across the Strait, while at the same time reaffirming its readiness to readjust the level of sales should renewed tensions erupt. Both the 1982 communiqué and President Reagan's April 1982 letter to then Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang clearly linked the level of future arms sales to the level of tensions. Thus, in Beijing's perspective, the American effort to modernize and expand Taiwan's defense establishment through technology transfers, without regard to the improvement in Beijing-Taipei relations, violates the spirit as well as the letter of the 1982 accord.

For its part, Taipei warns that the slightest hint of more rapid reductions and limits on technology exports would create a disastrous crisis of confidence on the island, damaging investment prospects, stirring demands for independence and bringing a halt to the liberalization of contacts with the mainland. Some officials even hint of accelerated efforts to develop nuclear weapons or of a possible deal with Moscow for military bases.

These threats appear to be greatly overstated. Given its $76 billion in foreign exchange reserves and its high investment influx during recent years, Taipei could comfortably absorb a loss of economic confidence. Demands for independence, as we have seen, often embellish what is primarily a demand for democratic rights. The trend toward improved relations with the mainland has gained a momentum that would be difficult to reverse. Nevertheless, the United States should take Taiwan's anxieties into account by accompanying more rapid reductions in sales to Taipei with parallel restraint in making new military sales to Beijing.

Washington has been effective in promoting democratic change on Taiwan and should encourage a continuation of the Chiang Ching-kuo legacy. The security of the island ultimately

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depends on domestic political stability accompanied by a relaxation of tensions with the mainland. China would be most tempted to intervene militarily in a chaotic political situation resulting from a polarization between mainlanders and Taiwanese.

For an export-oriented economy, there would indeed be a serious loss of confidence if the United States should adopt protectionist trade policies toward Taiwan. Washington should continue to resist such policies. At the same time, the United States should emphasize that it welcomes growing exports by Taiwan to the mainland in part as a way of relieving Taipei's colossal trade surplus with Washington, which reached $19 billion in 1987.

Beijing could contribute to a resolution of its differences with Taipei and Washington by making its dedication to peaceful reunification and meaningful autonomy more credible. While the use of force is China's sovereign right, frequent reaffirmations of this right have strengthened demands in Congress for upgraded arms sales to Taiwan. More important, Beijing is obstructing the development of democratic local government institutions in Hong Kong. A key provision of the 1984 reversion agreement states that "the legislature will be elected." However, when Britain permitted indirect elections last year for half of the seats in what is now an appointed local council as a prelude to direct elections this year, Deng objected, and direct elections have now been put off indefinitely. Taipei justifiably contends that Beijing's attitude casts doubt on its readiness for meaningful autonomy under the "one country, two systems" proposal.

It is often argued that China does not care about the Taiwan issue as much as it says it does, but merely uses it to keep the United States on the defensive in order to extract concessions on other issues. All that matters to China, this argument runs, is economic modernization. This assessment dangerously underrates the strength of Chinese nationalist feeling. Should it guide future American policy, the Sino-American relationship is indeed likely to face "new twists and turns" that could quickly tear apart the fabric of economic, political and strategic linkages so carefully developed since 1979.

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Gareth Porter

CAMBODIA: SIHANOUK'S INITIATIVE

For many years the conflict over Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia appeared intractable: Vietnam refused to negotiate except with China, while China flatly refused to negotiate; Hanoi would not consider any settlement in which the Khmer Rouge had a role, while the Khmer Rouge, backed by China, insisted there could be no settlement that did not include them. Cambodia seemed to be condemned indefinitely to Vietnamese military occupation, on one hand, and the continuous threat of the return to power of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, on the other.

But since former Cambodian chief of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk opened direct negotiations with the Vietnamese-sponsored People's Republic of Kampuchea last December, a peace settlement has for the first time become a real possibility. Indeed, the broad outlines of such a settlement, built around Sihanouk's return to Cambodia, have begun to emerge. Although the negotiations could still be snagged on the problems of power-sharing in a transitional Cambodian regime and insulating national elections against Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge army, the international context is far more conducive to a peace agreement today than it was in the early 1980s. Hanoi's interest in a negotiated settlement has increased as it has encountered difficulties with its plan to withdraw unilaterally all of its troops by the end of 1990. The passage of time has also brought a more pragmatic Chinese attitude toward Cambodia and a new configuration of relations among the United States, China and the Soviet Union that gives both China and Vietnam reasons for wanting an early settlement.

II

Underlying the diplomatic stalemate that prevailed over the Cambodian war for so many years was the bitter conflict between China and Vietnam. Although an element of geopolitical rivalry over influence in Laos and Cambodia was undoubt-

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edly involved, the conflict was fueled primarily by Chinese animosity and Vietnamese fears. Chinese leaders were angered by Vietnam's "ingratitude" for China's aid in the war against the United States and "betrayal" following a series of "anti-Chinese" actions after 1975. For their part, the Vietnamese, recalling a thousand years of Chinese efforts to sinicize them, believed Beijing was reverting to its historical policy of trying to keep weak and pliant states on its southern border.

It was the border war between the Democratic Kampuchea regime of Pol Pot and his erstwhile Vietnamese allies that triggered the violent Sino-Vietnamese confrontation of early 1979. In retrospect, the self-destructive policies of the Pol Pot period appear to have had more to do with racial antipathy toward the Vietnamese "hereditary enemy" than with communist ideology. Obsessed with reversing the centuries-long decline of the Khmer people, Pol Pot was apparently convinced after the Khmer Rouge victory in the Cambodian civil war (1970–75) that he had created a revolutionary force powerful enough to take back the formerly Cambodian land occupied for centuries by the Vietnamese.

Democratic Kampuchea's disastrous socioeconomic policies, aimed at creating a powerful Cambodia in just a few years, resulted in as many as two million Cambodian deaths from sickness, starvation and execution. Pol Pot's purge of party and army personnel suspected of disloyalty and his provocative military offensive along the disputed Cambodian-Vietnamese border in 1977 drove a number of his key military officers into alliance with Vietnam, and provided one segment of leadership of the new government that Vietnamese troops set up in Phnom Penh in January 1979.

In occupying Cambodia and putting a client regime in power, Vietnam clearly went beyond defending its border against Pol Pot's attacks. What drove Vietnamese policy was the belief, reinforced by two recent wars in Indochina, that Cambodia was a vital part of Vietnam's security sphere. After Vietnam concluded in mid-1978 that China had become the "main and immediate enemy" of the Vietnamese revolution, it was determined to eliminate Chinese influence in Cambodia.

When Vietnam decided to use force to get rid of the Pol Pot regime, the disparities between Vietnam and Cambodia in size, bureaucratic development and cultural self-confidence came into play. Vietnamese occupation and political tutelage inevitably took on the aspect of imperialist domination, even though

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Hanoi's purpose was not economic exploitation or colonization. Hanoi's ambition, in fact, was to mold a Cambodian social and political system that would be closely aligned with Vietnam for generations. The temptation to try for such a far-reaching historical goal was increased by the fact that the Cambodian population greeted the Vietnamese as liberators when they drove out the Pol Pot regime in January 1979.

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the establishment of the pro-Vietnamese People's Republic of Kampuchea was a blow to Chinese pride and prestige as a regional power. In response, Deng Xiaoping ordered a three-week punitive military expedition into Vietnam's northern border provinces in February 1979 to "teach Vietnam a lesson." This pedagogical invasion, which Chinese officials later evaluated as a costly failure, was followed almost immediately by the establishment of a large Soviet naval and air presence in Vietnam—to the chagrin of many Chinese military leaders.

Deng was successful, however, in mobilizing regional and global opposition to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. China drew the United States, Japan, West European countries and the noncommunist states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) into an informal international coalition aimed at putting military, economic and diplomatic pressure on Hanoi. Militarily, the Chinese provided the arms and ammunition to Pol Pot's forces with the cooperation of Thailand, which served as a conduit. Diplomatically, ASEAN took the lead at the United Nations, demanding a Vietnamese military withdrawal and insisting that the Cambodian seat at the United Nations remain in the hands of Democratic Kampuchea rather than fall to the Vietnamese-sponsored regime. The United States persuaded several countries and international institutions to suspend economic assistance to Vietnam until it left Cambodia, thus denying Hanoi an estimated half a billion dollars annually.

One weakness of this strategy was that it required the international coalition to give diplomatic support to the bloodstained regime of Pol Pot in the U.N. General Assembly. By 1981 several European states were threatening to vote against seating the Pol Pot regime. This danger prompted the creation in 1982 of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which united three opposition elements: the anticommunist Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) under the leadership of former Cambodian Prime

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Minister Son Sann, Prince Sihanouk's political front, and Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge.

With this arrangement Sihanouk and Son Sann (both of whom had repeatedly rejected the possibility of a united front with the Khmer Rouge in 1979 and 1980) were agreeing in effect to lend respectability to Pol Pot's forces in return for help in building up their respective armies. Both had been advised by China and Thailand (China's partner in supporting the Khmer Rouge resistance since 1979) that they would get military equipment only if they joined a coalition with the Khmer Rouge. Although the United States and ASEAN embraced the goal of building up the noncommunist resistance forces to equal or surpass Pol Pot's army, Washington only provided token nonlethal assistance beginning in 1985. It was left to the Chinese to provide the military supplies to the noncommunist forces, and the noncommunist counterweight to the Khmer Rouge never emerged.

Pol Pot's guerrilla army, estimated at 25,000–35,000 troops, far outnumbers all the combined noncommunist resistance forces operating inside Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge's ability to carry out military operations, however, has been substantially reduced since a successful Vietnamese offensive during the 1984–85 dry season eliminated a string of Khmer Rouge camps near the Thai border and disrupted their logistics systems. Once credited with having enough supplies to carry on two years of warfare, they are now believed to have only enough for two months of operations before having to retreat and regroup.

The Khmer Rouge have now decided to reduce military operations to a minimum and concentrate on strengthening their underground network in the villages. Noncommunist Cambodian resistance officials have become increasingly concerned in recent years about the large sums of American dollars that Khmer Rouge cadres have received from China to dispense in the villages to attract the rural population to their cause. The combination of small guerrilla units, underground cadres and abundant cash may give them a potential for a strong showing in any future election process.

The Khmer Rouge, who still refer to themselves as the "Democratic Kampuchea faction," are believed by some observers to be divided between a "moderate" group led by their nominal leader Khieu Samphan and military chief Son Sen, and the "extremist" clique surrounding Pol Pot. No doubt

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Khieu Samphan is more moderate than Pol Pot. He was chosen to replace Pol Pot as head of the Khmer Rouge faction of the CGDK as part of an effort to improve its image. But the Khmer Rouge army and political network are under the firm control of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and their wives—the inner core of the regime when it was in power. Khieu Samphan is a figurehead who remains powerless, as he was from 1975 to 1979.

The Pol Pot group has carried on an armed struggle for nearly a decade to restore itself to power. It ostensibly dissolved the Communist Party of Kampuchea in 1981, at China's suggestion, but the organization, by whatever name, remains unchanged. The same racial hatred for the Vietnamese that impelled its disastrous policies in the 1970s now provides the rationale for regaining power by whatever means necessary. As Ieng Sary declared in 1981, even if the Vietnamese withdraw from Kampuchea, it will only be for "tactical reasons," and the Vietnamese threat will not recede in "this generation or the next." The Pol Pot group trusts no other Cambodians to have the toughness to resist that threat.

Son Sann's KPNLF, once touted as the main alternative to the Khmer Rouge, has been seriously divided by squabbling between Son Sann and the military leadership. It has been unable to organize any significant military operations in the interior since the elimination of its border camps in the 1984–85 dry season. It suffered defections to the Sihanoukists, as well as massive desertion to the Thai border area and the Cambodian countryside. By early 1986 the KPNLF was believed to have only about a thousand men left inside the country. Although that figure is higher today, the KPNLF is in danger, as one U.S. official puts it, of becoming a "nonentity."

Prince Sihanouk's Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS) has emerged since 1985 as the second-strongest resistance force, with some 15,000 troops, of which perhaps half are operating in the interior. Sihanouk's main strength, however, is the fact that many soldiers of other factions, the rural population and most civilians working for the Phnom Penh regime still regard him with respect and affection as *Samdech Euv* ("Prince-father"). His return to Phnom Penh, in the context of a negotiated agreement that would allow him to operate freely, would dramatically alter the lines of Cambodian politics.

It is more than nine years since the Vietnamese invasion, but the regime in Phnom Penh has made only limited progress in building a political-military apparatus that can command the

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loyalty of the population. Its armed forces are believed to have some 50,000 troops, which have taken on an increasing share of military duties from the Vietnamese. But morale and cohesion remain a major question. The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party claims about 7,000 members and another 40,000 potential members in "core groups," but the loyalty of many of these new converts must be considered uncertain at best. Phnom Penh has gained some political credit by not overly regimenting Cambodian economic and cultural life, but it has been unable to restore production to its pre-1970 level. More important, Hanoi's hegemonic political role in Cambodia since 1979, mainly through the influence of Vietnamese officials in the central ministries, has alienated most of the educated segment of the population.

III

The possibility of a Cambodian settlement in the next year or two exists mainly because of the passionate desire of Prince Sihanouk for such a settlement and his long record of skillful diplomatic maneuvering. Sihanouk seized the initiative in a series of surprise moves in 1987 and early 1988. First, in May 1987, he resigned as president of the CGDK for a year. Then he met with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen in December 1987 and January 1988 outside Paris to discuss a framework for a settlement. Almost immediately following the second meeting, Sihanouk announced in Beijing that he was leaving the CGDK permanently in order to maintain his diplomatic independence. But then he began to hint that he might resume the leadership of the CGDK after all unless an adequate response to his latest initiative was forthcoming from Hanoi and Phnom Penh.

A shrewd diplomatic mind is at work behind Sihanouk's seemingly erratic behavior. What casual observers have long described as a "mercurial" personality is in fact a calculated tactic that he has been using for nearly four decades to enhance his diplomatic leverage: by abruptly changing sides, or threatening to do so, he gets concessions from more powerful actors who for one reason or another need his cooperation. In 1952, for example, Sihanouk, then a 30-year-old king, forced France to turn over complete control of the army, police and judicial system to his Royal Government of Cambodia (which had been collaborating with the French against Vietnamese-supported

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Khmer insurgents) by threatening a nationwide anti-French revolution.

Sihanouk abdicated his throne in 1955 to become a politically active chief of state. He used both his remaining aura of *devaraja* (god-king) and the force of his personality to dominate Cambodian politics until the March 1970 coup that ended his rule. Sihanouk's Royal Government of Cambodia was a conservative authoritarian system in which opposition figures were arbitrarily jailed and the economy tightly regulated by a traditionally venal bureaucracy.

But as a strategist of weak-state diplomacy, he was—and still is—unequaled in contemporary international politics. In the 1960s Sihanouk shrewdly managed Cambodia's relations with China and North Vietnam by giving those states a stake in supporting his monarchist regime against Pol Pot's communist movement. Sihanouk's greatest accomplishment was to minimize the impact of the inevitable spillover of America's Vietnam War into Cambodia after 1965. He negotiated an agreement with Hanoi in 1967, when its need for sanctuaries in Cambodia was greatest, and in 1969 he reopened relations with the United States, whose aid and embassy he had earlier expelled. After Sihanouk's ouster in 1970, Cambodia was quickly engulfed in war and internal violence.

For the next five years, Sihanouk was allied with Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge as well as with China and Vietnam against the U.S.-backed regime that had ousted him from power. He became a virtual prisoner of the Khmer Rouge after their victory in 1975. Even after he was sent to represent Cambodia at the United Nations as Vietnamese troops approached Phnom Penh, Sihanouk remained physically under Khmer Rouge guard. While in New York in January 1979, with the U.S. State Department's help, he escaped from the cadres assigned to him and began at once to position himself for a negotiated settlement.

The prince believed that he alone could be acceptable to both China and Vietnam. Convinced that the Vietnamese were still grateful to him for having permitted communist forces to use Cambodian border sanctuaries during the American war, he publicly recalled his close personal friendship with then Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and wrote three letters to him in 1979 asking that Hanoi agree to a negotiated settlement. The Vietnamese, he believed, would be able to weaken the Khmer Rouge forces within two or three years, after which

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China, the West and Vietnam would all recognize the necessity of a compromise plan in which he would play the central role. Sihanouk argued that the Khmer Rouge were the Cambodian people's main enemy, while the Vietnamese were only enemy number two. Meanwhile he tried to persuade China and the ASEAN states to abandon Pol Pot's forces, and sought U.S. support to build up an army.

By the end of 1981, however, Sihanouk recognized that he had miscalculated on all fronts. He had underestimated the staying power of Pol Pot's guerrillas as well as Beijing's commitment to them. The United States, which had embraced a Sihanouk solution to the conflict in the summer of 1979, had soon shifted, at the insistence of China, to support for a united front with the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese. And his old friends in Hanoi refused even to acknowledge his letters. Pham Van Dong went so far as to proclaim him "a finished man."

Confronted with these setbacks Sihanouk made a strategic shift, becoming president of the CGDK in order to avoid being marginalized by the external powers. But he never abandoned his ultimate aim of negotiating a peace agreement with Hanoi that would end Vietnamese occupation and restore Cambodian independence. The CGDK's eight-point peace proposal of March 1986, which first introduced the idea of a four-party coalition government (but failed to include any safeguards against Khmer Rouge military power), underlined his differences with the Chinese. After having acquiesced in the plan, Sihanouk publicly complained that it would result in the Khmer Rouge again ruling Cambodia.

By 1987 Prince Sihanouk had come to regard the CGDK as a serious hindrance to a diplomatic settlement. His coalition partners rejected all negotiations with Phnom Penh (Hanoi had signaled its interest in such talks as early as 1984) until the Vietnamese had substantially withdrawn—a posture he believed was too rigid. Son Sann and the Khmer Rouge insisted that there was no evidence of Vietnamese seriousness, and that talking with the Phnom Penh government would only lend it legitimacy. But Sihanouk was willing to take that chance in order to plumb Hanoi's intentions.

After the first two rounds of talks, Prince Sihanouk and Prime Minister Hun Sen remained far apart on the critical issue of a transitional government and its relationship to national elections. Hun Sen rejected Sihanouk's proposal that the

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present Cambodian government be dissolved and replaced by a provisional coalition government that would hold elections under international supervision. Hun Sen's counterproposal was that the elections be organized by an "electoral commission" with representation of all parties, and that the new coalition government be formed only after the elections take place.

The apparent deadlock in these first meetings was misleading, however. In response to Hun Sen's complaint that destroying the present administration would create chaos that the Khmer Rouge could exploit, Sihanouk said that the local and provincial administration would not need to be dismantled. Sihanouk called for giving each side equal representation at the top of each national ministry.

Phnom Penh was also not as inflexible as Hun Sen's opening position would suggest. It may well agree to negotiate on power-sharing in advance of national elections. Chea Soth, a member of the ruling Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Politburo, has suggested since the second round of talks that there would have to be negotiations with Sihanouk on the political structure of a coalition government to determine "whether you want it to be the Kingdom of Kampuchea, the People's Republic of Kampuchea, or Democratic Kampuchea." That offer appears to modify Hun Sen's insistence during the talks that a coalition government can only come after elections, and opens the way for determining a formula for apportioning posts within central government ministries.

Sihanouk and Phnom Penh also have a common interest in ensuring that the Khmer Rouge do not return to power after the Vietnamese troop withdrawal. Both are prepared to insist on a Chinese cutoff of military aid to the Khmer Rouge once an agreement goes into effect. Hun Sen insisted on the disarmament of the Khmer Rouge forces as a condition for the phased withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Sihanouk, who has declared that the Khmer Rouge leaders have a plan to return to power after the departure of the Vietnamese troops, also wants the Khmer Rouge forces disarmed. But the Chinese have supported the Khmer Rouge rejection of that proposal so firmly in the past as to convince Sihanouk that it is not politically feasible.

Prince Sihanouk's alternative to disarming the Khmer Rouge is the creation of a quadripartite national army in which the Cambodian government forces and the ANS, along with the

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KPNLF, would be able to balance the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk even encouraged Hun Sen to obtain more military assistance from the Soviets and said he expected to get similar help from the United States. Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan has rejected this aspect of the Sihanouk plan, calling instead for a unitary national army in which the larger Khmer Rouge officer corps and troop strength would give it dominant military influence.

A second element in the Sihanouk plan is a U.N. peacekeeping force to replace Vietnamese troops—a proposal that both China and the Khmer Rouge have privately rejected in the past. Foreign observers have expressed doubt that international peacekeeping forces in numbers that are politically feasible would be sufficient to provide security for a national election. Sihanouk, who has expressed a strong preference in the past for holding elections while a Vietnamese troop presence remains in the country, appears to recognize that risk. His current proposal for a three-phase Vietnamese withdrawal would permit an overlap between the international peacekeeping force and the Vietnamese military presence. During this overlap period, the interim government and the new national army could be formed and the preparations for elections carried out.

Sihanouk's acceptance of a continued Khmer Rouge military force through the electoral period is no doubt influenced by his conviction that some of the Khmer Rouge commanders are friendly to him. Some of them have not only collaborated with the ANS against the Vietnamese and Cambodian government forces but have reportedly used Sihanouk's picture to gain popular support. (Others, notably those loyal to Deputy Commander Ta Mok, have attacked ANS troops in various provinces.) Phnom Penh, however, is not likely to count on possible splits in the Khmer Rouge army to neutralize its military power. The disposition of Pol Pot's forces, therefore, is likely to be a sticking point in Sihanouk's negotiations with both the Khmer Rouge and Phnom Penh unless the prince can prevail on China to change its position on demilitarization of the Khmer Rouge.

The tenor of the Sihanouk-Hun Sen meetings convinced Sihanouk to continue the talks as long as required to reach a settlement. But the prince, who must carry out his own version of shuttle diplomacy, must also bring the Khmer Rouge and their Chinese allies around to accepting the bargain with Phnom Penh and Vietnam. Back in Beijing in late January, he therefore emphasized to Chinese party chief Zhao Ziyang and

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Khieu Samphan his insistence on the "dissolution" of the Vietnamese-sponsored regime. He canceled the meeting with Hun Sen scheduled for April, expressed the desire to talk directly to the Vietnamese and even suggested that he might return to the presidency of the CGDK.

The Sihanouk-Hun Sen track was thus temporarily shut down, but it is certain to reopen, with or without direct Vietnamese participation. Sihanouk's offer to enter into a bilateral coalition government with Phnom Penh if Khieu Samphan and Son Sann refuse to participate in the negotiations is a strong incentive for Hanoi to strive for an agreement between Hun Sen and the prince. The first two rounds of talks illuminate the political complexities of Sihanouk's effort to carry out two separate sets of negotiations that must ultimately be brought together. But it also demonstrates Sihanouk's remarkable capacity for diplomatic maneuver.

IV

Skeptics are reluctant to believe that there has been any basic change in Vietnamese policy toward Cambodia. They cite Vietnam's refusal to negotiate directly with Prince Sihanouk as evidence that it is trying to draw the prince into a trap and to strengthen the bargaining position of its Cambodian allies. The People's Republic of Kampuchea, like any incumbent regime, does not want to bargain away its own existence. Nevertheless Hanoi remains the ultimate arbiter of Hun Sen's negotiating posture. Its final decisions on a transitional coalition government will reflect its assessment of the relative risks and benefits of a unilateral withdrawal and of a negotiated settlement.

Some Vietnamese officials have been quietly formulating a political rationale for a genuine power-sharing arrangement in Cambodia in the event it becomes necessary. The failure of their Cambodian clients to consolidate their regime after nine years has reportedly been the subject of careful study in Hanoi. The explanation that has emerged is that the Cambodian economy is still at too low a level of production to support a Marxist-Leninist revolution—a reality which, the Vietnamese have concluded, will not change soon.

Hanoi's posture toward a political settlement during the first three years of its occupation was uncompromising: Vietnamese officials insisted that there was no "problem" to be negotiated. Any talk of negotiated settlement was discouraged by Hanoi's

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fear that the fragile new administration, which it was still struggling to stabilize, might collapse in a panic. While Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and other officials said privately that they still considered Sihanouk a patriot, they could not suggest the desirability of negotiations with him without the risk of destabilizing the Phnom Penh regime. Only in 1984 did Hanoi dare to propose a meeting between Sihanouk and Hun Sen.

The first direct proposal from Vietnam for formal negotiations in October 1986 was apparently in response to the CGDK's eight-point proposal of the previous spring. It was a secret offer to the Chinese through the Austrian mission to the United Nations for a meeting in which the three resistance factions, without Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, would negotiate with the Phnom Penh regime. The offer suggested that Hanoi was prepared to accept at least some Khmer Rouge representation in the settlement and, by implication, even in a future government.

Hanoi was still hoping that Sihanouk would separate himself from the Khmer Rouge and negotiate separately with Phnom Penh. A Vietnamese proposal for a separate meeting between Sihanouk and Hun Sen in Pyongyang in early 1987 was rejected by the prince as a result of his coalition partners' opposition. After Sihanouk's resignation from the CGDK in May 1987, the Phnom Penh regime, at Hanoi's urging, reversed years of propaganda attacks on Sihanouk and began referring to him publicly by his royal title. Phnom Penh's five-point proposal of October 1987 for the first time used the previously forbidden words "neutral and nonaligned Cambodia" and "coalition government."

Hanoi's negotiating strategy has always depended on having credible plans to withdraw unilaterally by replacing its troops with those of its Cambodian client. Since the early 1980s the Vietnamese leaders have had extensive plans to build up the self-sufficiency of the Cambodian government troops with Soviet-bloc arms, Vietnamese advisers and an infusion of Cambodian officers trained in Vietnam and Eastern Europe. The 1984–85 Vietnamese dry-season offensive and the construction of a massive border barrier were aimed at destroying the network of Khmer Rouge bases and virtually closing the Thai-Cambodian border to large-scale infiltration so that the war could be gradually turned over to the Cambodians.

The success of that offensive led to the Vietnamese pledge of a total unilateral withdrawal by 1990. Vietnam hoped to

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demonstrate to the United States, ASEAN and China that it would get out of Cambodia unilaterally, if necessary. At the same time, Hanoi hoped to force the Cambodian government troops to cope with the Khmer Rouge on their own.

The Vietnamese plan has achieved a measure of success. Guerrilla infiltration from the Thai border has been slowed. The system of border defenses has been turned over to Cambodian troops, and Vietnamese troops have been moved to the interior to increase security. The regular troop strength of the Phnom Penh regime has increased from 30,000 in 1985 to as much as 50,000. On the other hand, Vietnamese officials admit privately that Cambodian government troops are hard to recruit, poorly motivated and prone to accommodations with resistance forces, particularly those of the Sihanoukist army. Some Cambodian officers have openly resisted the 1990 withdrawal deadline: in May 1986 a Cambodian battalion commander declared to a reporter that Phnom Penh would request the continued presence of Vietnamese troops beyond 1990 if the Khmer Rouge were still being aided by China and Thailand.

The Vietnamese have also come to realize that the Khmer Rouge are attempting to take advantage of the withdrawal pledge to launch a new psychological warfare campaign. "When the water rises, fish eat ants," Khmer Rouge cadres have told Cambodian villagers, "but when the water recedes, ants each fish." Once the Vietnamese are gone, in other words, the Khmer Rouge will punish those who supported the Phnom Penh regime. Many villagers have become more reluctant to report on the presence of Khmer Rouge troops because of fear that one day the Vietnamese will not be around to protect them.

The Vietnamese have not been able to keep the pace of withdrawals that they had originally planned. The original plan was to increase the level of Cambodian troops to around 100,000, but it is now clear that nothing like that figure will be possible. After several years of staged troop withdrawals that turned out to be merely troop rotations, the Vietnamese finally did carry out a net withdrawal during the 1987–88 dry season estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 out of a total of 140,000 troops. Hanoi could still meet the 1990 deadline, but the risks are likely to be far greater than originally anticipated.

The Vietnamese could simply announce in 1990 that the Khmer Rouge security threat required an extension of the

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deadline. This, however, would be a costly admission of defeat that would eliminate whatever bargaining leverage remained in trying to negotiate controls over the Khmer Rouge. Uncertainty about being able to complete the withdrawal by the end of 1990 gives Vietnam a strong incentive to reach a negotiated settlement before that deadline.

Vietnam's interest in a negotiated settlement has also been spurred by its desperate need for capital and technology at home. Major investments, especially from Japanese businessmen, will not come to Vietnam until the Japanese government, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank signal their support by making major loans. That signal, in turn, will not come until the Vietnamese have completely withdrawn from Cambodia.

Meanwhile, the Vietnamese party and government leadership has undergone far-reaching changes. At the December 1986 Sixth Party Congress the last of the old guard stepped down. The new party chief, Nguyen Van Linh, 71, is a southerner who supported daring experiments with economic liberalization in the South after 1975. Like Mikhail Gorbachev, Linh has pushed for ideological renovation and candor. Also, like Gorbachev on Afghanistan, Linh has admitted that the continued conflict with China and the Cambodian resistance has been costly, forcing Vietnam to spend a large part of its budget to build an army.

The Vietnamese must also take account of the transformation of Sino-Soviet relations from enmity to near-normal relations during the 1980s and Gorbachev's determination to achieve full party-to-party relations with Beijing. The Soviets have become more active diplomatically in promoting a negotiated settlement. Significantly, Hun Sen stopped in Moscow both before and after his talks with Sihanouk, indicating that the Soviet leaders are monitoring the progress of the talks independently rather than relying on the Vietnamese. Soviet officials have cited Afghanistan, where Gorbachev has decided to withdraw Soviet troops without assurances on a successor regime, as a model for the resolution of other Third World conflicts. Hanoi clearly cannot count on indefinite Soviet support for its occupation of Cambodia.

V

For China, a settlement of the Cambodian conflict is a less urgent issue than for Vietnam. Beijing's position remains un-

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compromising: Vietnam must agree to a timetable for withdrawal without conditions, and even while withdrawal is under way, China will negotiate with Vietnam only on bilateral issues. But the Chinese perspective has also shifted as a result of political developments during the 1980s. Chinese leaders are no longer motivated primarily by the desire to see the Vietnamese "bled white" as they were in the early 1980s, as most of the emotional intensity that impelled the Chinese in that period has now dissipated.

Chinese policy toward Vietnam has undoubtedly been influenced by the Sino-Soviet rapprochement that began to develop in 1982. By 1985 Sino-Soviet relations had warmed to the point where China had dropped its earlier hostility toward Third World Marxist regimes with close ties to the Soviets, including Angola, Nicaragua and even Cuba. While Beijing has carefully excepted Vietnam from this general trend, the anti-Soviet aspect of China's posture toward Vietnam has now become much less relevant.

A central feature of China's hard-line policy toward Vietnam was its threat of further "lessons" in the form of incursions by 300,000 Chinese troops massed near the Vietnamese border. Beijing had assured Prince Sihanouk in 1981 that it would intervene militarily against Vietnam from time to time to support the resistance forces in Cambodia, and promised Thailand it would punish the Vietnamese for intruding into Thai territory. The pledge to Sihanouk was repeated in 1984. But when the Vietnamese overran the border bases of the Khmer Rouge and intruded into Thai territory in the 1984–85 dry season, the Chinese response was limited to stepped-up artillery attacks on the Vietnamese border.

The disappearance of the threat of a second lesson was undoubtedly related to Beijing's decision to place top priority on economic modernization at the expense of the military. But it was also linked with the changing Sino-Soviet relationship. Although Chinese leaders have consistently maintained that the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia is one of the three obstacles to full normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, Beijing began by 1984 to have its own interest in maintaining the momentum of improved relations. The desire to avoid disrupting that process constrained Chinese military aggressiveness toward Vietnam during the 1984–85 Vietnamese dry-season offensive in Cambodia. Vice Premier Ivan Arkipov, the highest-level Soviet visitor to China in 15 years, was about to

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arrive in Beijing, and the Chinese apparently decided against any major attack on Vietnam rather than see the trip canceled, as had happened the previous year.

In January 1988 the Sino-Vietnamese border was extraordinarily quiet. A Chinese diplomat confirmed that the fighting on the border was "lower" than in previous years, citing a declining level of fighting in Cambodia and an improved atmosphere on the "global level." In mid-March, however, Sino-Vietnamese naval clashes near the contested Spratly Islands demonstrated the difficulty of reducing tensions between the two countries.

Moreover, Chinese relations with Thailand and the Khmer Rouge tend to perpetuate Beijing's hard-line policy toward Cambodia. During the 1980s Beijing has developed an extraordinarily close security relationship with Thailand, involving frequent high-level exchanges of military leaders and Thai purchases of Chinese arms. That relationship would erode in the event of a Cambodian settlement.

The Chinese alliance with Pol Pot's "Democratic Kampuchea faction" also remains intact. Beijing has assured other countries that it wants Sihanouk to lead the future government of Cambodia, but it has continued to protect the freedom of the Khmer Rouge to maintain their armed forces even after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Chinese officials recognize privately that elections will tend to reflect the political-military balance in the country, and that Khmer Rouge military superiority and financial resources will give them a significant advantage over other factions. While they do not want a blatant grab for power by Pol Pot, there are obvious advantages for China in having a strong military faction in Cambodia that is allied with it. Despite suggestions from Sihanouk and ASEAN officials over the years that Pol Pot and Ieng Sary be removed from leadership posts, Chinese officials are unlikely to agree. Chinese interests in Cambodia have, in fact, been closely linked with those of the Pol Pot leadership group for the past decade.

In sum, the willingness of the Chinese to end its military assistance to the Khmer Rouge or to force the Khmer Rouge to accept restrictions on their freedom of action as part of a settlement remains uncertain at best. A bilateral agreement between Sihanouk and Hun Sen would certainly increase the pressure on Beijing to make such hard decisions. Given the balance of Chinese interests, however, it may require additional incentives and the active participation of other external actors,

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notably the United States, to overcome Beijing's reluctance to force its ally's hand.

VI

For nearly a decade, the United States has deferred to ASEAN and China in its policy toward the Cambodian conflict, shunning any independent diplomatic effort to facilitate a negotiated settlement. For the last two years, some American officials have been arguing privately that the United States should discuss with both ASEAN and China the problem of how to deal with the Khmer Rouge in a settlement. But although the United States has raised its concerns about the matter with the relevant governments, it has never taken the step of suggesting modalities for a solution or asking its friends to do so.

The United States has a major strategic interest at stake in resolving the Cambodia conflict through Sino-Vietnamese accommodation. That conflict led to the introduction and consolidation of the Soviets' largest concentration of military power outside the Soviet Union itself, with an average of 22 to 25 ships operating out of Cam Ranh Bay at any given time. Only an agreement that restores normal Sino-Vietnamese relations and integrates Vietnam into the Pacific trade and investment system can begin to reverse the extreme Vietnamese dependence on the Soviet Union against China.

The main obstacle to a U.S. diplomatic initiative on Cambodia in recent years has been the reluctance to usurp ASEAN's leading role. In fact, ASEAN states have long been asking the United States to take some responsibility. During the 1984 ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in Jakarta, the foreign ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore urged Secretary of State George Shultz to push China to drop its stance of nonnegotiation. "Let's face it," said one ASEAN diplomat, "we are only a small power. The U.S. can have a lot more influence on the Chinese than we can."

The United States has also been held back by the belief that it cannot be a "major player" in the conflict, since it does not have large-scale aid to offer as carrots for Hanoi. But the United States in fact has been the arbiter of the capitalist world's economic relations with Hanoi through its influence with Japan and the multilateral financial institutions. If used wisely, this diplomatic clout could give the United States effective leverage on the policies of both China and Vietnam.

Up to now, U.S. policy has been to support normal economic

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relations with Vietnam only after a Cambodian settlement has been reached and Vietnamese troops have been completely withdrawn. Thus the flow of capital to Vietnam depends, in effect, not only on decisions by Hanoi but on those by Beijing. What is needed is a diplomatic position that provides incentives for both of the major players to reach an accommodation. The United States could consult with Prince Sihanouk, ASEAN and other supporters of the ASEAN position, including Japan, to formulate specific terms of a settlement providing reasonable guarantees against a Khmer Rouge military takeover.

If Vietnam did agree to those terms, normalization of economic relations could begin after a given interval, perhaps three to six months, even if China and the Khmer Rouge have not agreed to their side of the bargain. Such a proposal would give China both the incentive and the time to ensure that an agreement providing for a total Vietnamese withdrawal on a timetable is negotiated and signed before the normalization process begins. China would certainly push the Khmer Rouge to compromise on military safeguards and facilitate the negotiated withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in order to avoid a humiliating political defeat as the Vietnamese break out of the isolation China has successfully imposed for nearly a decade.

A constructive U.S. role in the Cambodian peace process would require only that Washington exercise influence to formulate a settlement consistent with the interests of the United States, ASEAN and the Western allies, as well as with Cambodian self-determination. Such a diplomatic role would be behind the scenes and multilateral in character. It would not take the initiative away from Prince Sihanouk, but would strengthen his bargaining position vis-à-vis both Hanoi and Beijing.

The United States obviously should not try to play the role of regional hegemonist in Southeast Asia that it played in the 1950s and 1960s, ultimately without success. Its military power, though still dominant in the region, is of very limited value in attempting to restore peace in a regional conflict like that in Cambodia. But the dynamics of the negotiations suggest that there is a need for a U.S. role in Southeast Asia that is neither belligerent nor passive. U.S. economic and political ties with both regional and external states are still the basis for a strong diplomatic effort toward regional peace and stability.

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Richard N. Gardner

THE CASE FOR PRACTICAL INTERNATIONALISM

The next president will face unprecedented opportunities—but also unprecedented difficulties—in promoting the national interests of the United States through multilateral diplomacy and international organizations. How the new administration seizes the opportunities and copes with the difficulties will go far to determine whether we face a favorable or hostile world environment as we approach the 21st century.

The opportunities are there if we have the skill and imagination to seize them. Almost everywhere we find a strong objective case for promoting the national interests of the United States and the general welfare of nations through cooperative action in international agencies—from the resolution or containment of regional conflicts through U.N. peacemaking and peacekeeping, to the negotiation of more open markets and the management of financial imbalances through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Bretton Woods organizations, to global action on nuclear safety, acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), drug abuse, overpopulation, environmental destruction and underdevelopment through the United Nations' specialized agencies and special programs. The case for multilateralism will be particularly compelling as we face a new era in which our relative power has declined and we will need to share economic burdens and political responsibility, not just with Europe and Japan, but with emerging power centers in the developing world.

The "creeping moderation" that is now evident in many Third World countries is another reason for cautious optimism about prospects for constructive multilateral cooperation. In a growing number of developing countries, the crucible of hard experience has produced a new interest in free markets, human

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rights and respect for international obligations. Even in the U.N. General Assembly, after years of unreasoning attacks on the United States and Israel and pursuit of the chimera of a statist New International Economic Order, the tide is beginning to turn, as evidenced by the declining number of votes to deny Israel's U.N. credentials, the growing support for U.S.-backed resolutions on Afghanistan and Cambodia and the moderation of the 1986 Assembly session on Africa.

The possibilities for constructive multilateral action are also enhanced by changes in the policies of the two great communist nations who posed the major challenges to the effectiveness of the United Nations and other international agencies throughout most of the postwar period. The People's Republic of China has played an increasingly constructive role in the United Nations and in the Bretton Woods organizations since taking its U.N. seat in the early 1970s. And Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, in his extraordinary *Pravda* article of September 17, 1987, has proclaimed a new Soviet interest in strengthening the United Nations, indicating that cooperative action among interdependent nations should now take precedence in Soviet foreign policy over international class warfare. Gorbachev's article offered a dozen proposals for strengthening international cooperation, including enhancement of the U.N. secretary-general's role in preventive diplomacy, wider use of peacekeeping forces in regional trouble spots, acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (the World Court), creation of a new International Space Organization, a global strategy for environmental protection, and even international negotiations to bring national laws into conformity with international human rights standards. To give credibility to this new rhetoric, the Soviet Union has announced its intention to pay most of its financial arrears to the United Nations, and has even made a substantial down payment.

Americans would be foolish not to recognize in Gorbachev's new approach a shrewd propaganda stroke at a time of diminished U.S. support for the United Nations. But we would be equally foolish not to test Gorbachev's proposals to see whether some of them can be developed to the mutual advantage of both our countries and the entire world.

II

The next president will also find his administration's in-box filled with some exceptionally difficult problems. As of this

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writing, U.S. financial arrears to the U.N. system are well over $300 million, and could reach more than $400 million by the next president's inauguration. This withholding of legally owing payments undermines U.S. leadership, compromises international programs that serve our national interests, and sabotages budgetary and organizational reforms that were set in motion on the promise that we would meet our financial obligations.

Our inability to deal sensibly with the large U.S. domestic budget deficit, except through the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings process, has led to disproportionate reductions in the two percent of the federal budget (about $20 billion) that normally goes for foreign affairs, and the five percent of that subtotal (about one billion dollars) that represents our annual contributions, assessed and voluntary, to international agencies.[1] Some combination of revenue increases and reform of entitlement programs will be essential, not merely to get our economic house in order but also to restore the diminished financial base of American international leadership.

The second and even more ominous cause of our financial delinquency is the shattered domestic political support for U.S. participation in the international organizations. For this "twilight of American multilateralism" the behavior of other nations must bear some part of the blame. It would be hard to overemphasize how the souring of America's worldview, particularly toward the United Nations, was provoked by Soviet intransigence within international agencies and Soviet aggression outside them, and by the anti-business, anti-freedom, anti-Israeli and anti-American behavior of Third World radicals in the 1970s and early 1980s, too often acquiesced in if not supported by the "nonaligned" U.N. majority. It was almost as if a coalition of communist and Third World countries had set out to knock down every key pillar of support for internationalism in the American body politic: "Let's say Zionism is racism and turn off the Jewish community; let's launch a statist New International Economic Order to turn off American business; let's sour American labor by politicizing the International Labor Organization; and let's enrage the media by

[1] This figure does not include our contributions to the International Development Association, the concessional aid affiliate of the World Bank, and to the development banks for Asia, Africa and Latin America, which currently total about $1.2 billion—about $600 million below the Administration's request for fiscal year 1988.

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threatening to limit press freedom in UNESCO." Of course, that was not the plan, but the result was the same.

Still, the collapse of political support for America's multilateral leadership is not explained entirely by the unreasonable behavior of foreigners, nor will it be resolved even if the hopeful auguries of more responsible behavior by other countries are realized in practice. We can see this from the decline in congressional and public support for the Bretton Woods institutions and GATT, which have hardly been forums for the harassment of American values and interests. Some profound changes have been taking place in our domestic political and social structure—the decline in the influence of the Eastern internationalist establishment in both political parties, the rise in power of single-issue interest groups, and the collapse of central leadership and party discipline in a Congress increasingly inclined to micromanage foreign policy. These changes make it harder for any president today to support international agencies in the same way as did Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nixon. To paraphrase something recently said to this writer by a friendly European observer, the question now is whether constituency politics as presently practiced in America can be reconciled with American leadership in a cooperative, rule-based international system.

A satisfactory answer to this question, if it is to be found, must be bipartisan and must be built on the understanding that neither dogmatic unilateralism nor utopian multilateralism is an appropriate policy for a superpower in a complex and dangerous world. The next president will need to blend power politics and world-order politics, unilateralism and multilateralism—acting alone where multilateral solutions are unavailable, developing multilateral options where they represent a better means of achieving our national objectives. He will also need to blend bilateral, regional, "plurilateral" and global approaches—as we have done in trade policy, where we make some agreements with all GATT members, some agreements with those GATT members willing to undertake a higher level of obligation in new GATT codes, and still other agreements in the form of free trade agreements with countries like Canada and Israel.

Multilateralism need not mean the tyranny of the United Nations' small-country majority or the limiting of cooperation to the lowest common denominator of recalcitrant members. It can and must mean some "power steering" in multilateral

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agencies, through more sophisticated decision-making devices as well as what Harlan Cleveland has aptly called "coalitions of the willing"—groups of like-minded countries acting responsibly under a larger multilateral umbrella. But most of all, such a flexible approach to international cooperation will require a clear sense of American priorities in the international system of agencies, a realistic sense of what those agencies can and cannot do, and a coherent strategy for promoting American priorities in cooperation with allies, with nonaligned nations and sometimes with adversaries.

In an age addicted to catchy phrases and convenient labels, we might call this middle way between the twin perils of dogmatic unilateralism and utopian multilateralism a strategy for "practical internationalism." Of course, such verbal formulas are meaningless unless they are applied in concrete cases. Let us see what such a strategy might look like in three areas: functional cooperation on priority global issues, the peace and security work of the United Nations, and our approach to international law and the World Court.

III

A strategy of practical internationalism would begin with certain crucial global problems that can only be dealt with effectively through multilateral agencies. Restoring balance and order in world finance and trade is clearly one of the highest priorities, but since an adequate examination of these subjects would require an article by itself, we will focus instead on other functions that are performed by the U.N. system, whose importance is less widely understood.[2] We start with five challenges to the welfare of Americans where the right kind of presidential leadership could rally public and congressional support.

The nuclear challenge. Our country shares with other nations a growing concern to prevent nuclear-weapons proliferation, to improve the safety of nuclear reactors, to organize early warning of and international assistance for nuclear disasters and to guard against nuclear terrorism as increasing amounts of separated plutonium transit the globe. The International

[2] A discussion of practical steps to improve the functioning of international cooperation in trade and finance is contained in William D. Eberle, Richard N. Gardner and John V. Moller, *Building on Progress: The U.S. and the World Economy*, Aspen (Colo.): Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1986.

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Atomic Energy Agency, a well-managed organization where the United States and the Soviet Union share the same priorities and work well together, is already moving effectively on this agenda.

The drug challenge. The United States is the principal target for drug traffickers the world over, and virtually all Americans accord a high priority to stopping drug abuse. The United Nation's 1987 Vienna conference on this subject has given new impetus to global efforts in preventive education, treatment and rehabilitation of addicts, and new measures of law enforcement to apprehend and extradite drug traffickers. The U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control, with greatly increased resources, is now a major instrument for strengthening drug enforcement machinery in developing countries, providing incentives for crop substitution and helping overcome powerful interests in illicit cultivation, manufacture and export of drugs.

The AIDS *challenge.* The World Health Organization's system of global health cooperation led years ago to the elimination of smallpox and dramatic progress toward eradicating malaria. This system is now being mobilized to deal with the spread of AIDS, described by WHO as "a health disaster of pandemic proportions," particularly in Africa. There should be a national constituency in the United States to support WHO, a well-run U.N. specialized agency, as it helps member countries to establish national AIDS programs and sponsors research and exchange of information on prevention, control, immunology, international travel, safety of blood supplies and other urgent AIDS issues.

The environmental challenge. Americans are rapidly becoming more aware of their interest in joining with other nations to deal with global environmental problems. The scientific and political leadership of the U.N. Environment Program helped produce the first international agreement to limit the use of chlorofluorocarbons that are damaging the ozone layer, our global atmospheric shield against ultraviolet radiation that causes cancer and other threats to human health. Working with other international agencies, UNEP is also seeking to develop an international consensus on remedies for "global greenhouse warming," caused by the burning of fossil fuels and tropical deforestation, a phenomenon that could cause catastrophic changes in the world's climate and sea level. Other major priorities for U.N. environmental cooperation are the global monitoring of environmental trends, efforts to clean up

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the Mediterranean and other regional seas, and measures to fight desertification and deforestation. Enlightened political leadership in the United States could mobilize support for such efforts, echoing the conclusion of the recent report of the World Commission on Environment and Development that "there is a growing need for effective cooperation to manage ecological and economic interdependence."

The population challenge. World population, which has already passed five billion, will reach eight to 12 billion in the 21st century before it finally levels off. Where within that range it finally stabilizes will profoundly affect the habitability of our planet and the lives of the children and grandchildren of Americans living today. Even in the near term, population growth in many countries of Africa, Latin America and Asia, which is causing explosive increases in the population of already overcrowded cities, poses grave threats to economic development, environmental balance and political stability. South of our own border, rapid population growth in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, with its attendant mass poverty and unemployment, has triggered a huge flow of illegal immigration into our country. Multilateral support for national efforts of voluntary family planning in developing countries provides a politically important supplement to legitimize purely bilateral aid by rich donor countries. A major challenge to the next president will be to restore U.S. support for the U.N. Fund for Population Activities, which we have cut off over charges that China's population program uses coercive abortion, something both China and UNFPA deny.

Any effective strategy to deal with these priority challenges to American interests will succeed only if supported by successful efforts to educate and train people (particularly in developing countries), to eradicate mass poverty and to restore momentum to global growth. Human resource development in developing countries argues for the restoration of our nation's traditional support for the U.N.'s main institution for technical assistance funding, the U.N. Development Program, our contributions to which have declined by one-third in real terms during recent years. And if the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), under its new leadership, can rebuild confidence in the management of its programs, particularly in Third World educational development, the United States should be willing to resume its membership.

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But most of all, the world needs to enlarge the flows of private and official capital to developing countries in order to stimulate an adequate level of global growth. A near-doubling of World Bank capital and International Monetary Fund quotas should be a high priority for American leadership, coupled with securing special additional contributions of concessional aid from Japan. Multilateral development institutions are now essential mechanisms for recycling the huge Japanese surplus into developing nations, restarting private capital flows, managing the debt crisis and rebuilding lost export markets for the United States. And, quite obviously, their conditionality requirements and structural adjustment lending are the best hope we have to wean developing nations from statist to market-oriented growth policies.

We cannot expect multilateral institutions to reflect only our priorities. The question is whether coalitions can be built around trade-offs between different countries' priorities in ways that yield net benefits to all, including ourselves. In the international financial institutions, where weighted voting applies and where senior management enjoys our confidence, the answer is clearly yes. But even in the nonfinancial institutions of the U.N. system, the benefits to us of our participation have usually outweighed the disadvantages.

The major problem in ensuring that this continues to be so is the gross disproportion in U.N. agencies (other than the financial institutions) between budgetary contributions and influence in determining how the money is spent. The United States, which pays 25 percent of the United Nations' regular budget, has only one vote out of 159 in the General Assembly. The eight largest contributors to the U.N. regular budget (the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Canada) supply over 70 percent of the funds but have only five percent of the votes. At the same time, the vast majority—over 100 members, mostly developing countries—contributes in total less than two percent of the budget. Similar patterns exist in the major specialized agencies.

The answer to this problem will not be found in weighted voting, since no formula that would substantially assist the United States and other major contributors can be negotiated in the foreseeable future. The answer will be found instead in more timely and effective interventions by the large contributors with senior U.N. officials at an early stage of the budget

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process—and also by new procedural devices for "power steering." The strengthened Committee on Program and Coordination (CPC) that emerged from the 1986 reforms adopted by the General Assembly is a first step in the right direction, and similar committees need to be created in specialized agencies where they do not exist.

It is doubtful, however, if the practice of consensus decision-making that exists in the CPC will provide as useful a way of setting budget priorities as it will of establishing budget ceilings, since it enables small as well as large members of the committee to use their veto for bargaining purposes. In the central United Nations, and in the specialized agencies as well, we need to work toward a new system of structured decision-making that has three main elements: small program and budget committees in which the large and middle-sized contributors have a majority of places, a requirement for the approving vote of two-thirds of the members of these small committees, and a rule of procedure that prohibits the adoption of any budget by the General Assembly and other plenary bodies that is not first approved in the small committees.

The other major reform to which the United States and the major contributors should be turning their efforts more effectively is the reduction in size and the upgrading of quality of U.N. staff. This means more attention to the choice of the heads of major specialized agencies, to avoid the problems that have been encountered at UNESCO and the Food and Agriculture Organization. It means taking more seriously the quality of U.S. appointees to senior posts in the U.N. system, where our influence has declined alarmingly—particularly on the 38th floor at U.N. headquarters. It means urging the secretary-general to devote more attention to management and to ensuring the independence and the competence of Secretariat employees. And it means consolidating duplicative intergovernmental bodies and secretariats like the Economic and Social Council, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. These budgetary and administrative questions are not glamorous, headline-grabbing issues, but unless the United States and its allies are more serious about them in the future than they have been in the past, the potential for realizing our common interests through functional multilateralism will be severely limited.

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IV

A strategy of practical internationalism will need to look carefully at the risks as well as the opportunities involved in the political activities of the United Nations and at the evolving attitudes of the Soviet Union and other key countries.

The risks are evident enough. On the two central issues of Israel and South Africa, the United States has been at odds with the overwhelming majority of U.N. members. The new administration will need to take initiatives on both of these problems. Yet it is far from sure that any proposal that seems reasonable to us will satisfy the demands of the General Assembly majority. No matter how many General Assembly votes we may win on Afghanistan and Cambodia, it will be in our interest to mount any new initiatives on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the South African dilemma in the Security Council or outside the United Nations entirely.

Nevertheless, as an annual gathering place for heads of state and foreign ministers, the General Assembly has its uses. It provides us with opportunities for dialogue and influence that would not be readily available elsewhere. Its resolutions in economic and legal areas can sometimes be useful. But the main point is that, since General Assembly action is constitutionally required for U.N. budgetary and administrative decisions on many programs we like that are run by subsidiary bodies of the Assembly, we have to be resilient enough to recognize that Assembly political resolutions we disagree with are the price we have to pay for the carrying forward of these programs. Those political resolutions, it should be emphasized, have no binding force and, given the nature of the majorities behind them, usually receive very little political legitimacy. To be sure, as former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations (now Senator) Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) and others have emphasized, such resolutions can influence ways of thinking and acting around the world; we should vote against them if they cannot be made acceptable to us by vigorous diplomacy in the United Nations and foreign capitals.

The political role of the Security Council and the secretary-general, on the other hand, offers considerable opportunities for the advancement of our national interests. Thirteen times since the United Nations was founded, men in blue helmets have been dispatched with the support of the United States to verify cease-fires and interpose themselves between hostile

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forces. Without U.N. peacekeeping, the disengagement agreements in 1973 between Israel and Syria and Israel and Egypt (and therefore the Camp David agreements) would not have been possible, the former Belgian Congo would have been dismembered, and Greece and Turkey might have gone to total war. The three main U.N. peacekeeping operations still in existence today—in southern Lebanon, on the Golan Heights, in Cyprus—remain the most politically useful means anyone can think of to contain violence in those areas.

Historical experience suggests that in some situations in some parts of the world, U.N. peacekeeping can serve American interests better than the intervention of American forces. In the summer of 1982, the Reagan Administration had two opportunities to propose sending U.N. forces to Beirut, but it chose to send American forces instead. That fateful mistake resulted in the loss of 253 marines and a humiliating American withdrawal. It should have been clear from the outset that a U.N. force composed of soldiers from disinterested countries would have been a more effective peacekeeping instrument than an American contingent perceived in Lebanon as the ally of one side in a bitter communal conflict.

On the other hand, the recent proposal for a U.N. naval force to protect nonbelligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf probably asks too much of U.N. peacekeeping, which only works if the adversary parties agree to it. In the absence of a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, Iran would not agree to U.N. protection limited to nonbelligerents like Kuwait, and Iraq would object to giving U.N. protection to Iranian vessels while Iran continued to threaten a military breakthrough in the land war. It is doubtful if a consensus could be found in the Security Council to send a naval peacekeeping force to the Gulf over the objections of Iran or Iraq, and it is equally doubtful that nonaligned members would be willing to supply naval units for a force that would draw the fire of one or the other of the belligerents. Unless we want to invite the Soviet fleet into the Gulf, a risky proposition at best, the naval presence of the United States and its allies remains the best means of protecting nonbelligerent shipping against Iranian attack until a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war is achieved.

The peacemaking efforts of the secretary-general, like the use of peacekeeping forces, can also offer a useful alternative to direct American action, though not in all situations. Ralph Bunche was able to achieve an armistice agreement between

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Arab countries and Israel in 1949 that no U.S. government negotiator would have achieved. In a different instance, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in 1973–74 produced the disengagement agreements that no U.N. intermediary could have managed (though U.N. peacekeeping forces were required to carry them out). President Carter's personal commitment was needed to make the Camp David accords possible, but if a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is finally arranged, the efforts of a U.N. mediator, Diego Cordovez, will have been an important element. In many situations, U.N. and U.S. diplomacy may prove to be mutually reinforcing. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk's recent revelation that President Kennedy had authorized him, as a last resort, to have U Thant propose a swap of American missiles in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba as a way of resolving the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 is a reminder that the secretary-general may be a useful last resort to find a face-saving way out when superpower confrontations threaten to explode into nuclear war.

Gorbachev's new approach to the United Nations offers the hope, though obviously not the certainty, that the U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking role can be even more important in the future. His *Pravda* article, calling for a "comprehensive system of international security," endorsed, as we have noted, the use of U.N. peacekeeping forces in regional trouble spots and the secretary-general's role in preventive diplomacy. Until now, Gorbachev's generalities have not been followed up with concrete proposals, and the Soviet item on international security submitted to the last General Assembly failed to impress the U.N. membership. One place to test the seriousness of Gorbachev's new interest in the United Nations is in Afghanistan, where U.N. diplomacy and a U.N. peacekeeping force may play a critical role in securing the withdrawal of Soviet troops, assuring the end of military aid to the Afghan rebels and facilitating a broadly based and nonaligned Afghan government. If the United Nations can succeed in Afghanistan, a similar effort in Cambodia might have a better chance of success.

Beyond these specific trouble spots, the United States can ask the Soviet Union to give its full support to the new early-warning system for political crises that the secretary-general has created—the Office for Research and the Collection of Information—and both countries can agree to let him engage

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in good offices, mediation and fact-finding, free of Security Council veto. We can also urge the secretary-general to improve the quality of his military advice and to broaden the number of countries earmarking and training units for U.N. peacekeeping service.

A genuine policy of noninterference in the affairs of other nations, which Gorbachev now asserts as a Soviet goal, would represent a dramatic departure from the policies the Soviet Union has followed since 1917. Such a policy would mean that the Soviet Union would never use its power to prevent a people from choosing a government it wants, even if that were a noncommunist government. It would also mean the United States would never use its power to prevent a people from choosing a government it wants, even if that were a communist government. If Soviet-American relations are really entering a new era of "live and let live"—and this remains yet to be demonstrated—the United Nations will have a crucial role to play in sustaining it. For in specific questions of self-determination there will be factual disputes about what the people of a nation really want and whether there is intervention by outside forces. There is really no satisfactory way to resolve such disputes except through an international agency that can patrol borders, supervise elections, and verify compliance with nonintervention norms.

V

An additional word is necessary on the other key area in U.N. political activity—human rights. Here again, we need not choose between the bilateral and the multilateral approach; we are going to require both. The main instrument of bringing American pressure to bear on behalf of the victims of oppression will be bilateral diplomacy. We will also employ regional machinery like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe reviews of the Helsinki accords and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. But the resources of the United Nations should be part of our strategy as well. This means not only the debates in the Human Rights Commission or the General Assembly, but also the many new U.N. investigative bodies that have now been established, and the advisory services that the U.N. Secretariat makes available to member countries.

Thanks to the United Nations, we now have in place a comprehensive body of international human rights principles

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whose salient elements are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two Human Rights Covenants and treaties on specific issues, such as the Genocide Convention and the Convention on Racial Discrimination. These have influenced the national laws of member states and provided agreed standards to measure national behavior when complaints are brought before international bodies.

The main weakness of the United Nations, as everybody knows, is implementation. Until recently, U.N. human rights attention was focused mainly on three countries—Israel, South Africa and Chile—while communist, Islamic and African regimes were exempt from scrutiny. The General Assembly majority has so far declined to create a U.N. high commissioner for human rights who could examine the human rights practices of all members objectively and bring gross violations to the attention of U.N. bodies.

Yet in the last few years the United Nations' "double standard" in dealing with human rights has been gradually eroding. U.N. human rights bodies have begun to look at Poland, Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Iran. A Human Rights Committee composed of distinguished experts is now reviewing the human rights compliance reports of individual countries under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. And the functions envisaged for the high commissioner are being performed piece-by-piece—by special rapporteurs and working groups in problem areas like involuntary disappearances, torture, summary or arbitrary executions and religious intolerance. These rapporteurs and groups do not stop with the consideration of general issues; they seek information on individual cases, call public attention to human rights violations, and often intercede on behalf of the victims.

The next administration will therefore enjoy new opportunities to employ U.N. instrumentalities to promote American values, provided the U.N. human rights work is not dismantled under the impact of U.S. budgetary withholdings, and provided also that we send our best advocates to U.N. human rights bodies and make full use of private human rights groups as sources of information. We can also help our position by ratifying the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, as well as the Convention on Racial Discrimination. The practical effect of our failure to ratify the first of these U.N. covenants is that we cannot sit at the table and participate in the interpretation of

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political rights when cases under the covenant come before its Human Rights Committee. Our participation would give us a practical opportunity to test Gorbachev's surprising proposal that national laws should be reviewed before international bodies to see that they conform with international human rights standards.

VI

What would practical internationalism mean for American policy in the realm of international law? The Founding Fathers of the American Republic believed that respect for the "law of nations" should be a guiding principle in our relations with the outside world. American statesmen like Elihu Root and Charles Evans Hughes continued this tradition in the early days of this century, as did postwar presidents like Truman and Eisenhower. Yet in recent years, neither the executive branch nor the Congress has seemed much interested in the requirements of international law.

In this unprecedented situation for our country, there are many who now declare that international law does not exist while, at the other extreme, there are some who decry any unilateral use of force and would subject our country to the international "rule of law" on all matters as determined by the World Court or other U.N. bodies. Neither of these extreme positions makes good sense. Neither serves our national interests.

It is time for us to go back to first principles. International law is nothing more or less than a system of mutual restraints and reciprocal concessions that nations accept because it serves their interests to do so. These restraints and concessions are mainly found in treaties that nations enter into voluntarily. To a lesser and diminishing extent, they are also found in "customary international law," the repeated practice of nations, including our own, that is accompanied by a sense of legal obligation. On a wide range of subject matter—freedom of the seas, the protection of diplomats, the rights of foreign investors—almost all nations observe these rules almost all of the time. The observance and further development of international law is very much in the national interests of the United States, a democratic nation that believes in the rule of law at home, and a status quo power that seeks stability and order abroad. Those who say that "there is no such thing as international law" are

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really asserting a profoundly un-American idea—that we should not honor our international commitments.

The crisis of confidence that presently afflicts the subject of international law in the United States is mainly related to the question of international rules on the use of armed force. One of the core principles of international law is the prohibition of the use of armed force by one nation against the territorial integrity or political independence of another nation except in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense. This principle is found in the U.N. Charter, in the Charter of the Organization of American States, and in other sources of modern international law. Until the Reagan Administration, the United States insisted that this core principle of law prohibited the organizing of armed insurgencies against recognized governments, whether by the United States, the Soviet Union or anyone else.

When the Administration began aiding the Nicaraguan contras in 1981, it argued that such aid was justified as a legitimate exercise of collective self-defense because of Nicaragua's aid to the insurgents in El Salvador. But in his 1985 State of the Union address, President Reagan employed a very different rationale for our Central American policy, claiming that "support for freedom fighters is self-defense." Since then, Administration spokesmen and some of their supporters outside of government have asserted a moral and legal right to give military aid to "freedom fighters" seeking to overthrow communist regimes, not just in Nicaragua but anywhere in the world.

This "Reagan Doctrine," as it has come to be called, is regarded as inconsistent with international law by all of our allies in NATO and the Organization of American States and by virtually all legal scholars in the United States and overseas. The rationale, insofar as it has been thought through, rests on the twin theses that considerations of freedom must override traditional restraints on the use of armed force and that, on some new theory of "reciprocity," the United States should no longer feel bound by rules of international law violated by others.

These arguments are both fundamentally flawed. The doctrine of collective self-defense can reasonably be interpreted to justify American aid to Afghan freedom fighters resisting the invasion of their country by a Soviet army, as well as aid to the Nicaraguan contras for the limited purpose of forcing Nicaragua to stop the subversion of its neighbors. But in a world of

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diverse political systems and divergent views on the meaning of freedom, the attempt to legitimate "wars of liberation" against established and recognized governments that are not "democratic" by our or someone else's standard is a formula for world civil war. It could provide a legal cover for forcible intervention by outsiders against countries like South Korea, South Africa, Chile and even Israel—interventions that would serve the cause of neither peace nor freedom. How a government treats its people is a legitimate matter of international concern, which may be manifested through strong diplomatic action and even economic sanctions. But as long as a government is not threatening its neighbors, it is wrong to subject it to armed attack. To hold otherwise is to destroy not merely centuries of established legal principle but the very basis of coexistence among diverse political systems.

But if the next president should reject the "unilateralist" view that international law is meaningless or that we should declare open season on all undemocratic regimes, he should also reject the equally simplistic view that international law permits no unilateral use of force except in the face of an armed attack on a nation's own territory.

The U.N. Charter restraints on the use of force were drafted on the assumption that an effective collective security system would be established by the United Nations to maintain order and justice. The collapse of that assumption does not mean that the use of force provisions have become inoperative, but it does require that concepts like "self-defense" and the prohibition on the use of force against the "territorial integrity and political independence" of states be reasonably construed to enable the law-abiding states to defend the civilized order. This would mean, for example, a reading of the Charter to permit the United States to launch an air strike on a country like Libya that engages in a series of terrorist attacks on American citizens. It would also justify a reading of the Charter to permit the rescue of one's citizens in another country that is unwilling or unable to protect them. And it should certainly permit a limited and temporary use of force to defend a country from an indirect aggression in the form of an externally organized insurgency or coup d'état, as may have been the case in Grenada.[3]

[3] Our action in Grenada may also be justified by the threat to the lives of American students and the invitation of Grenada's governor general. See my article, "Sovereignty and Intervention: The Just Use of Force," *Freedom at Issue*, March-April 1985.

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This brings us to the question of the International Court of Justice. In the present state of international relations it is simply not realistic to expect nations to accept the World Court's compulsory jurisdiction in all disputes to which they may be a party. It is particularly unrealistic to expect them to accept compulsory jurisdiction in controversies arising out of the use of armed force, where the national security interests are too great, the facts usually too difficult to establish, and the international rules on the subject still insufficiently developed, particularly where civil wars are involved.

But this does not mean that we should turn our back on the World Court entirely. The Court is composed for the most part of able and impartial jurists whose views of international law will be acceptable to us on most matters that do not touch on questions of armed force. We can therefore take specific controversies to chambers of the Court[4] on a voluntary basis, as we did with Canada to define the maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Maine, and as we are now doing with Italy in a case involving the requisitioning of the property of an American multinational. In both of these cases, where negotiations failed to yield a resolution of the controversy, friendly countries saw adjudication before the Court as a useful solution. Moreover, we should continue to observe the more than 60 bilateral and multilateral agreements to which we are a party providing for World Court resolution of disputes over their interpretation.

Finally, we can fashion a new U.S. acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction that properly balances our interest in the development of the international legal order with our desire to avoid risks to U.S. security interests. The way to do this would be to exempt from our acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction all matters relating to the use of armed force, and further to provide that cases reaching the Court under this revised acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction would be heard before a chamber of five judges chosen in accordance with the Court's rules after consultation with ourselves and the other party to the dispute.

VII

The next president will need to convince the American people that strengthening international institutions is in the

[4] Chambers normally consist of five of the 15 judges, and are chosen by the president of the Court in consultation with the parties.

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U.S. interest and will serve a more stable and cooperative world order. His key cabinet appointments will be one concrete expression of his new direction. Top new talent for developing a coherent U.S. multilateral strategy will be required in the National Security Council staff, in the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs and in our missions to international agencies. The new administration will also need to deal with the decline in the quality of Americans in senior posts at U.N. headquarters and in many U.N. agencies. And it will need to find ways of creating what we began to lose some years ago—a cadre of foreign service officers skilled in multilateral diplomacy.

To carry out a policy of practical internationalism, the next administration will have to do a better job of harmonizing our policies in international institutions with key allied and nonaligned nations. A special effort will need to be made to develop common approaches with the European countries and Japan, from whom we have become increasingly isolated in multilateral forums. We will also need to work harder to heal the breaches that have opened up on multilateral issues between ourselves and our allies in this hemisphere. And in Soviet-American summits, as well as in our meetings with the Chinese, the search for more effective multilateral cooperation in pursuit of common interests should become a regular agenda item.

The next president will also need to use his "bully pulpit" to talk sense to the American people about the changed international realities that face them as they approach the third millennium. Through his words and his actions, he will need to hammer home the essential message, now only dimly understood, that multilateral action can often serve America's enlightened self-interest by sharing economic burdens and political responsibility and by accomplishing tasks that the United States cannot perform as well by acting alone.

Unilateral military action will still be necessary in exceptional cases, as well as bilateral diplomacy and special arrangements. But if multilateral institutions can start delivering tangible benefits that Americans feel in their daily lives, it will not be incredible for a future president to say out loud what the leaders of other industrialized democracies have already been prepared to tell their people: "I am an internationalist because I love my country."

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THE DOLLAR AND THE DEFENSE OF THE WEST

The world economic system is in deep trouble. The threat to the international economic system has been a long time in the making: the growth of the world economy has depended overwhelmingly on the strength of the U.S. economy and the dollar. Paradoxically, many have thought growth depends on continuous dollar deficits, the source of growing monetary reserves believed essential to expanding world trade. But others have long feared that this dependence on the dollar points toward eventual disaster. Three decades ago Robert Triffin warned that a strong dollar and chronic U.S. payments deficits could not indefinitely coexist. Either the dollar would weaken and the system would break down, or the American payments deficit would end, the supply of monetary reserves would contract and economic expansion of the system would cease.

But no purely economic explanation for today's gathering crisis is adequate. All along, U.S. deficits have been in large measure a consequence of America's willingness to carry the heaviest share of the defense burdens of the noncommunist world. An end to the American deficits suggests an end to the American burdens. This gives the present financial crisis a geopolitical and historical dimension. It appears a crisis, not only of the dollar, but of American "hegemony" and of the global political economy which that hegemony has built. This creates the grim possibility that the United States, the country that created the postwar global economy, is now on a course fated to destroy it. As Professor Paul Kennedy's recent book reminds us, history is full of examples of hegemonic powers that brought themselves down because they were unable to

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sustain a viable relationship between geopolitical pretensions and economic resources.[1] His is an ancient and recurrent lesson among historical moralists: a country with too-great power grows overextended and then self-destructive.

If this course is to be averted, it must be understood that the solution to America's dollar problem is not purely economic but also geopolitical. Furthermore, the adjustments needed cannot be made by the United States alone, but must also involve its major allies. There are few alternatives: the current method of financing the Pax Americana makes a weak and fluctuating dollar inevitable and has increasingly destructive consequences for the world economy.

II

The Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system broke down in 1971–73. But with the switch to a system of floating exchange rates, something closely resembling the old system of open international trade relations survived. The floating rate system has made it possible to believe that the essentials of a liberal international order could be preserved. While the United States remained in balance-of-payments deficit—which the widening budget deficit of the Reagan years worsened seriously—the dollar remained the world's principal currency, and the United States the chief provider of military protection for the noncommunist world. The monetary system survived, at least in a semi-stable state, because the American payments deficit was covered by capital inflow from abroad. Even though the American national debt grew by more than $1.5 trillion over the Reagan years, foreign governments were eager to prevent both a collapse of the dollar and a withdrawal of the United States from its defense commitments. Nor did the United States want to give up the dollar's role or America's political-military hegemony, despite the heavy costs.

Yet events in 1987, culminating in the stock market crash that began in New York and swiftly ran around the world, again raised fears that the American-led economic and security system would end with a bang. Those fears were eased by actions taken in 1987 and early 1988 by the United States and its major allies to arrest a further fall of the dollar, which had plummeted to an all-time low. Profound and volatile anxiety nevertheless remains. Unfortunately, it seems well founded.

[1] *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, New York: Random House, 1987.

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The year 1988 opened inauspiciously for the American economy. With a heavy hangover of inventories from the final months of 1987, a recession appeared to threaten as consumers began to react to the October crash by cutting spending. Fear of a recession in an election year now dominates thinking about economic policy in Washington. The Administration is giving top priority to keeping the economy growing and would doubtless, in a crisis, use monetary and fiscal policy actively to that end. But excessive stimulus would weaken the dollar, causing Wall Street and the financial community to worry about renewed downward pressure on U.S. securities markets. Part of the country, however, welcomes the dollar's slide as providing an opportunity for American farmers and manufacturers to recapture markets lost to foreigners. Unlike Europeans, most Americans have never learned to see the value of their money on the foreign exchanges as a measure of the nation's economic health.

The Reagan Administration has blown hot and cold on the dollar, depending on the pressures of the moment. When concerns about the trade deficit mount, the Administration threatens to let the dollar fall further; when worries about the securities markets or a slowing of foreign capital inflow rise, it seeks to stabilize the dollar. Actually, the U.S. authorities seem quite prepared to see the dollar fall wherever markets and foreign central banks will allow. Europe and Japan, the Administration assumes, are anxious enough about the effect of the dollar's decline on their exports to support it indefinitely.

The expectation underlying this latter-day Republican version of "benign neglect," akin to the earlier Carter and Nixon versions, is that the dollar's fall will narrow the U.S. trade deficit and restore confidence in the dollar once it has fallen far enough. Foreign investors will again be willing to finance a persistent but diminishing trade deficit by buying U.S. securities and other dollar assets on a large scale, as they did before they dropped that responsibility in the lap of the central banks over a year ago. All this will happen, some optimists assume, regardless of the posture of U.S. fiscal and monetary policy. Hence, the theory goes, the Administration and the Federal Reserve are free to use expansive monetary and fiscal policy to forestall a possible recession without having to give more than lip service to the problem of the dollar.

But less cheerful analysts warn that "benign neglect" of the dollar contains, in present circumstances, the threat of a finan-

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cial crisis or series of crises that could drive the dollar into a free-fall, which would drive interest rates up and bring on a severe recession throughout the Western world. According to this view, there is no clear bottom for the dollar if U.S. domestic policy remains stimulative: if fiscal and monetary policy are used to spur domestic demand, imports will stay high and the trade balance will scarcely improve in real terms and could even worsen, due to the constantly renewed effect of a falling dollar in raising U.S. import prices. Foreign private investors' confidence would then not be restored, and they would stay away from dollar investments. Sooner or later, the willingness of foreign central banks to support the dollar would falter, as it did in 1979, and for the same reason.

Any prudent policy avoids placing all its bets on one scenario. Yet in a serious crisis, wavering can be disastrous. So great are the present dangers that we believe the United States should abandon its gamble on "benign neglect" and resolutely adopt a strategy that gives a high priority to preventing undue deterioration of the dollar. The reasons seem clear from a closer analysis of how the crisis has been unfolding.

III

The critical difference between the two possible approaches—benign neglect based on belief in a self-stabilizing dollar and defense of the dollar to prevent a major crisis of confidence—lies in the assumption made about the connection between the foreign exchange market and the financial markets. In the first, more sanguine view, the dollar's fall will be self-limiting as it restores trade equilibrium. There will, therefore, be no untoward consequences for interest rates and securities prices. In the second view, however, a falling dollar would eventually trigger a collapse in the U.S. credit and securities markets, with grave consequences for the real economy.

Which view is more likely to prove correct? The experience of the last couple of years throws light on this question. In early 1986 the dollar unexpectedly lost 11 percent of its value against the West German mark in only six weeks. Although the U.S. currency had been declining irregularly for nearly a year, there had not previously been so steep a plunge or an adverse reaction in the U.S. bond market. This time, however, the U.S. bond market nose-dived; in late April 1986 it lost

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more than seven points. At the time, it was the largest one-week fall in memory.

Until then, foreign investors had been willing to buy U.S. bonds and other dollar assets despite the falling dollar. Why? Because the advantage in U.S. interest rates or the expected capital gains on dollar investments compared to other currencies offset the exchange risk. Then, in January 1986, as the dollar plunged, foreign investors' assessment of the exchange risk changed, with two consequences. One was that many investors, unwilling to buy more dollar securities or even hold all those they already owned without hedging the exchange risk, hedged by borrowing dollars from banks in the United States or abroad and then selling the borrowed dollars for hard foreign currencies such as the Japanese yen, the German mark or the Swiss franc. The surge of demand for dollar credit drove up short-term interest rates in the United States and the Eurodollar market, and the selling of the borrowed dollars drove the dollar down.

The second effect was on the U.S. bond market; the new perception of increased exchange risk knocked bond prices down and raised U.S. long-term interest rates. Fears of rising U.S. import prices and inflation due to the falling dollar further lifted long-term rates.

The dollar's plunge in January-March 1986 had been precipitated by the decisions of the Federal Reserve, which was under heavy pressure from the Administration and manufacturing and farm interests to try to remedy the situation by opening the money tap wider. The money supply took off, with M1 accelerating from 11.5 percent in 1985 to nearly 17 percent in 1986. In this expansive monetary environment the dollar was bound to go on falling. By the spring of 1987 there was a full-fledged crisis. Treasury bond prices declined, and net private foreign purchases of dollars fell to zero and below; purchases of U.S. securities were offset by short-term bank outflows reflecting borrowing to hedge against dollar exposures. To finance the trade deficit and slow the dollar's fall, foreign central banks had to step into the breach and absorb $70 billion in five months (January-May 1987). Since then, the financing of the U.S. trade deficit and the support of the dollar have been in the hands of the central banks, particularly the Bank of Japan.

For the year 1987 as a whole, foreign central banks bought a total of $140 billion to underpin the dollar but succeeded

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only in slowing its fall. Quite evidently, something more than central bank intervention will eventually be needed to avoid a hard landing, for intervention on this scale cannot continue indefinitely. To close the external deficit there must be enough excess domestic production to take advantage of the lower relative prices of domestic versus foreign goods caused by the devaluation.

In our view, the notion that there can be a painless correction of a large trade deficit is an illusion, though a convenient one for a party or government facing an election. It minimizes the costs and dangers that lie ahead, and rationalizes a policy of trying to put onto foreign governments the main responsibility for the fate of the dollar and the U.S. economy.

This is not to suggest that U.S. economic policy is solely responsible for the present difficulties and their solution. The present dangerous imbalance of trade and capital flows between the United States and the two main surplus countries, West Germany and Japan, is after all the joint product of the opposite macroeconomic strategies the debtor and surplus countries have followed over the last few years. In the United States huge fiscal deficits, along with monetary expansion, have encouraged consumption at the expense of saving; in Germany and Japan fiscal consolidation and monetary restraint have held down consumption and made a large surplus of savings available for investment or loans in the United States.

IV

Purely economic analysis cannot explain why the United States has followed policies so different from the Germans and Japanese. Nor can purely economic analysis cope with the broader geopolitical consequences that might be expected if the United States were to change its economic policies.

America's large geopolitical role bears a heavy responsibility for its fiscal deficit, which compels, in turn, its monetary instability. As America's relative economic strength has diminished, its geopolitical burdens have grown harder to carry.

What should American policymakers do to reduce the imbalance between America's public resources and commitments? How much of the remedy lies with a reallocation of domestic resources and how much with a readjustment of international role? There is as yet no national consensus on that critical question. It raises political issues well beyond the bounds of economic analysis. The search for an answer should begin with

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examining the causes of the fiscal deficit. What does our political system demand that causes us regularly to exceed our fiscal resources?

Some blame America's budget deficit on an excessive level of public welfare and "entitlements." But others respond that claims that the share is excessive cannot be supported by comparing such American spending with that of other advanced Western countries. Compared to West European countries that have similar ratios of wealth to population, the American level of public benefits and civilian spending is remarkably low. Public spending in France and West Germany is, in proportion to their economies, much higher than in the United States. But so is their taxation.

From a European perspective—and that of many Americans as well—the U.S. fiscal imbalance arises not from spending too much but from taxing too little. Yet American resistance to paying higher taxes seems deeply rooted—and the landslide defeat of Walter F. Mondale on the tax issue in 1984 makes politicians wary of proposing it too boldly or openly.

Why are European countries able to raise so much more in taxes, proportionately, than the United States? Judging from Europe's experience, America's fiscal problem may be that it spends too little on civilian benefits rather than too much. It seems difficult to separate the greater tolerance for higher taxes among French and German citizens from the substantially higher level of benefits those citizens—particularly middle-class taxpayers—receive from the state. Higher pensions, heavily graduated according to working incomes, free medical care, excellent free secondary schools, superior public transport, better police protection and superior public amenities in general—above all in the big cities—make Europeans' willingness to pay higher taxes not so difficult to understand. But to expect Americans to pay a European level of taxes in return for an American level of civilian expenditures is politically unrealistic.

Equally unrealistic, in our view, is the strategy that would eliminate the deficit by heavy cuts in our country's comparatively underdeveloped welfare spending, as the Reagan Administration has always advocated rhetorically, or by huge cuts in America's comparatively low level of "middle-class entitlements," as advocated by many of the Administration's critics. Despite its rhetorical enthusiasm for cutting civilian spending, the Reagan Administration has been unable to do more than slow its growth somewhat. The already comparatively low level

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of such expenditures, plus the widespread complaints about the insufficiencies of education, public housing, health services, pollution control and public infrastructure, all point to more rapid growth of civilian spending in the future. America's fiscal profile—its particular mix of taxation and civilian and military spending—seems unable to achieve equilibrium.

V

If a combination of lower civilian spending and higher taxes is unlikely, what then are the prospects for cutting military spending?

Although American public spending and taxation are substantially lower than in France and Germany, American military spending is very much higher—over twice the proportion of national income in the United States as in the Federal Republic. While military spending has powerful support in the United States, the American defense constituency evidently cannot generate support for European levels of taxation. Despite the insistence of advocates of high military spending that the public can and must be "educated" to pay the necessary taxes, postwar experience does not suggest that the experiment can succeed. Congress and the American electorate do not generally disapprove of the country's geopolitical role, but have been reluctant to raise enough taxes to pay for it.

How can military spending be cut and with what consequences? Roughly speaking, there are three strategies for reducing the military budget substantially. The first is what might be called managerial efficiency; the second, hegemony on the cheap; and the third, geopolitical efficiency.

Every new administration vows to make the Pentagon more efficient. International comparisons suggest great possibilities. European states, France in particular, are thought to be far more efficient in the management of their military resources. Why cannot the United States similarly cut its costs without impairing its power? Present circumstances, after all, seem particularly promising. After the buildup during the Weinberger period, it would be surprising if there were not substantial room for managerial improvement. Recent changes in the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, moreover, promise more efficient coordination of operations and weapons procurement.

The fundamental problem remains, however: America's federal budgetary process is such that no president or secretary of defense has the power to maintain the same tight control over

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spending that is characteristic of the more centralized political structures of Western Europe. While the struggle to improve the efficiency of American military spending is indispensable, without fundamental and perhaps undesirable changes in our constitutional processes it may not succeed sufficiently to have a profound effect on our present fiscal imbalances.

Furthermore, many experts predict that ballooning costs are built into maintaining our present force posture and will not be easy to reverse. Costs for our increasingly sophisticated weapons technology seem to rise inexorably. Many weapons systems already being developed show sharp projected increases once the systems are ready for deployment. Thus, if the Pentagon wants to keep its present force structure, it will be hard put to keep its present budget from shooting upward.

Savings in the Pentagon budget mean, therefore, deciding which weapons systems and forces are essential and which are not. Reducing forces and weapons systems, however, logically implies reducing our capacity for certain geopolitical roles and commitments. Reduced spending without reduced burdens constitutes the familiar strategy of hegemony on the cheap, the consequences of which will be taken up presently.

Some experts, however, believe that very substantial savings can be made in our military budget without changing America's military commitments or even troop levels. For example, in an analysis for the authors, Professor William W. Kaufmann, a defense specialist at Harvard University, proposes specific five-year cuts in a long array of military programs that he argues would save $367.2 billion from the last projected Weinberger five-year defense outlay of $1,577.4 billion (in constant fiscal year 1988 dollars).

In terms of reduction by mission, Kaufmann's approach would break down into savings over five years in the categories and amounts set out in Table 1 (see next page). The "other" category includes savings on military personnel ($17.5 billion), national guard and reserve ($8.5 billion), civil service ($9.5 billion), retirement pay ($0.5 billion), military construction ($20 billion), other research, development, testing and equipment ($31.2 billion), and burden-sharing ($30 billion—$15 billion with the Federal Republic of Germany and $15 billion with Japan.)

The cuts in weapons programs would break down into savings of $6.5 billion for the army, $75.3 billion for the navy, and $168.2 billion for the air force.

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TABLE 1

REDUCTION BY MISSION

(in billions of 1988 dollars)

Mission	*Savings*
Strategic nuclear retaliation	$120.8
Land warfare	6.5
Amphibious warfare	22.8
Carrier battle groups	33.2
Antisubmarine warfare	6.1
Air superiority / interdiction	28.3
Intercontinental mobility	32.3
Other	117.2
Total	$367.2

Kaufmann is hardly alone in believing that very substantial savings in the defense budget can and must be made. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci has submitted a new five-year plan involving one percent real annual growth from the fiscal year 1988 total outlays and 1.7 percent annual real growth in budget authority; in 1989 dollars this growth amounts to $122.7 billion in outlays and $188.4 billion in budget authority. Such a plan could yield savings, over five years, of about $140 billion in defense outlays and $190 billion in budget authority from the Weinberger baseline, which projected three percent annual real growth.

Some downward adjustment, provoked by economic pressures, is now clearly in process. How durable and efficacious will these defense cuts prove to be? Is it true that they can or should be made without any corresponding geopolitical adjustment—that is, without any change in American commitments? Defense spending has, of course, been severely pruned in the past. But cuts have never proved durable.

Postwar American military spending has always tended to be a cyclical process, with the United States regularly trying to sustain traditional commitments with cheaper forces. Thus, after the buildup that accompanied the Korean War, the Eisenhower Administration cut military force levels substantially while relying on nuclear weapons to sustain our geopolitical commitments. Realization that the Soviets were developing serious nuclear capabilities of their own in turn prompted the Kennedy-Johnson military buildup of the 1960s. By Nixon's

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time, with Congress refusing to sustain military spending and eliminating conscription, the American global position relied on MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles), détente, arms control, the "China card" and hyperactive diplomacy in general. By the mid-1970s a dangerous gap between American global commitments and the military forces able to back them up began to be perceived widely throughout America and Europe. Carter's buildup was succeeded by Reagan's more massive buildup. Today, with the United States already into a new period of retrenchment, arms control, détente and "smart" weapons are again in favor.

What are the prospects for a retrenchment more durable than Nixon's or Eisenhower's? Are the 1990s fated to discover a new "missile gap" or "window of vulnerability," to be followed by another hectic buildup in response? The Reagan rearmament has been highly wasteful, and therefore offers ample opportunities for greater management efficiency, but has it been any more so than the Korean or Vietnam Wars?

The durability of defense cutbacks depends on whether what results represents some reasonable fit between forces, military doctrines and geopolitical commitments. To cut forces and weapons systems without corresponding coherent alterations in military doctrines or geopolitical commitments obviously runs the risk of merely perpetuating the old cyclical pattern of defense spending, itself a major cause not only of military inefficiency but also of fiscal waste.

VI

Since the Eisenhower presidency nuclear weapons have allowed the United States to maintain its military protectorate for Western Europe without having to match Soviet conventional forces on the Eurasian continent. In effect, the United States has threatened to initiate a nuclear war rather than see Europe overrun by Soviet conventional forces. A nuclear defense of this kind has always been much cheaper than conventional defense—a differential grown still greater with the years. NATO's reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence has, of course, continued long after the Soviets developed intercontinental ballistic missiles. An enormous American superiority in missiles and bombers persisted through the 1960s and continued to lend credence to the nuclear protectorate. A lead in MIRV technology prolonged the American superiority still longer. By the later 1970s, however, strategic parity had clearly come

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about, and it had become widely perceived that the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe could suddenly expose the United States to a high degree of risk.

A number of trends have followed. Europeans have demanded further reassurance of American "coupling." Hence the dual-track decision in 1979 to deploy new American missiles in Europe capable of reaching the Soviet Union. The United States, in turn, has grown more fearful of the nuclear risks. Hence the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the new American emphasis on conventional as opposed to nuclear defense for Europe.

The prospect of having to maintain a European military balance with less reliance on nuclear weapons has already started to cause severe strains within the Atlantic alliance. Some American military experts see the solution in a transformation of military weaponry in order to give NATO a more powerful conventional defense. One school, for example, argues for a revolutionary new form of conventional defense based on technologically advanced "smart" weapons. Another group sees a radical transformation of American ground tactics, weapons and formations away from reliance on static positions and overwhelming firepower. But neither solution, whatever its intrinsic military merits, seems a promising way to reconcile the traditional American position in European defense with an urgent need to shrink budgetary deficits. If the past is any guide, high-tech conventional weapons will not save money. Nor is the American military likely itself to develop, let alone lead its allies through, a revolutionary transformation of forces and tactics that will bring large budgetary savings.

This situation explains the revival of interest in a greater "Europeanization" of NATO. This is a solution that would hope to cut American military spending through geopolitical efficiency rather than hegemony on the cheap. Since the European allies are much stronger economically in relation to the United States and the Soviet Union than in 1950, when NATO's hegemonic pattern was established, the United States ought to be able to devolve to those allies some of the geopolitical responsibilities for sustaining the Pax Americana from which all have profited so handsomely. In particular, the time has come for the European states to take the primary role in organizing their own territorial defense. Current strategic trends suggest that a Europeanized NATO could be more efficient militarily.

By the Pentagon's own calculations the U.S. commitment to

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NATO is responsible for roughly half of the American defense budget. Why the NATO portion of the U.S. defense budget is so large is easy to understand. Of America's 18 standing divisions, for example, ten are devoted to NATO—five deployed in Europe and five more in the United States ready to arrive in Europe within a few days, where they are to find large quantities of stored equipment and supplies. Unlike air and naval forces assigned to NATO, these very expensive and heavily armored land divisions are not easily adaptable to purposes beyond the NATO theater. Hence the particular attractiveness, military as well as fiscal, of a substantial reduction in these ground forces—particularly those deployed in the United States.

Obviously, Europeans have a very substantial comparative advantage over the United States when it comes to providing land forces for European territorial defense. And certainly, if European defense is to depend increasingly on conventional forces, U.S. fiscal conditions preclude an increased American contribution to those forces. On the contrary, with severe cuts in military spending likely, these forces are a logical target.

Even if no U.S. troops were withdrawn from Europe, some analysts estimate that gradually eliminating the five U.S.-based NATO divisions could, in the long run, save as much as $50 billion annually in the U.S. defense budget. While exact calculations are inevitably contentious and elusive, common sense suggests that cutting five of our 18 divisions would eventually have major fiscal consequences, even if the cuts took several years to reach their full extent.

The argument for devolution in NATO is, of course, military as well as fiscal. Replacing NATO forces that are based an ocean away from Europe with, for example, an enlarged and firmly committed French force could be more effective militarily as well as substantially cheaper. Indeed, it is not easy to imagine a serious conventional defense for Western Europe without the wholehearted participation of the French. Military arguments for Europeanization can also be made in the realm of nuclear forces. Strategic parity has inevitably undermined the effectiveness of America's extended deterrence. To the extent that Europeans wish to continue relying on nuclear deterrence, the future does not lie with more American coupling but with a larger role for indigenous European nuclear forces. The United States can perhaps help sustain those European nuclear

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forces, but it cannot expect that it would have dominance over them.

Europeanization of NATO is hardly a new idea, but it means different things to different people. Traditionally, American administrations have called for greater "burden-sharing," by which is meant a desire for Europeans to contribute more money and forces to the American-run NATO defense. The past forty years have made clear the limits of such an approach. Present military and fiscal trends suggest more radical alternatives. Among these are not only "devolution"—a reduced American participation under a European-run NATO command—but also "disengagement," an outright American withdrawal from NATO.

Complete American disengagement from Europe would constitute a diplomatic revolution difficult to justify in terms of American interest. While other parts of the world have gained in importance since the 1950s, the American-European connection is as vital to the postwar system as ever. Western Europe is still an agglomeration of industrial, commercial and financial power rivaled in scale only by the United States itself. Culturally and politically, Western Europe is the other part of the world where political and economic liberty is deeply implanted and reliably practiced. Western Europe also has three of the world's half-dozen major modern military powers, two of them nuclear. Thanks principally to the alliance between the United States and the major states of Western Europe, the Soviet Union has been contained in Eurasia and the United States has been given the margin of superior power to shape the global system. If, instead, Western Europe and the Soviet Union were allies, we would be living in a very different world.

The very strength of Europe is, however, what makes the radical alternative of devolution seem feasible. Not only do West European states have great economic and military resources, but they also have had extensive postwar experience in intimate confederal cooperation. The European Community is by far the most impressive experiment in intergovernmental cooperation in modern history. The cooperation required to coordinate Europe's economies reaches intimately into the domestic interest-group politics of every member state. Compared to the difficulties of an economic confederation, managing a military coalition against the Soviet Union should be relatively simple, once the necessity of replacing part of the American military forces committed to NATO is clear.

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Proponents of devolution, moreover, see it not as a policy reflecting American weakness or failure but as an overdue adjustment to the consequences of America's successful earlier policies. Building a liberal global order that has rejuvenated Western Europe and Japan, developed at least parts of the Third World and contained the Soviets has also inevitably eroded the overwhelming American global predominance that characterized the earlier postwar decades.

Devolution is the logical policy of adjustment. While managing it undeniably carries risks, to its proponents those risks are preferable to the almost certain deterioration that would follow from trying either to sustain the old predominance or to withdraw from the global order.

The attractiveness of devolution, to be sure, is greater to Americans than to many Europeans, who have grown comfortable in a military dependence that has exacted a very low political and economic price. Those who hunt through the present European scene for illustrations of the risks and limits will have no trouble finding them. There is no way to prove that Europe will rise to the occasion of an American devolution. Most European leaders have little interest in precipitating such a move by affirming their capacity to cope with it. Publicly, they take every opportunity to profess their own weakness. Privately, some are more sanguine. Few European politicians, of course, care to be blamed for giving the Americans a pretext to reduce their NATO forces.

Nevertheless, the major European states—France, Germany and to some extent Britain—have clearly been intensifying their own military cooperation, at least partly in anticipation of American pressures for a greater European role in the alliance. Progress so far suggests hope, but no easy assurance. Military and political differences remain that make the familiar American leadership seem a more comfortable alternative. But given the urgent need to bring America's budget under control, those comforts are very precarious. Those in this country who genuinely want to save NATO should get on with reforming it. And those Europeans who want an Atlantic alliance would be well advised to get to work on its European pillar.

VII

American policy in recent years has been more and more addicted to wishful thinking. Economically, as we have suggested, the era of comfortable self-indulgence appears near its

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close. Today the United States is on a collision course with history. The American fiscal dilemma must be resolved, and the perpetual instability of the dollar that is its consequence must cease. This will require a radical and resolute policy to stop the United States from perpetually living beyond its means. Austerity will have to include the federal government and there will be no quick fix by either an abrupt rise in taxes or a sharp cut in civilian spending. Taxes will have to be raised from their Reagan levels, but so will civilian expenditures. Major and durable military cuts are essential and these logically require a readjustment of America's geopolitical role and alliance commitments. Needless to say, none of this will be easy. Under normal circumstances, political leaders here and in Europe would certainly prefer to patch up the status quo one more time.

Present trends are not likely to present them with the opportunity to succeed, however. In the next decade the world's most critical problems are likely to be in the economic sphere. The prospect of a breakdown of world monetary and trading arrangements now constitutes so grave a danger that no responsible American government can ignore our own heavy responsibility for the present disarray. American policymakers can no longer give military commitments automatic priority over fiscal balance. The United States needs a long-term geopolitical posture that is compatible with a durable fiscal and monetary balance. European and Japanese governments, too, are faced with a compelling self-interest in seeing the United States regain its political and economic equilibrium.

But while reality is finally closing in on the economic fantasies of the past, there is the danger of a new explosion of wishful thinking in the geopolitical sphere. This is fed by the marked change in Soviet internal policies and external tactics. While the Soviet shifts may offer new opportunities to sustain a military balance at a lower cost and with less tension, they also pose the danger that both Americans and Europeans will find a new pretext for putting off the long-needed reform of the Western alliance itself. As in the early 1970s, détente and arms control once more seem to offer promising prospects for fiscal retrenchment without geopolitical adjustment. The Soviet Union now shows an interest in reducing its own military spending, and therefore in pursuing arms control agreements and perhaps in finding solutions to the political tensions that make armaments seem so necessary.

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Skeptics note, however, how limited and transitory periods of détente have proved in the past. Even if Gorbachev should be taken seriously as a domestic reformer or diplomatic conciliator, his internal and alliance problems are formidable and his own capacity to control or even survive them is questionable. In any event, however Gorbachev fares, the Soviet Union will remain a great Eurasian military power, its very existence weighing on the independence of the neighboring countries of Europe, Asia and the Middle East. The need for a powerful military counterweight will remain, even if the level of the balance can be somewhat reduced and stabilized.

Under the circumstances, it is imperative that the United States not become so preoccupied with Soviet relations that it fails to make the fundamental changes in the West that are the precondition for future stability within the global system. No imaginable arms control agreement is going to eliminate the urgent necessity for the United States to reduce its highly destabilizing budget deficits by, among other steps, very substantial cuts in current military outlays. If arms control agreements with the Soviets may offer an intelligent way to reduce some part of the cost and danger of sustaining a military balance in Europe, they will not eliminate either the need for such a balance or the need for the Europeans to bear a greater responsibility for sustaining it.

To argue for the priority of Western needs over U.S.-Soviet détente is not to denigrate détente's opportunities. It may be that the Soviets now feel constrained to accept a more modest agenda of global ambitions in return for urgently needed progress at home. If so, it will confirm with success the long-standing Western policy of containment. But the victory will be Pyrrhic, and highly transitory, if meanwhile there is a breakdown of the global economy. The swarm of troubles that a Western economic breakdown would generate would soon reconvert the Soviets to Leninism. In any event, an economic crash will set many other demons loose in the world besides Soviet ambition.

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BOOK REVIEW ESSAY

W. W. Rostow

BEWARE OF HISTORIANS BEARING FALSE ANALOGIES

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000. By Paul Kennedy. New York: Random House, 1987, 678 pp. $24.95.

Professor Kennedy, a British scholar translated to New Haven, has written a massive book around a grand theme: the relation between the rise and fall of major powers over the past five centuries and the shifts in their relative economic strength and technological virtuosity. It is both a work of historical analysis, in which the author seeks to discern recurrent patterns upon which to base defensible generalizations, and a policy prescription, notably for the United States. Understandably, it is the latter strand that is receiving current attention; but before examining Kennedy's advice it is worth surveying briefly the other dimensions of his work.

First comes a survey of the world scene circa 1500, with quick portraits of Ming China, the Muslim world including Mogul India, pre-Tokugawa and Tokugawa Japan, pre-Petrine Russia, and Europe before the rise of the modern nation-states. Kennedy then brings to the stage his succession of quasi-Wagnerian melodramas of rise and fall: the Hapsburgs (1519–1659), the Anglo-French struggle in the wake of brief Dutch primacy (1660–1815), post-Napoleonic British primacy (1815–1885) and its erosion (1885–1918), the rise of the United States and the U.S.S.R. at the expense of the middle powers (1919–1942), the bipolar world and the beginning of its erosion (1943–1980). (My own opinion is that the erosion of the bipolar world began as early as 1948, when the U.S. Congress passed the Marshall Plan legislation and Tito successfully broke with Stalin.)

This survey involves the mobilization of a large volume of evidence, much of it not directly related to Kennedy's central theme. Sensing the diffuse character of his exposition, he provides a terse ten-page introduction. There he confronts two of the major unresolved analytic problems that run through his study, and there he fails to confront a third.

First, he asks, how much generalization is justified by this tale of battle and blood and wasted resources? The evidence, he finds, is too conflicting for any tidy laws of history. He limits himself to three unsurprising propositions:

—There is a causal link between economic strength and the power position of states in the international system.

—In the long run, the rise and fall of states reflects their relative economic position in the world economy.

—There is a time lag between the trajectory of a nation's relative economic strength and its relative military-territorial influence.

Second, Kennedy draws back a bit even from this degree of "crude economic determinism." He lists other factors that have affected relative national success and failure in the arena of power: geography, military

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organization, national morale and alliance systems, among others. These are, however, not pursued systematically in the analyses that follow.

Third is his missing insight: he fails to distinguish sharply those states which pursued policies of regional hegemony from those content with a balance-of-power policy (that is, a policy which aimed to prevent the hegemony of any other power in their region). In the post-1500 era—marked, above all, by the triumph of nationalism—it has made quite a difference whether a power set out to suppress the nationalism of others or rather to help mobilize the nationalism of allies to resist suppression by a third party. It is a distinction worth making.

The central problem of Kennedy's analysis and, later, prescription concerns his treatment of Great Britain in relation to the other cases of rise and decline. There is a subsection in Kennedy's book whose title poses a good question: "Britain as Hegemon?" It evokes Britain at the height of its power, with Europe in reasonable diplomatic equilibrium aided notably by Bismarck's restraint. It was an equilibrium about to break down, but it represented a technique for exercising power in a multipolar arena quite different from that of Britain's predecessors or would-be hegemonic successors in Europe. A balance-of-power state may not be liked, but it is almost certain to find allies when it confronts another power intent on regional hegemony.

The British decline thus differs from the others. Britain's relative role in fending off attempts by a succession of powers to gain hegemony in Europe was, indeed, reduced by the progressive industrialization of other states. But its relative decline as a European and Atlantic power is not the result of pursuing a hegemonic dream in Europe. It did exercise hegemonic powers in the Empire, despite the recognition after the American Revolution that such powers would progressively wane as nationalism gathered strength. While the end of the British imperial dream was psychologically and politically traumatic, it saved money.

Nevertheless, the trauma of imperial decline postponed Britain's recognition that its destiny lay primarily with the European continent. The problem that had to be overcome was captured in Dean Acheson's somewhat cruel analysis and challenge late in 1962; namely, that Great Britain had lost an empire but not yet found a role.

The most obvious generalization from Kennedy's saga is political rather than economic: the pursuit of hegemony strengthens nationalist resistance, renders the expansionist effort increasingly costly, and out of its own dynamics may drive a state to extend its exertions to a point where failure is inevitable, as the hegemonic power reaches beyond its relative economic capacity. A state pursuing a balance-of-power policy may find its relative status shifting due to the spread of industrial innovations, but it is not destined to repeat the fate of Hapsburg Spain, Napoleonic France, imperial and Hitlerite Germany, or militarized Japan.

In short, Kennedy's generalizations from the historical record down to 1942 suffer from a confusion of the British case with the others, and a confusion of two quite different links between economic resources and power in the world arena: the progressive economic strains imposed by the pursuit of hegemonic dreams in the face of affronted nationalism; and the progressive dilution of relative economic power as the British demonstration

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of industrial and commercial takeoff, starting in the 1780s, was followed during the succeeding two centuries by a sequence of takeoffs in continental Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East.[1]

This distinction becomes central when Kennedy moves beyond 1942. Kennedy's theory takes the form of a double analogy: he treats the post-1945 rise in U.S. power by analogy with hegemonic empires of the past; its decline by analogy with his interpretation of the decline of Britain. Neither analogy, in my view, is applicable.

Now, his stylized portrait. From 1943, he argues, the United States and the Soviet Union interpreted the world in bipolar power and ideological terms and acted accordingly. The two nations are presented as having equally fallen prey to "globalist" thinking. An unnamed "American official" is evoked from a secondary source to explain: "It is now our turn to bat in Asia," in succession to British and Dutch imperialists. American postwar economic policy is presented as an effort to exploit free trade and laissez-faire, at a time of European weakness, to consolidate American postwar economic primacy. This is the not-unfamiliar litany of some on both sides of the Atlantic since the end of the Second World War.

A full response to this caricature is not appropriate here. But it is worth recalling that the political instinct of the United States in 1945–46 was to come home from the world as much as it could and rely to the greatest possible extent on its membership in the United Nations to keep the peace. In the actions taken in Europe the United States was not engaged in an obsessive, bipolar duel for world power with the U.S.S.R. It was acting in continuity with its policy since 1917; namely, that it would move to redress the balance of power in Europe at times of acute crisis when that balance was palpably threatened. And it acted in a particular way.

In 1945–46 the issue debated in the U.S. government was whether to support the unity of Europe at the certain cost of creating a great economic competitor, gambling that the United States would have a strong partner in holding the balance of power. Well before the Marshall Plan offer, the U.S. government had decided on this course, and it has remained American policy in Europe for more than forty years. Washington was the steady friend of Jean Monnet, with his plans and dreams for a strong Europe—not exactly the posture one would expect from a power caught up in a hegemonic seizure.

In Asia, too, if one examines what the United States did, as opposed to the rhetorical sound track, it is clear that since the late nineteenth century the nation acted quite consistently in terms of the balance of power, and has continued to do so during the more than forty years since the end of the Second World War: the defense of South Korea; the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty; the Southeast Asia Treaty; the defense for twenty critical years of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; and the reaffirmation by Presidents Carter and Reagan of the Southeast Asia Treaty as it applies to Thailand, despite the tragic outcome of the engagement in Vietnam. There is great continuity in this story.

Just as Professor Kennedy does not capture the balance-of-power roots

[1] For a visual presentation of this sequence, see my book, *The World Economy: History and Prospect*, Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1978, p. 51.

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of American policy, he fails to deal clearly with the U.S. nuclear role. The preservation of a balance of power in Europe and Asia was, of course, complicated and rendered more expensive for the United States by its role of nuclear guarantor for its allies and others opposing Soviet hegemony in both regions. No other nation could or can foreseeably assume that function—and an abandonment of it would plunge the world into a dangerous, unstable phase of nuclear proliferation.

Now Kennedy's prescription: the United States should shift resources from "security" to "investment," sacrificing short-run military security to longer-run economic security. It is here that his analogy shifts from Russia and its predecessor hegemonic powers to his view of post-1945 Britain. There are four observations to be made about this advice.

First, of course, U.S. military outlays should be the minimum compatible with the protection of American vital interests. As a proportion of GNP, U.S. military expenditures have declined from 13.2 percent at the peak of the Korean War, to 8.9 percent at the peak of hostilities in Southeast Asia (1967), to 6.5 percent in the fourth quarter of 1987. This trend decline is no cause for complacency, but it is often forgotten amid rhetorical charges of a spiraling arms race.

Kennedy is quite aware of the trend but argues it does not take into account the relative rise in the economic power of other countries. His view would only be valid, however, if the United States were seeking hegemony over those countries. In fact, the relative rise in economic power has mainly occurred in countries allied to the United States, or where important common balance-of-power interests exist (e.g., India and China).

Second, the prospect is that the proportionate burden of the United States may decline further in the future, as the result of arms control agreements and other arrangements which reduce military burdens for both the United States and the U.S.S.R. The image that emerges from Kennedy's rhetoric and analysis—of an America in the grip of compulsions to pursue a linear expansion in its military outlays until it self-destructs—is justified neither by past trends nor by reasonable expectations for the future.

Third, desirable as it is, a relative reduction in military outlays does not automatically translate into a higher growth rate, nor is a relatively high rate of growth incompatible with a relatively high rate of military expenditures. For example, the burden of U.K. military expenditures declined in the years down to 1978, while the economy continued to deteriorate. Something of the same could be said of the American economy in the 1970s, when military expenditures declined to a trough of just under five percent of GNP in 1979. On the other hand, Taiwan, with 20 percent of U.S. GNP per capita and a proportionate military outlay higher than the United States, enjoys a per capita rate of growth almost four times higher. The situation of South Korea is similar. The capacity to reconcile a high rate of growth with a nation's security requirements is a much more complex affair than Kennedy allows.

Fourth, the challenge confronting the United States as it faces a protracted phase of increasing competition from the emerging powers requires much deeper and more radical change than Kennedy suggests: for example, improvement in the quality of the American educational system; increased

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cooperation between business and labor as well as bipartisan approaches to balancing the federal budget; intensified ties between the universities and the private sector. Incidentally, despite a high military claim on U.S. research and development resources, the United States seems to be maintaining its position in the generation of new technologies reasonably well. The critical dimension of competition lies in the pace at which entrepreneurs actually bring to bear the new technologies in production, a process not closely related to the military budget.

My conclusions about this book, then, are the following:

—The author's failure to distinguish a balance of power from a hegemonic policy is a fundamental flaw in his analysis and prescription.

—His familiar but still curious view of American diplomatic history conceals the fact that—rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding—the United States has, ever since its alliance with France during the Revolution, pursued a balance-of-power policy.

—Such pursuit has permitted the United States to avoid the vicious circle which engulfed all true hegemonic powers over the past five centuries. I would add that nuclear weapons and a certain historically rooted caution have thus far also saved the Soviet Union from that fate, although its society has been greatly strained by its hegemonic efforts.

—For a balance-of-power country a satisfactory defense and a vital economy are not incompatible if, in David Hume's phrasing, they remain "industrious" at home and conduct a "civilized" alliance policy abroad.

A final word: Kennedy closes with a passage in which he tries to define the narrow margin open to statesmen (and their societies) in dealing with historical forces they can "neither create nor direct": a parable drawn from Bismarck, who once, in a Hegelian mood, set the limit of the possible as steering "with more or less skill and experience" on "the stream of time."

Kennedy seems to have somewhat more central European pessimism in him than the majority of Americans. As I went through the endless tables of relative economic power that characterize the text—some incorporating my own calculations—I thought from time to time he was taking these trends a bit too seriously. This came to me even more strongly while reading in his 1983 work, *Strategy and Diplomacy 1870–1945*. Its lead essay argues that Britain wisely followed a policy of "appeasement"—of adjustment to the inevitable rise of other powers—as it felt its primacy waning in the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; that Neville Chamberlain was on the right track with Germany—but for Hitler's actions, which "discredited" appeasement and gave leverage to the "unholy alliance" of left and right that came to oppose Chamberlain.

In fact, there was more to British policy over the whole period Kennedy analyzes than passive adjustment to economic and military power trends; for example, the alliance with France after 1900 and the beginning of a sense in British policymaking circles that an American alliance might in time be necessary to redress the balance of power in the old world.

But my most fundamental disagreement with Kennedy is his tendency to regard history as linear. He clearly believes, for example, that societies cannot regenerate. He regards calls for regeneration as the province of right-wing patriotic politicians trying fruitlessly to swim against the tides of history.

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To Bismarck, I prefer Churchill ("the course of history . . . is always being altered by something or other"). Without a conviction that man has a somewhat larger control over his destiny than Bismarck and Kennedy suggest, Britain's defeat of Napoleon and its remarkable World War II performance would have been impossible—as would the quite unpredicted postwar regeneration of Western Europe and Japan, and a great many other heartening historical events.

There is a special reason that Americans should lean toward the Churchillian view that our margin of control over our destiny is, to a degree, more generous than Kennedy allows. It was expressed in 1961, at a difficult moment in the wake of the Bay of Pigs debacle. President John Kennedy told me: "The British could have a nervous breakdown in the wake of Suez, the French over Algeria. They each represent six to seven percent of the free world's power—and we could cover for them. But we can't afford a nervous breakdown. We're forty percent, and there's no one to cover for us. We'd better get on with the job." And so we did.

What is the job now? The United States should stick with a new positive version of the balance-of-power policy that we have pursued with some success for more than two centuries. Such a new version lies in the broad direction Western Europe took, at long last, in the wake of the Second World War, after five centuries and more of internecine bloodletting. In order to balance the power of Germany on the one hand, and the United States and the Soviet Union on the other, Western Europe moved toward intensified, institutionalized cooperation, leading ultimately, perhaps, to unity. Great Britain could have and should have led that effort. For explicable although unfortunate reasons it did not, but the fact is that the European Community represents a more civilized version of the balance-of-power policy Britain pursued for centuries at times of power crisis in Europe.

The answer for the United States at this historical interval, when its relative power and influence, while diminished, still transcends by far that of any other power, is, in a sense, to pursue on a wider basis the policy Britain should have pursued toward Europe after 1945; that is, to move forward with others to give institutional substance to the profound common interests that suffuse the Pacific Basin and tame forehandedly the tensions which exist or might emerge; to move similarly in a new spirit of authentic partnership within the western hemisphere; to tighten the ties of partnership within the Atlantic community; and to hold out to the Soviet Union a vision of a soft landing from the cold war.

In more immediate terms there is a case for adjusting carefully and maturely the economic burdens within the alliances across the Atlantic and Pacific, in light of recent shifts in relative economic and technological capacity. There is no case for radical change in the structure or purposes of those alliances, committed as they are to both defense and conciliation, arms and arms control. On the contrary, their steadiness and continuity are fundamental to the possibility of a successful transition from where we are to a liquidation of the cold war. Another blind American retraction, as in 1945–46 and the 1970s, which Paul Kennedy's false analogies tend to encourage, could destroy that possibility.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

BREAKTHROUGH/PRORIV: EMERGING NEW THINKING. Edited by Anatoly Gromyko and Martin Hellman. New York: Walker/Moscow: Progress, 1988, 281 pp. $9.95 (paper).

Responses to "the challenge to build a world beyond war" by Soviet and American scholars plus a few others. A notable fact about the book is that it is being published simultaneously in the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet contributors—with a rather heavy representation from the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, hardly a hotbed of new thinking—stress the significance of changes instituted by the Gorbachev regime in the direction of openness, diversity, democracy, human values and international interdependence. The Americans, exemplifying their expected diversity, offer a variety of individual views, definitely not establishment thinking, on how to save the world from destruction. This is not, however, just another exercise in "struggle for peace" propaganda or a declaration of principle on the inadmissibility of nuclear war. The authors at least try to address practical ways, both social and technological, to reduce the existing threats to survival.

AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES IN TRANSITION. Edited by Hans Binnendijk. Washington: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, 1987, 336 pp.

The project that produced this book had three main aims: to clarify what happened, and why, in several countries that have recently seen authoritarian dictatorships overthrown; to see if there are any common patterns and lessons; and to consider how an outside power such as the United States may best adapt to or influence such situations in its own interests. The cases include five where the transition "went awry" (Iran, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, El Salvador), five where the turn was to democracy (Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Argentina and the Philippines) and one where the outcome defies description (Haiti). The contributors are U.S. diplomats who were directly involved in the events, plus some scholars who are specialists in the affairs of the countries in question. The conclusions are well worth close study by those who will have to cope with such revolutions and by those who would presume to judge them.

GLOBAL POLITICAL FALLOUT: THE VCR'S FIRST DECADE. By Gladys D. Ganley and Oswald H. Ganley. Norwood (N.J.): Ablex, 1987, 166 pp.

Almost imperceptibly, often illegally and probably irreversibly, video cassette recorders have been spreading throughout the world, with potential political consequences not known or understood but feared. For countries where tight control of information is part of the established order, as in the

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Soviet bloc and much of the Third World, proliferation of the VCR (easy to smuggle, to buy on the black market) represents a new challenge. This study by the Program on Information Resources Policy at Harvard brings together evidence from all over the world, listing questions for further study.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE CARTER AND REAGAN EXPERIENCES. By A. Glenn Mower, Jr. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1987, 167 pp. $37.50.

After a simplified historical review of the competing currents of realism and moralism in U.S. foreign policy, the author takes up the growing importance of the question of human rights in the years following World War II. He notes that there were many factors of continuity despite philosophical differences in the records of the Carter and Reagan Administrations: the former in time tempered its early enthusiasm with realism, and the latter found itself defending human rights against some of its "authoritarian" friends. For its detail and its objectivity the book is a welcome addition to the literature.

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Gregory F. Treverton

BEYOND AMERICAN HEGEMONY: THE FUTURE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. By David P. Calleo. New York: Basic Books, 1987, 288 pp. $20.95. A Twentieth Century Fund Book.

THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP: EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE BURDENS OF ALLIANCE. By Josef Joffe. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987, 256 pp. $29.95.

Just when it again seemed that everything to be said about the West European-American alliance had been said, two important books appear, together framing the central issue sharply. Calleo's thesis is straightforward: under NATO, "the Europeans have been militarily underdeveloped while the United States has been militarily overextended." The answer is orderly devolution to Western Europe of more responsibility for its own defense, an argument Calleo has made on other grounds in earlier works. If the underlying argument is overdrawn—with decent economic management there is no reason why the United States cannot afford to spend six percent of its GNP on defense, although its citizens may choose not to—its central argument is more and more in fashion and needs to be confronted. For Joffe, a German who is culturally and even politically close to America, NATO is neither as "parasitic" to the United States nor as "oppressive" to European self-reliance as Calleo implies. Joffe is less optimistic than Calleo about a Western Europe with a diminished American role: he is less confident that Europe has transcended its history; by sparing Europeans "the necessity of self-reliant choice in matters of defense, the United States banished the *systemic* cause of conflict at the root of so many of Europe's past wars."

THE ORIGINS OF ALLIANCES. By Stephen M. Walt. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1987, 322 pp. $32.50.

This rare combination of theory and practice will appeal most to specialists, but it contains useful insights for the making of policy as well.

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THE KEY TO FAILURE: LAOS AND THE VIETNAM WAR. By Norman B. Hannah. Lanham (Md.): Madison Books, 1987, 361 pp. $19.95.

A remarkable book, joining earlier works by Bruce Palmer and Harry Summers as truly reflective and personally disinterested criticisms of American strategy in the Vietnam War. Its focus is heavily on the neglected role of Laos and specifically on the agreements of 1962 and how these were consistently treated as a given, precluding any major U.S. action in Laos while leaving Hanoi free to build up the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Hannah shows how ideas in the direction of changing this ground rule were put forward periodically: by him (with support from one senior army general) from his post as political adviser to the Pacific commander in 1965–66 (and later directly to President Nixon in 1969), and by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker directly to President Johnson in 1967. Yet there was never institutional advocacy leading to a systematic look at the possibility he stresses, a *cordon sanitaire* below the 17th parallel and across to the Mekong. This concept remains by far the most plausible strategic "might-have-been" of the war, and it is here argued in a thorough and balanced manner, with many wise comments on decision-making that are always fair and never make things seem easier than they were.

The result is a superb and original contribution, a history for the lay or expert reader. Above all, in addition to reminding us of the power of inertia and fixed assumption, it frames a gut strategic issue—sealing off a battlefield versus fighting locally—that was relevant in the Cuban missile crisis and could be germane to many conflicts in other areas, even perhaps Central America today. William P. Bundy

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND WESTERN SECURITY, 1984–87. By Anthony H. Cordesman. London and New York: Jane's Publishing (for the Royal United Services Institute), 1987, 185 pp. $28.00.

CONSTRAINTS ON U.S. STRATEGY IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS. By Stephen T. Hosmer. New York: Crane, Russak, 1987, 188 pp. $22.00 (paper, $12.50).

SUPERPOWER COMPETITION AND SECURITY IN THE THIRD WORLD. Edited by Robert S. Litwak and Samuel F. Wells, Jr. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987, 320 pp. $29.95.

Cordesman's careful chronology of what is probably the bloodiest war of the postwar era helps us understand why that war has gone on so long. His policy suggestions are thoughtful reminders that the West should be seeking to end the war on the right terms, not gloating over its prolongation, and that we have been dangerously misled by the oil glut to disregard energy planning. Hosmer's book is narrower than its title suggests—it is about constraints on U.S. military operations—but it is a useful survey of historical experience as seen through the eyes of policymakers: what constrained them, especially their concerns about Soviet reactions, and what induced them to relax the constraint? The Litwak-Wells volume, the product of a series of seminars at the Wilson Center in Washington, seeks to engage perspectives that rarely connect—those who see the roots of Third World insecurity in superpower or East-West terms and those who give pride of place to indigenous regional factors—and does so with an outstanding group of authors.

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THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA IN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THOUGHT. By Robert E. Osgood. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 138 pp. $23.85.

Published posthumously, this book returns to a lifelong interest of Osgood's: American attitudes toward military force. His prose is clear and his insights are arresting—why, for example, should retaliatory use of nuclear weapons be regarded as of a morally different order than first use? The breadth of analysis reminds us how much we have lost with Osgood's passing.

THE ARMS CONTROL DELUSION. By Malcolm Wallop and Angelo Codevilla. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1987, 220 pp. $16.95.

THROUGH THE STRAITS OF ARMAGEDDON: ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND PROSPECTS. Edited by Paul F. Diehl and Loch K. Johnson. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987, 279 pp. $32.50 (paper, $12.95).

The Wallop-Codevilla critique of arms control from the right is familiar but breezily put: the United States expected too much and got too little. In particular, the book repeats the litany that America has "zero means for enforcing" Soviet compliance with existing treaties. For the authors, arms control is preeminently a domestic matter; as Walter Lippmann said of the run-up to World War II, "the disarmament movement has been tragically successful in disarming the nations that believe in disarmament." In this perspective, not surprisingly, President Reagan's conversion to arms reductions amounts to virtual apostasy. The Diehl-Johnson volume is balanced, and the foreword by Dean Rusk is a treat—the elder statesman's skepticism about dramatic predictions from either right or left, about either weapons capabilities or the imminence of doom.

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: SHIELD OR SNARE? Edited by Harold Brown. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 297 pp. $24.95 (paper).

STAR WARS: THE ECONOMIC FALLOUT. Edited by Rosy Nimroody. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988, 234 pp.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL. Edited by Alvin M. Weinberg and Jack N. Barkenbus. New York: Paragon House, 1988, 263 pp. $24.95.

STAR WARS AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE. Edited by Hans Gunter Brauch. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 599 pp. $39.95.

For anyone who has missed the SDI debate and wants to catch up, the Brown volume is a useful primer. In their careful chapter on the macroeconomics of SDI, Barry Blechman and Victor Utgoff estimate the opportunity cost of a comprehensive defense as equivalent to a $570 annual tax surcharge for citizens earning $30,000 to $50,000. The Nimroody book, the result of a Council on Economic Priorities project, presents a still sharper conclusion, arguing that the Reagan SDI program "harbors . . . serious threats to the economy," especially if early contracts build political momentum behind the program. Weinberg and Barkenbus make clear their moral preference for a defense-dominated nuclear world—specifically for a defense-protected arms build-down—but they are fair-minded enough to report their surprise that not all their contributors agreed; indeed their own epilogue is as good a synthesis of the defense-offense arguments as

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there is anywhere. The Brauch volume disaggregates the European reaction to SDI in country-by-country chapters—helpful source material, if probably more than most readers will need.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Robert Gilpin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, 449 pp.

"The postwar age of multilateral liberalization is over and the world's best hope for economic stability is some form of benign mercantilism." Professor Gilpin of Princeton reaches this conclusion through an impressive examination of political and economic developments affecting money, trade, development, finance and the multinational corporation. He concentrates on the interplay of international market forces and the way national governments try to influence them. Making no firm predictions as to what will come of the emerging "mixed system of nationalism, regionalism and sectoral protectionism," the book recognizes that poor countries will suffer as opportunities shrink. Among the few reasons for "moderate optimism" are the common security interests of some major countries and the advantages they see in economic interdependence at the same time as they try to limit it. Any serious debate on such matters will have to take account of the clear arguments of this excellent book.

THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE. By Edmund Dell. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 268 pp. $37.50.

"In a world in which conflict is the norm, the first objective of the state must be the achievement of economic security. . . . Interdependence and freer trade increase uncertainty and risk." Fifteen years in Parliament, several of them as secretary of state for trade in a Labour government, plus business and academic experience, provide the bases for Edmund Dell's clear, vigorous and often witty arguments. He bashes the case for free trade (and its proponents) but he accepts no other economic theory as a guide to statecraft, only pragmatism and negotiation. He seems to associate himself with a "modern mercantilism" that reflects "a calculating attitude instead of a committed attitude to the benefits of free international trade." Although it is far from solving all the problems it poses, this lively and interesting book provides something that has been missing in the literature and nicely illustrates some of the points made by Gilpin (above).

THE MARSHALL PLAN: AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1947–1952. By Michael J. Hogan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 482 pp. $59.50.

The subtitle is important. Based to a considerable extent on American and British archives, this book concentrates on the relations of the two countries during the period of the Marshall Plan and its blurred ending in rearmament. One major theme concerns the American acceptance of the British view that global responsibilities and the sterling area made it impossible for the United Kingdom to enter fully into the economic integration of Western Europe. Another major contention is that, although the Americans sought to remodel Europe in their own image, Europe resisted

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sufficiently so that "in the end, America was made the European way." This interesting and useful book overlaps Imanuel Wexler's *The Marshall Plan Revisited* (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1984) and Alan Milward's *The Reconstruction of Western Europe* (which has just appeared in paperback). There is, however, enough difference in coverage and approach to make it necessary for serious students of the period to look at all three books.

FOR RICHER, FOR POORER: THE NEW U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP. By Ellen L. Frost. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987, 199 pp. $9.95 (paper).

Is the rapid shift in the relative wealth of Japan and the United States the underlying source of the tensions between the two countries? That is only one of the many penetrating questions considered in this thoughtful, well-informed examination of one of the most important segments of international relations. How Washington and Tokyo deal with one another is of more than bilateral importance, as the book shows, but most of the many suggestions for reducing the dangers and improving the prospects focus on "we and they." The author, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense who now works for Westinghouse, had the advice of a study group at the Council on Foreign Relations in writing this valuable book.

TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY: A CONFUCIAN PERSPECTIVE ON LEADING ECONOMIC ISSUES. By Ronald Dore. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987, 264 pp. $35.00 (paper, $11.95).

One of the best interpreters of Japan to the West asks whether some of the good features of Japanese economic and social performance may be emerging in England and the United States in the natural order of things, and whether some others could be developed with a certain amount of encouragement. His rich and subtle discussion focuses mainly on Britain. A final chapter that looks at the United States is almost as interesting for the comparison between the two "Anglo-Saxon" countries as for the relation of each to the Japanese model.

REMAKING THE WORLD BANK. By Barend A. de Vries. Cabin John (Md.): Seven Locks Press, 1987, 200 pp. $14.95 (paper).

Packed into this small, thoughtful book is a most informative analysis of the past practices of the World Bank and a series of concrete recommendations for dealing with an international economy "now drastically different from what it was in the fifties and sixties, when it first developed its lending standards." As a longtime member of the bank's staff, Mr. de Vries knows what he is talking about and makes a lucid, persuasive case for the changes he proposes.

CONSTRAINTS ON STRATEGY: THE ECONOMICS OF WESTERN SECURITY. Edited by David B.H. Denoon. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986, 251 pp.

THE CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY: IMPACTS OF REDIRECTED MILITARY SPENDING. By Bernard Udis. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 154 pp. $23.00.

The economic basis of security and the effects of defense spending on national economies are old but ever-present subjects for research and debate. Forecasting economic growth, the contributors to Denoon's volume

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see the biggest strains arising in Western Europe and discuss the ways the United States and its allies can best cope. Udis is principally concerned with policies to redirect business activity as defense expenditures fall. These are useful books but they raise as many questions as they answer.

SELLING THE ROPE TO HANG CAPITALISM? THE DEBATE ON WEST-EAST TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. Edited by Charles M. Perry and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987, 246 pp. $30.00.

Tales of espionage, smuggling and false identity make this volume livelier than many otherwise comparable studies of export controls. The 20 papers prepared for a conference in late 1985 have some interesting accounts of how the Reagan Administration tightened the handling of technology transfers by officials and former officials. The discussion of the basic policy issues is familiar. In their conclusions the editors recommend taking a hard line to maintain Western technological superiority.

OPENING UP THE SOVIET ECONOMY. By Jerry F. Hough. Washington: Brookings, 1988, 100 pp. $8.95 (paper).

The prospect of serious reform in the Soviet economy greatly complicates the choices the United States must make about trade, technology transfer, joint ventures, human rights and relations with allies. Professor Hough of Duke University shows why and makes the case for relaxing American policy. Unlike others, he does not think Gorbachev would make concessions on arms control or foreign policy solely to get better economic treatment. The gains for both countries would come through long-run changes in the U.S.S.R. and a reduction of the anti-Western and protectionist forces there.

POWER, PRODUCTION, AND THE UNPROTECTED WORKER. By Jeffrey Harrod. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, 347 pp. $40.00.

Following the large study of *Production, Power, and World Order* by Robert Cox (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1987/88), his associate Jeffrey Harrod applies the same general approach to unprotected workers, "the least powerful of producers within the world labor force." Fitting an extraordinary range of material into a rigorous framework (which, however, does not deaden the sensitivity of an *engagé* author), the book tells a great deal about subsistence farmers, peasants, casual laborers, unorganized workers with regular jobs, the self-employed and household workers. Taken together they may constitute half the workers of the world, or three-quarters of those in the noncommunist world.

FOOD AID: THE CHALLENGE AND THE OPPORTUNITY. By Hans Singer, John Wood and Tony Jennings. New York: Oxford, 1987, 245 pp. $18.95 (paper).

Food aid has been praised on humanitarian grounds and condemned for depressing local agriculture. In this first-rate book, three experienced development economists weigh the arguments and stipulate the conditions needed for good results. They look also at the history of food aid, its many forms and effects and related issues such as transportation, distribution and supervision. This is very close to being the definitive work.

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BETRAYING THE NATIONAL INTEREST. By Frances Moore Lappé, Rachel Schurman and Kevin Danaber. New York: Grove Press, 1987, 160 pp. $18.95 (paper, $8.95). A Food First Book.

A point-by-point indictment of U.S. aid for failing to reduce hunger, supporting repressive regimes and overemphasizing the military, and for exaggerating the Soviet threat to the Third World.

WHAT PRICE FOOD?: AGRICULTURAL PRICE POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Paul Streeten. New York: St. Martin's, 1988, 127 pp. $35.00.

This tightly reasoned study, drawing on broad experience, shows how quite different measures have to be taken in different countries to reduce hunger and undernutrition in the world. Usually it is not sufficient to act on the price of food alone to obtain the most favorable results.

PIONEERS IN DEVELOPMENT: SECOND SERIES. Edited by Gerald M. Meier. New York: Oxford (for the World Bank), 1987, 244 pp. $29.95.

Is development economics different from the rest of economics? Does the revival of neoclassical thinking—especially about international trade—help explain why much planning for development failed? These two questions run through the thoughtful papers of Theodore Schultz, Gottfried Haberler, Hla Myint, Arnold Harberger and Celso Furtado that make up the bulk of this volume. Like the pioneers whose retrospective papers made up the first collection produced by the World Bank, *Pioneers in Development* (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1985), these thinkers do not want to make great changes in what they wrote in the past.

THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS. Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman. London: Macmillan/New York: Stockton Press, 1988, 4 vols. $650.00.

This is a formidable compendium focusing on the ideas, doctrines and methods of economics and their history. The many biographies, including quite a few of living economists, emphasize their contributions rather than their life histories. Most of the articles are good reading even for non-economists. Taken altogether, this is an impressive and valuable reference work of the sort that does not come along every decade.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

THE SUPERPOWERS IN CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS OF DOMESTIC DISCORD. By Richard J. Krickus. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987, 236 pp. $14.95 (paper).

The author argues that both the Soviet Union and the United States are in deep trouble. The economic and nationality problems of the former may be "leading to the demise of the Soviet regime and the disintegration of the Russian empire." The American problem is neglect of the general welfare instigated by "extremists of the right." He hopes for a peaceful transition to pluralism in the Soviet Union and a new social contract in the United States. A good book, forcefully written.

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POST-REAGAN AMERICA. By Archibald L. Gillies and others. New York: World Policy Institute, 1987, 174 pp. $8.95 (paper).

The unifying theme of the alarmed essays in this book is that the presidential election of 1988 coincides with an epochal time of decision for America. Will the nation continue to follow outmoded assumptions concerning hegemonic military and political power, or will it respond constructively to the reality that this is no longer—if it ever was—"the American century"? The authors call for a replacement of geopolitics with "geoeconomics."

AMERICA INVULNERABLE: THE QUEST FOR ABSOLUTE SECURITY FROM 1812 TO STAR WARS. By James Chace and Caleb Carr. New York: Summit Books, 1988, 316 pp. $19.95.

A lively, anecdotal attempt to identify the unilateralism of current U.S. policy toward Central America and the quest for absolute security exemplified in the Strategic Defense Initiative with fundamental national characteristics evident as early as 1812. The chapters on recent events are perceptive.

AMBASSADORS IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS ON U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN POLICY. Edited by C. Neale Ronning and Albert P. Vannucci. New York: Praeger, 1987, 168 pp. $36.95.

Because of the relative neglect of Latin America by the highest levels of the U.S. government and the disproportionate weight of the United States in most Latin American capitals, individual American ambassadors have on occasion wielded considerable influence—even as the ambassadorial role worldwide has diminished. The six case studies here describe Dwight Morrow in Mexico (1927–30), Sumner Welles in Cuba (1933), Spruille Braden in Argentina (1945), Adolf Berle in Brazil (1945–46), Lincoln Gordon in Brazil (1964) and Nathaniel Davis—writing of his own experience—in Chile (1971–73).

AMBASSADOR IN PARIS: THE REAGAN YEARS. By Evan Galbraith. Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1987, 160 pp. $16.95.
PINSTRIPES AND REDS. By David B. Funderburk. Washington: Selous Foundation Press, 1987, 226 pp.

These memoirs by Reagan ambassadorial appointees share a strident anti-Sovietism but are otherwise different. Ambassador Galbraith's account of Paris is humorously pugnacious—as befits an associate of William F. Buckley. There is also interesting material on the controversy over the pipeline to carry Siberian natural gas to Western Europe and on pressure on France over arms sales to Nicaragua. Ambassador Funderburk, protégé of Senator Jesse Helms, describes his tour in Romania and rails against the State Department as "an entrenched bureaucracy not subject to public opinion or presidential directives," with "a lack of sympathy for putting American interests first, and a tendency toward internationalism, détentism and compromise with Communists."

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SHEATHING THE SWORD: THE DEMILITARIZATION OF POST-WAR JAPAN. By Meirion and Susan Harries. New York: Macmillan, 1987, 364 pp. $22.50.

The authors combine a selective history of American occupation policy with a survey of four decades of pressure on Japan to devote more resources to its armed strength. They describe Japan as effectively demilitarized as a result of initial (although soon regretted) U.S. policy and the continuing will of the majority of Japanese people. They argue the unwisdom of American efforts to reverse the situation.

THE MODERN PRESIDENCY: FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN. Edited by Malcolm Shaw. New York: Harper & Row, 1987, 317 pp. $27.50.

One American and six British scholars analyze and describe the growth of presidential power and the changing relationships of presidents to political parties, Congress, the executive branch and foreign policy. The authors sustain the incontestable point that the modern presidency began with F.D.R. A good introduction to the subject.

AGNES SMEDLEY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN AMERICAN RADICAL. By Janice MacKinnon and Stephen R. MacKinnon. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1987, 425 pp. $22.95.

The product of years of research on three continents, this is an enthralling biography of a dedicated and romantic American left-wing journalist and activist. The authors skillfully blend a thorough grasp of the first half of the century with a sensitive use of psycho-biographical techniques. Agnes Smedley (1892–1950), reared in working-class poverty in the American West, worked first among radicals in Weimar Germany, and then in the 1930s and 1940s was a friend and associate of the Chinese Communist leadership. Her ashes are buried beneath a monument to her memory in Beijing.

The Western Hemisphere

Abraham F. Lowenthal

PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY, REPRESSION, AND ECONOMIC STRATEGY. By John Sheahan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, 399 pp. $47.50 (paper, $12.95).

An ambitious attempt to analyze continuities and changes in contemporary Latin America. The book focuses on three questions: what accounts for persistently strong inequalities of Latin America; what are the main effects on Latin America of its relations with the rest of the world; and what relationship has there been in Latin America between the trends toward market-oriented economic systems and extreme political repression. Using both topical and country-oriented approaches, Sheahan ranges widely and sensitively over recent Latin American experiences with market capitalism, Marxist socialism and various middle-road alternatives. He draws balanced, reformist conclusions—aimed both at Latin American leaders and those who shape U.S. policy. A wise and perceptive book.

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POLITICAL SURVIVAL: POLITICIANS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA. By Barry Ames. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, 286 pp. $38.00.

This well-researched study, focused primarily on Brazil from 1945 to 1964 and during the more recent period of *abertura* (political opening) since 1974, analyzes how Latin American politicians use short-term spending strategies to create civilian coalitions and avoid military coups, leaving inflation and mounting debt as problems for the next administration.

REVERSAL OF DEVELOPMENT IN ARGENTINA. By Carlos H. Waisman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, 329 pp. $40.00 (paper, $14.50).

Argentina's truncated economic development and its often frustrating politics have puzzled analysts for decades. Waisman's detailed and lucid rethinking of the Argentina predicament focuses on decisions made in the 1940s that locked Argentina into an extreme version of protectionist import substitution and a cooptive approach to labor, based on state corporatism. These policies reflected elite fears of communism and a waning commitment to liberal principles. Waisman argues that ideas count; his perspective on Argentine history challenges economic determinist explanations of political repression in the Southern Cone.

AMISTAD ESQUIVA: LAS RELACIONES DE ESTADOS UNIDOS Y CHILE. By Heraldo Munoz and Carlos Portales. Santiago de Chile: Pehuen, 1987, 179 pp.

Two outstanding Chilean scholars argue that U.S.-Chilean relations must be understood as an "elusive friendship," with conflict predominating over cooperation most of the time. Their sophisticated discussion of the dilemmas facing the Reagan Administration as it makes policy toward Chile under Pinochet is especially interesting.

CHILE: DEATH IN THE SOUTH. By Jacobo Timerman. New York: Knopf, 1987, 134 pp. $15.95.

The noted Argentine journalist, one of the hemisphere's mightiest pens, takes aim at the horrors of the prolonged Pinochet dictatorship in what was once Latin America's strongest democracy. But he reserves his most passionate prose to scold the "infantile" and violent left, whose language and psychology account for the "dynamic that mobilized the military for a genocidal onslaught against their own people." He argues persuasively that Chile's democratic opposition needs to come to terms with "the contradiction between reason and emotion," recognize that a military defeat of Pinochet is impossible, understand the unviability of extreme leftist approaches and find a road to democracy through conciliation—even with those who supported the overthrow of Salvador Allende.

MEXICAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION. Edited by Judith Gentleman. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 320 pp. $34.95.

Nine academic specialists, two of them Mexican, analyze whether Mexico's political and economic reforms during the past decade are likely to add up to significant changes in the locus of power. Careful analysis of the opposition's organizational capacity, leadership traits, popular following, and of the outcome of the reforms lead the authors to conclude that the

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concessions made by Mexico's ruling elite have solidified control by the governing party, the PRI. PAN, the largest opposition party, is reduced to being a negative voice for the disenchanted among the urban middle class, while the left has not been able to build appreciable strength, even in conditions of economic crisis.

FINDING OUR WAY: TOWARD MATURITY IN U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS. By Howard J. Wiarda. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1988, 304 pp. $27.50 (paper, $16.75).

A handy compilation of 15 essays by an academic Latin Americanist well connected with the Washington policymaking community during the Reagan years. Although the book suffers from some of the repetition and internal contradictions that almost inevitably mar such endeavors, the volume's main argument emerges clearly: "The Reagan administration's Latin American policy has evolved significantly since January 1981 and become far more nuanced and mature." A stimulating work.

NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES: A LOOK AT THE FACTS. By Robert F. Turner. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987, 165 pp. A Special Report of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

This monograph draws on unclassified and declassified material to support its quasi-legal brief for U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan contras. Perhaps the most interesting section discusses the well-publicized "CIA training manual" that U.S. agents provided the contras, in which certain passages appeared to recommend the use of terror tactics. Turner argues that this was not a CIA manual but a translated U.S. Army document; that its basic contents and tone were misrepresented; that the offending passages may well have been planted and leaked by a Sandinista "mole" in the contra high command; and that in any case the passages do not necessarily mean what they seem to say. In effect, this volume offers the case that the United States (despite the author's recommendation) did not present before the International Court of Justice; it should be considered together with the Court's judgment of June 27, 1986.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

EUROPE: MORE THAN A CONTINENT. By Sir Michael Butler. London: Heinemann, 1988, 184 pp. (North Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, distributor, $34.95).

Sir Michael, an old hand in the British Foreign Service, was Britain's permanent representative to the EEC from 1971 to 1985. This—anglocentric—essay is quite interesting on Britain's fight concerning the Commission of the European Communities budget and on Mrs. Thatcher's formidable style. A moderately optimistic account of how the Brussels machinery works—and should work in the future.

FRANCO: A BIOGRAPHY. By Juan Pablo Fusi. New York: Harper & Row, 1988, 202 pp. $25.00.

A fair-minded critical assessment of the man who for 40 years was Spain's dictator. It depicts him as being originally an old-fashioned nationalist

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patriot, certain that the army was the guarantor of the nation which quarreling liberal civilians had for decades weakened and betrayed. The author, a Spanish historian with long English associations, is also very good on the slow disintegration of the Franco regime in the 1970s.

GENERAL LUCIUS D. CLAY UND DIE AMERIKANISCHE DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK, 1945–1949. By Wolfgang Krieger. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987, 560 pp.

A major work, based on a thorough command of American sources, and focusing on the critical years when, under the pressure of the cold war and attendant security considerations, American occupation policy gradually changed, aiming at the construction of a West Germany integrated into NATO. This excellent study concentrates on General Clay, the famous American proconsul, whom Krieger, a young German historian, analyzes in a critical but admiring fashion. The author deliberately forswears model-building and addresses a complex, fascinating history to the general reader. A contribution to postwar history, and particularly attentive to German efforts to reconstruct the circumstances of the country's division.

GERMANY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. Edited by Edwina Moreton. New York: Cambridge University Press/London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1987, 185 pp. $37.50.

Papers from a symposium held in London in 1986 dealing with various aspects of the resurgent German question, including essays on foreign views on the two Germanies, on German-German relations, and on conditions in the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. Timely, comprehensive, valuable.

THE HOLOCAUST IN HISTORY. By Michael R. Marrus. Hanover (N.H.): University Press of New England (for Brandeis University), 1987, 264 pp. $16.50.

A well-known historian presents at once an exposition of the principal issues in the process of murder and examines the manner in which historians have dealt with the subject in the last four decades. Carefully researched, with scrupulous attention to controversial issues, this book is a remarkable achievement of thorough, humane analysis.

THE GUN IN POLITICS: AN ANALYSIS OF IRISH POLITICAL CONFLICT, 1916–1986. By J. Bowyer Bell. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1987, 361 pp. $24.95.

A collection of essays on the Irish troubles, on Anglo-Irish relations and on the long history of the Irish Republican Army, by an author steeped in the revolutionary history of the island and interested in political violence generally. Ireland since 1916 is the focus, set within a wider context. There is general concern with revolutionaries, "whether they seek power or only an audience to their despair." Reflective comparisons are made—to Menachem Begin's Zionist terrorist organization, for example—and the larger European scene: "The number of Irishmen killed in a few days at the Somme totals more than all the political deaths on the island this century." A highly readable set of essays.

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THE MITTERRAND EXPERIMENT. Edited by George Ross, Stanley Hoffmann and Sylvia Malzacher. New York: Oxford, 1987, 383 pp. $45.00 (paper, $16.95).

Twenty essays on the years of the Mitterrand presidency, on their effect on the French economy and political culture, on France's role in the world. Altogether a first-rate interpretative summary of years that have been studied with daunting thoroughness. Stanley Hoffmann concludes that "the major contribution of the five years of Socialist rule is a big push toward the 'normalization,' or banalization, of French political life." On the whole, a surprising but perhaps not unwelcome development.

"C": THE SECRET LIFE OF SIR STEWART GRAHAM MENZIES, SPYMASTER TO SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL. By Anthony Cave Brown. New York: Macmillan, 1987, 830 pp. $25.00.

Cave Brown has been on this trail for over 20 years and has brought to bear a wide variety of materials. Yet few of these are as novel or revealing as he tries to make out, and the result is still murky, even as a portrait of the head of Britain's wartime and immediate postwar secret service, and unhelpful on the tough questions that still surround that service. In the end Menzies emerges much the same as one might have thought before on the basis of such serious and incisive books as Christopher Andrews' *Her Majesty's Secret Service*: very spotty in his judgment of people and operations within his own secret intelligence bailiwick (notably in the Venlo Incident); effective in helping to get important prewar Polish and French help on the breaking of the Enigma code (and in devising security procedures for this crown jewel), but otherwise little involved in the brilliant Ultra success nominally under his command; above all, incredibly insensitive and class-ridden in his most devastating error, the failure to detect that Kim Philby was a Soviet spy. (On the last, the author produces and clings to a bizarre hypothesis convincingly rejected by Menzies' own associates.) The lay reader may find this book entertaining, if the salt shaker is kept handy. Serious students should treat it with special reserve. William P. Bundy

THE GHETTO OF VENICE. By Riccardo Calimani. New York: M. Evans, 1987, 313 pp. $19.95.

The scholar will find this a gold mine; non-scholars may find it somewhat elliptical, but its vivacity, precision and humanity will carry them through four centuries (the Ghetto was established in 1521) at such speed that they will be astonished suddenly to find themselves in the Nazi-occupied Venice of 1944. A wonderfully readable chronicle, full of anecdote and detail, colorful, humorous, mysterious. Lucy Edwards Despard

PAINTED IN BLOOD: UNDERSTANDING EUROPEANS. By Stuart Miller. New York: Atheneum, 1987, 255 pp. $17.95.

A mélange of familiar generalities about "the European" and his psyche, defined essentially by his being different from "the American." The book, with a healthy American bias, is enriched by some telling quotes and enlivened by the apt anecdote, cleverly gathered by an American ex-academic during his many years in Europe. Miller rather relishes his freedom from disciplinary constraints. Inter alia, Europeans are depicted as reserved, secretive, rooted, distrustful, deeply formed by history. Pleasant, facile, suggestive.

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The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

PERESTROIKA: NEW THINKING FOR OUR COUNTRY AND THE WORLD. By Mikhail Gorbachev. New York: Bessie/Harper & Row, 1987, 254 pp. $19.95.

The Soviet leader describes his and the Communist Party's program of restructuring as radical and even revolutionary (as indeed it may be in time), although the specifics he gives on economic reform, democratization and openness—interlaced with standard formulas and exhortations—hardly merit those adjectives. Nevertheless, in this remarkable (though hastily concocted and repetitious) book he speaks out in ways his predecessors never did, and there is no doubt that fresh winds are blowing, no doubt about his determination to get Russia moving again. His "new thinking" on foreign policy—peaceful coexistence, negotiated disarmament, renunciation of nuclear war, settlement of regional disputes, economic cooperation—is couched in phrases that have been heard before; their real content will be seen in practice. If he is sincere, the world should benefit; if not, it is still good propaganda.

THE GORBACHEV PHENOMENON: A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION. By Moshe Lewin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, 192 pp. $16.95.

A thoughtful politico-sociological study on changes in Soviet society since Stalin's day. The interpretation is the author's own, but he bases it substantially on the considerable volume of social science research done in the U.S.S.R. in recent years. In brief, the argument is that the push for reform is no momentary invention of Gorbachev's, but the inevitable result of the evolution of Soviet society to the point where the old political and economic structures could no longer be effective.

THE SIXTH CONTINENT: MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AND THE SOVIET UNION. By Mark Frankland. New York: Harper & Row, 1987, 292 pp. $22.95.

In one of the better recent books on the Soviet Union, a former Moscow correspondent of the London *Observer* concentrates on the crisis of leadership and the politics of the successions following Brezhnev, and in the process gives an informal but informed picture of the system's flaws and troubles that made reform seem so necessary. The importance of Andropov's brief reign, opening as it did the way for the Gorbachev reforms, comes through clearly. Since much of the internal struggle remains obscure, the author fills in with stories that made the rounds in Moscow (and with speculation of his own here and there), but his account generally rings true and is well worth reading even by those surfeited with recent literature on Gorbachev.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP IN SOVIET RUSSIA: FROM LENIN TO GORBACHEV. By Robert C. Tucker. New York: Norton, 1987, 214 pp. $22.50.

Robert C. Tucker, who has devoted a career to the study of Russian politics and ideology—particularly to Stalin and Stalinism—uses the concept of political culture and the theme of interaction among top leadership,

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party elite and the common people to interpret and explain the evolution of the Soviet system. The individual chapters are previously published essays; their appearance here is not only a convenience to readers but an integral exposition of the author's mature thought. The long final chapter on the Gorbachev effort at reform follows some of the lines of widespread Western analysis but is distinctive on two counts: first, in its historical perspective, reaching back through the Soviet experience to Lenin and the NEP, and also to pre-1917 Russia; and, second, in its attention to changes in the cultural realm as Gorbachev attempts to rally the intelligentsia to his side.

POLITICS, WORK, AND DAILY LIFE IN THE USSR. Edited by James R. Millar. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 423 pp. $49.50 (paper, $16.95).

The first major product of an ambitious project in which the recollections and views (ascertained through questionnaires and interviews) of some 2,800 emigrants from the Soviet Union to the United States are used to provide or add to knowledge of contemporary Soviet life. The testimony has some built-in bias in that, by the very fact of emigration, these witnesses rejected or were rejected by Soviet society. However, the scholars tabulating and analyzing this material with the latest computers and techniques are aware of its limitations and do not draw unwarranted assumptions about Soviet society as a whole. Because they are acquainted with published Soviet and Western research in the field, they are well equipped to judge this (in many respects novel) evidence. A book of fundamental importance, although not light summer reading.

THE DECLINE OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT: MOSCOW, BEIJING, AND COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE WEST. By Heinz Timmermann. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press (in cooperation with the Federal Institute for East European and International Studies, Cologne), 1987, 275 pp. $32.50 (paper).

Whatever happened to Eurocommunism? Heinz Timmermann is at his best in describing the differing destinies of the Italian, French and other Western communist parties. His book is also an excellent guide to Moscow's changing strategies in trying to organize and utilize the "world communist movement"—with particular attention to the key role of China (and leaving aside, for the most part, the ruling parties in Eastern Europe, Cuba and Vietnam). Looking at the Gorbachev record, the author stresses the downgrading of ideology in favor of mobilizing communist parties in support of Soviet foreign policy objectives. Has that not been standard Soviet practice since Stalin's time?

BIG BROTHER: THE SOVIET UNION AND SOVIET EUROPE. By Hélène Carrère d'Encausse. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987, 332 pp. $39.50 (paper, $24.50).

In its general course, as in its dramatic episodes of crisis, Soviet policy in Eastern Europe has been the subject of a voluminous literature. This overview, first published in France in 1983, covers the four decades since Yalta and breaks no new ground, but it is a most excellent narrative and synthesis, blunt and ruthlessly objective, always focusing on how successive leaders in the Kremlin saw their vital interests in their European empire

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and determined their priorities and limits of tolerance in the face of changing conditions and unanticipated challenges. In a twist that seems uncharacteristic, the author credits the Soviets with notable success in measures of integration, as if to suggest that the problem of nationalism has been solved for good and all. A brief epilogue, written in mid-1987, has been added for this edition.

A WAY OF HOPE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By Lech Walesa. New York: Henry Holt, 1987, 325 pp. $19.95.

In telling his own story, Walesa gives ample illustration of how his qualities of leadership came to the fore in the dramatic events of August 1980, and also of how difficult it was for him to continue to provide effective leadership to Solidarity and its many members and supporters in the subsequent period, especially after martial law was imposed in 1981. His book offers striking firsthand testimony on the continuing struggle between regime and society in Poland, as well as on the simple faith and sturdy character of Walesa himself.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN POWER: A PROFILE OF PARTY POLITICS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Karel Kaplan. Edited and translated by Fred Eidlin. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 231 pp. $28.95 (paper).

Kaplan served for many years as a communist functionary, including a stint as historian with access to the party archives. His book is thus an insider's account of how the Czechoslovak party is organized and how it has ruled since 1948 (except for the brief interlude of the Prague Spring in 1968). Even though much of the text makes for tedious reading—what committees met how many times and what member of the *apparat* transmitted orders to whom—it has some interesting material on the purge trials and other episodes and it does reveal the inner workings of the system in all their complexity, by no means the classic model of totalitarianism. Kaplan makes two questionable assumptions, which the editor flags in his introduction: that the setup in Czechoslovakia was and is similar to that in every communist state, and that it is practically invulnerable to change and decay.

IN THE NAME OF THE WORKING CLASS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION. By Sandor Kopacsi. New York: Grove Press, 1987, 304 pp. $16.95.

A dedicated communist and rising star in the postwar Hungarian regime, Kopacsi became chief of police (the regular civil police, not the hated security forces) in Budapest in 1952. In 1956 he supported the liberal and nationalist trends represented by Imre Nagy, sympathized with popular demands, and was named deputy commander of the new national militia. When Soviet forces took over, he was seized, tried with Nagy and the other "traitors," sentenced to life in prison, and amnestied some years later. This is not the only inside story of 1956, but it is an arresting and significant one, a swiftly moving narrative studded with vivid encounters as the author, now a Canadian citizen, recalls them.

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THE ARTFUL ALBANIAN: THE MEMOIRS OF ENVER HOXHA. Edited by Jon Halliday. London: Chatto & Windus, 1986, 394 pp. (Topsfield, Mass.: Salem House, distributor, $9.95).

For more than 40 years Hoxha was Number One in Albania, Europe's most isolated and insulated country, virtually cut off from the West and cutting itself off, successively, from its partners and patrons in the communist world: Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and finally China. He was, apparently, a busy writer all those years, and in the 1970s a flood of published material in the form of diaries, reports and memoirs presented his version of his country's experience. He had no special affinity for the truth. His works are dominated by the theme of Albania as the one true Marxist regime and had the purpose of justifying himself and denigrating his enemies (who included, on the domestic side, most of his colleagues, and, internationally, Tito, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Mao). The only communist leader he liked and admired was Stalin. Nevertheless, with all the necessary reservations, the accounts of conversations which the editor has selected for this volume are both fascinating and revealing. He interlards them with extensive comments and notes which constitute a running history of postwar Albania.

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: REGIONAL CHANGE AND GREAT POWER STRATEGIES. Edited by Samuel F. Wells, Jr., and Mark Bruzonsky. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 366 pp. $38.50 (paper, $15.95).

This volume, sponsored by the Wilson Center, has no one clear message; it has several, all worth pondering, from a number of authors. Containing brief studies of the situation and policies of key countries in the region, as well as think pieces on current problems and conflicts in the Arab-Israeli area and in the Gulf, it is a kind of comprehensive guidebook pointed to policy issues and options at the time of writing (early and mid-1980s), as well as those likely to be the challenges of the future. The contributors (mostly Americans) are realistic and independent in their judgments, uninfluenced by the myths propagated by interested parties or by governments, including their own.

ISRAEL UNDERCOVER: THE SECRET WARFARE AND HIDDEN DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Steve Posner. Syracuse (N.Y.): Syracuse University Press, 1987, 366 pp. $17.95.

Readers looking for sensational revelations are likely to be disappointed. The author has gathered material from far and wide but he has no tunnels into the Mossad, the CIA or the PLO. His book is a jauntily written, generally well informed but somewhat disjointed account of the Arab-Israeli conflict with special emphasis on intelligence operations, on secret Israeli talks with King Hussein, and on the role of the United States with respect to civil and international strife in Lebanon. Interviews with American and other officials add spice to the material found in published sources.

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CREATING FACTS: ISRAEL, PALESTINIANS AND THE WEST BANK. By Geoffrey Aronson. Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987, 334 pp. $24.95.

A study of Israel's occupation policy, and especially its settlements policy, in the West Bank from 1967 to 1982. It documents the differences in outlook and policy between Labor and Likud, and between key individuals in both parties, as the government changed hands through successive elections. But the book notes the basic continuity in the determination to make Israel's control permanent by creating irreversible "facts" and denying political rights to the Arab populations. The results are evident in the total absence of reconciliation over the years and in today's violence and bloodshed. Aronson is certainly no apologist for Israel, but neither is he a propagandist for the Palestinians. This is a serious work of scholarship based largely on Israeli official statements and the Israeli press.

BLAMING THE VICTIMS: SPURIOUS SCHOLARSHIP AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. Edited by Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens. London: Verso, 1988, 273 pp. (New York: Methuen, distributor, $34.95; paper, $12.95).

Like the Zionist versions of past and present aspects of the struggle over Palestine, these essays also tend to find truth and right all on one side. One essay, that of Noam Chomsky on terrorism, defeats itself by polemical overstatement. Nevertheless, many of the points the authors make on historical questions (e.g., on the makeup of the pre-1948 population of Palestine, or on the reasons for the flight of Arabs in 1948 from territory that became Israel) are valid. The final chapter, a profile of the Palestinian people, is a measured and sober presentation, partisan of course but a useful counterbalance to opposing partisan interpretations uncritically accepted by so many in America.

WAR AND INTERVENTION IN LEBANON: THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN DETERRENCE DIALOGUE. By Yair Evron. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1987, 246 pp. $39.50.

An Israeli political scientist's study of a particular aspect of Israeli-Syrian relations: the way in which the two governments, by signals transmitted through public statements and through a third party (the United States), worked out a practical system of mutual deterrence based on "red lines" that were generally understood but subject to change over time and never specifically defined. He is naturally more surefooted on the Israeli than on the Syrian side of the story, but there is no doubt of the authenticity either of his account of how the system developed or of his conclusions.

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS, 1945–85. By Mohrez Mahmoud El Hussini. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 276 pp. $49.95.

The special vantage point of the author, an Egyptian naval officer and naval historian with access to the records of Soviet-Egyptian negotiations and to many involved individuals, makes this a particularly valuable book. The account of the ups and downs of the Soviet-Egyptian relation, especially in the Nasser era, on arms deliveries, military cooperation and Soviet pressure for use of Egyptian naval facilities, throws a searching light on how important Egypt was for Soviet military strategy in the Mediterranean as well as for Moscow's broader grand strategy in the Middle East and the

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Third World. It also illuminates the policies of Nasser, who resisted Soviet demands for facilities as long as he felt he could—that is, until he no longer had an American card to play against the Soviets.

QADDAFI'S WORLD DESIGN: LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1969–1987. By Ronald Bruce St. John. London: Saqi Books, 1987, 184 pp. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, distributor, $35.00).

Although the subject has not been ignored by others, this is the broadest treatment yet of Libyan foreign policy under Muammar al-Qaddafi. It does not penetrate deeply or go into great detail—the author calls it a "preliminary statement"—yet one wonders how much digging is really necessary or useful in the case of policies so bizarre, ill conceived and irrelevant. The answer, presumably, is that when a policymaker has, in the service of his ideology and his whims, plenty of oil and money and an addiction to terrorism, the rest of the world and particularly his neighbors have to take notice. However, perhaps those concerned can now begin to relax; even a "preliminary statement" can conclude that Qaddafi's policies have failed.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

CHINA'S SECOND REVOLUTION: REFORM AFTER MAO. By Harry Harding. Washington: Brookings (in cooperation with the Council on Foreign Relations), 1987, 369 pp. $32.95 (paper, $12.95).

This is the most thorough study of the post-Mao reforms in China yet published and it is likely to be a standard source for many years. Harding hedges his bets on the future. Among the more plausible scenarios, he sees China moving "slowly, even haltingly, toward a more open, market-oriented economy and a more relaxed and consultative political system," but he also sees a possibility of some reforms being rescinded, modified or indefinitely postponed. With regard to the impact on international relations of a successfully modernizing China, Harding discounts what he calls the apocalyptic scenarios. "China will retain a stake in the stability and prosperity of the international system. . . . The vitality of the rest of Asia, and the adaptability of the regional balance of power, will also restrain China's ambitions." The rise of Chinese power, therefore, is not likely to culminate in either a systemic political crisis (like the rise of the Axis powers in the 1930s), a sustained cold war or acute economic competition.

THE CHINESE ARMY AFTER MAO. By Ellis Joffe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987, 210 pp. $20.00.

The author, who teaches at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, has a long and distinguished background in writing about Chinese military affairs. His latest work is the most thorough account yet of the modernization of the Chinese armed forces in the post-Mao period. Joffe concludes that although the People's Liberation Army has made steady and substantial progress, China's conventional forces are still at least two decades behind the technological level attained by the armies of the superpowers—or, for that matter, of other modern societies.

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JAPAN FACING ECONOMIC MATURITY. By Edward J. Lincoln. Washington: Brookings, 1988, 298 pp. $31.95 (paper, $11.95).

According to the author, Japan is today facing major economic adjustments brought on by earlier successes. At the heart of the problem is Japan's excess of domestic savings over investment, which came about as a result of the slowdown in economic growth in the 1970s. Japan has relied excessively on export expansion to keep the economy going and has adopted macroeconomic policies without adequate consideration of the international consequences of such policies. Japanese policymakers initially failed to realize that reliance on export growth would increase tensions with the United States, and they now underestimate the adjustments that will be necessary for Japan as the United States begins to get its own house in order.

WESTWARD WATCH: THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHANGING WESTERN PACIFIC. By Norman D. Palmer. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987, 176 pp. $14.95 (paper).

This is a very clear-eyed and comprehensive overview of American security policies in the Asia-Pacific region. It concludes with a sober warning that the U.S. still lacks well-defined policies for dealing with the region. Palmer warns that the United States must take a broader approach to security, embracing nonmilitary as well as military aspects, and must search for "a wider framework of cooperation" within and beyond the region. Unfortunately, he does not expand on these ideas.

INDIA BRIEFING, 1987. Edited by Marshall M. Bouton. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press (with The Asia Society), 1987, 222 pp. $33.85 (paper, $13.85).

The Asia Society is helping to fill a gap in publications on contemporary India with a new series of annual briefings. The first contains seven chapters of uniformly high quality by thoughtful specialists. The opening chapter, Myron Weiner's midterm assessment of Rajiv Gandhi, is a somber appraisal. Weiner says that Gandhi assumed office at a time when the capacity of the Indian state to maintain law and order, facilitate economic growth and cope with an uncertain security environment had all seriously eroded. He concludes that halfway through his five-year term as prime minister, Gandhi has faltered in each of his major initiatives designed to deal with these problems.

KOREA AT THE CROSSROADS. A Study Group Report. New York: Council on Foreign Relations/The Asia Society, 1987, 62 pp. $4.95 (paper).

This up-to-date study is a model of how to go about writing on important issues of contemporary international relations. A small, diverse, well-selected group of American scholars, ex-officials, businessmen and journalists held a series of meetings and interviews in New York, Washington and Seoul in 1987 on Korean-U.S. relations, Korean politics and the economy. They heard a variety of views which were then discussed and analyzed. A final report then presents a coherent and thoughtful account of the most recent developments in Korea and their implications for U.S.-South Korean relations. If this model were more widely adopted, and if it were to replace the more common conference volume which usually lacks integration and

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coherence, the literature on contemporary international relations would be enormously improved.

CHINESE LIVES: AN ORAL HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA. By Zhang Xinxin and Sang Ye, edited by W.J.F. Jenner and Delia Davin, with a preface by Studs Terkel. New York: Pantheon Books, 1987, 367 pp. $18.95.

Studs Terkel's 1974 book, *Working*, a collection of interviews with ordinary and not-so-ordinary Middle Americans about their jobs and aspirations, was later translated and widely read in China. Two Chinese writers who found particular inspiration in the book, journalist Sang Ye and fiction writer Zhang Xinxin, decided to attempt a similar project. They interviewed over one hundred people across China about their work, their families, their schooling, their money worries, their dreams. Some 60 are translated here. The interviewees speak with unusual candor about subjects normally kept under the cover of privacy. A former prostitute speaks about her past life and reform; a pair of newlyweds brag about their new possessions; a widower talks about his life as a retired banker; a woman tells why she decided not to marry. What emerges is a sense that monetary concerns, material comforts, status and prestige are among the greatest worries in Chinese society today. Sara Robertson

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

THE LAST WHITE PARLIAMENT. By Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 203 pp.

South Africa's charismatic white opposition leader tells his own story, that of a man caught in the middle and increasingly aware of the ineffectuality of his own public position as head of the liberal Progressive Federal Party. With candor and without rancor, Slabbert gives us an insider's view of South Africa's often Kafkaesque political processes, including his private interviews with the state president, P. W. Botha, and conversations with African National Congress insurgents in Lusaka. His account shows how a white person's consciousness of the anomalies of apartheid can broaden and deepen under the constant pressures from life amid racial repression and revolt.

"THEY CANNOT KILL US ALL": AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF SOUTH AFRICA TODAY. By Richard Manning. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987, 255 pp. $16.95.

Although journalists' accounts of their personal experience of apartheid will for some time suffer from comparison with Joseph Lelyveld's *Move Your Shadow*, Manning, former *Newsweek* correspondent, succeeds in his story of his nine months in South Africa in vividly updating our images of the pitched battle between blacks and whites which continued from 1984 into 1987. Manning's tour coincided with an upsurge in black-black violence, and he handles fairly sensitively the material he gathered from black activists in the townships and from some of their targets. His puzzle is missing an important piece, however: nowhere does he take the same sort of long look at the government-supported black vigilantes.

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APARTHEID'S REBELS: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA'S HIDDEN WAR. By Stephen M. Davis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, 238 pp. $27.50 (paper, $8.95).

Notable as virtually the only book-length study on the African National Congress published here in recent years, this treatment offers a comprehensive overview of the history and current role of South Africa's leading insurgent group. Balanced and very readable, it offers an American audience an accurate general picture. Given that most of the author's firsthand research appears to have been undertaken several years ago, however, the account leans very heavily on secondary sources and the press. With South Africa's sharp crackdown of the past year, it also seems somewhat overtaken by events.

THE SOUTH AFRICA QUAGMIRE: IN SEARCH OF A PEACEFUL PATH TO DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM. Edited by S. Prakash Sethi. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987, 512 pp. $29.95.

Trying to close the barn door after the horses have fled, this collection of essays musters some cogent economic and political arguments against sanctions, and a number of essays amount in effect to a defense of inaction by outside parties. The editor himself advocates a visionary scheme for aid to South Africa coupled with precisely targeted sanctions, and a few advocates of international pressure, including Archbishop Tutu and Congressman Howard Wolpe, are given a platform alongside more than 30 opponents, mostly Americans and white South African moderates. Notably missing, apart from Tutu, are any voices of the authentic black opposition.

AFRO-MARXIST REGIMES: IDEOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY. Edited by Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Rienner, 1987, 335 pp. $35.00 (paper, $16.95).

Despite the obvious problems with generalizing about either "Marxism" or "public policy" in states riven by insurgency, this collection of essays conveys a good deal of valuable information about the four chief socialist states in Africa: Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. Certain interesting patterns emerge. As the editors point out, for all except the least orthodox (Zimbabwe), Marxism has facilitated the authority or consolidation of the regime, but not, in the same way, of the state; on the contrary, Marxist ideology has exacerbated certain problems with state-building for each—particularly in strengthening regime inflexibility regarding ethnic interests and in aggravating major failures in the economic sphere, stemming from top-down control and disregard for the agricultural economy.

DECOLONISING THE AFRICAN MIND. By Chinweizu. Lagos: Pero Press, 1987, 294 pp. (London: Sundoor, distributor, $50.00; paper, $25.00).

Swinging wildly but battering his target repeatedly, the author of *The West and the Rest of Us* carries forward his polemic against cultural dependency. Africans need African models rather than the European ideas and standards they now follow. Lambasting African participation in the Olympics, the Nobel Prize competition and in Western organizations, he prescribes a reinterpretation of history and an appreciation of what is truly African in literature. Though often ham-handed, the message of this book

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is undoubtedly central to the successful evolution of African states and economies.

THE WORLD BANK AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF ZAIRE. By Winsome J. Leslie. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Rienner, 1987, 208 pp. $30.00.

As the author says, Zaïre offers an extreme case against which to judge World Bank efforts at using its aid to spur policy and administrative reform. Thus the description of the bank's record in Zaïre is not especially useful in assessing the broader African picture. It does, however, offer careful documentation of the intricacies of maneuvering within Zaïre, and can serve as a cautionary tale for any foreign experts who may still be insufficiently wary about the difficulties of trying to impose controls on African economies.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE NEW AFRICA. By I. William Zartman. Washington: University Press of America, 1987, 175 pp.

The themes of this book, first published in 1966—the permanence of the African state, the flexibility of alliances in the continent, the primacy of ideology, the low level of state power and the leftward trend in African politics—are in different degrees evident today, though ideologies of the left are in eclipse at present. As the author points out, however, Africa's state relations remain today much as they were two decades ago, because levels of power are perhaps even lower now than they were then.

THE AFRICAN STATE IN TRANSITION. Edited by Zaki Ergas. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 340 pp.

Although too often windily theoretical, this collection explores themes of real current interest, especially the uses—and failures—of coercion and participation in the functioning of African state institutions today. Notable are contributions by Donald Rothchild on mechanisms for control, Marina Ottaway on the prospects for socialism, and Carol Lancaster on causes and effects of economic crises.

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Edited by Janis A. Kreslins

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